mi^ifi 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



DDD17T177S4 




Glass. 
BooL 



J\5Z3. 



i. 



Handbook of the War 
for Public Speakers 

EDITED BY 

Albert Bushnell Hart 

AND 

Arthur O. Lovejoy 
for the 

Committee on Patriotism 
Through Education 

of the 

National Security League 



NEW YORK 

NATIONAL SECURITY LEAGUE 

19 WEST 44th STREET 

19 18 



Price 25 Cents 



Committee on 

Patriotism 

Through Education 



One of the sub-divisions of the National Security 
League is the Section on Patriotism Through Educa- 
tion, which is intended to be a rallying point for teachers, 
educational administrators and professional men who are 
interested in a proper understanding of the conditions of 
national defense and the present war, by their country- 
men of the United States. 

The central authority in this section is the Committee 
ON Patriotism Through Education appointed by the 
League ; at present it consists of the following persons : 

Robert M. McElroy, Educational Director, Chairman. 
Mrs. Thomas J. Preston, Jr., Secretary. 
Henry J. Allen, Wichita Beacon. 
Shailer Mathews, University of Chicago 

S. Stanwood Menken, President National Security 

League. 
Mrs. Philip North Moore, National Council of 

Women. 
Thomas F. Moran, Purdue University. 
Calvin W. Rice, Society of Mechanical Engineers. 

The purposes of the Committee are set forth in a 
Report made at Washington, January 27, 1917, and 
Outline of Plan made in New York, May 12, 1917, 
which will be sent on application. The Committee aims 
to organize throughout the country a system of public 
discussion on the place of the United States among 
nations; and particularly on the causes, progress and 
desirable outcome of the present war between the United 
States and the Central Powers. 

This effort takes the particular form of organization of 
public meetings and public addresses wherever needed 
throughout the Union. This Handbook and its accom- 
panying volume, America at War, are a kind of laboratory 
course for speakers and writers in this cause. 



for further information address the 

Committee on Patriotism Through Education 
19 West 44th Street, New York Cit^ 






Handbook of the War 
for Public Speakers 

EDITED BY 

Albert Bushnell Hart 

AND 

Arthur O. Lovejoy 

for the 

Committee on Patriotism 
Through Education 

of the 

National Security League 



NEW YORK 

NATIONAL SECURITY LEAGUE 

19 WEST 44th STREET 

19 18 



Price 25 Cents 






HOPE, WARNING AND PROPHECY 
By Abraham Lincoln. 

Of our political revolution in 76 we are 
all justly proud. It has given us a degree 
of political freedom exceeding that of any 
other nation of the earth. In it the world 
has found a solution of the long-mooted 
problem as to the capability of man to 
govern himself. In it was the germ which 
has vegetated and still is to grow and ex- 
pand into the universal liberty of mankind. 



:^ 



It has long been a grave question whether 
any government, not too strong for the lib- 
erties of its people, can be strong enough 
to maintain its existence in great emer- 
gencies. 

Fellow citizens, we cannot escape history. 
No personal significance or insignificance 
can spare one or another of us. The fiery 
trial through which we pass will light us 
down, in honor or dishonor, to the latest 
generation. We, even we here, hold the 
power and bear the responsibility. We shall 
nobly save or meanly lose the last, best 
hope of earth. Other means may succeed; 
this could not fail. The way is plain, peace- 
ful, generous, just— a way which, if fol- 
lowed, the world will forever applaud and 
God must forever bless. 

JUL 1 5 1980 



EDITORS' INTRODUCTION. 

This little book is designed primarily to be of service 
to those who take part in the campaign of patriotic educa- 
tion initiated by The National Security League. It seeks 
to set down in brief outline the essentials of that great 
argument which it will be the work of the participants in 
the campaign to develop', to enrich with their personal 
contributions, and to bring home to the mind and con- 
science of the citizens of the Republic. 

The present book is introductory to a larger volume, 
under the title America at War, which will place at the 
disposal of users of this Handbook a much fuller col- 
lection of material, together with more detailed analyses 
of the principal issues, and an extensive classified list of 
references. There will also shortly be distributed by 
the League a volume entitled Out Of TJieir Own 
months, a remarkable collection of utterances by 
German statesmen and writers illustrating the spirit, 
political principles and war aim* of the leaders of 
German opinion. It is hoped that the three volumes 
will complement one another in a convenient and ser- 
viceable way. 

The task to which these books are meant to contribute 
is a task more fundamental than any other, when a 
democracy prepares for war — that of informing the un- 
derstanding, of awakening the moral vision and the moral 
passion, of the entire people, concerning the cause for 
which they fight. It is essential to bring to the mind of 
every honest and loyal citizen the momentousness of the 
present crisis ; to make him or her understand what deep 
concerns of humanity are at stake; to bring all to feel 
that America has never entered upon a more just or 
more necessary war. 

In this task, the chief obstacle is likely to be the tradi- 
tional American feeling of isolation from the rest of the 
world. The war is (we hope) to be fought wholly on 
another continent ; and it has arisen as a sequel to a Euro- 
pean conflict. To some Americans, consequently, it ap- 

[3] 



4 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

parently still seems a thing remote from our own national 
life and interests. Those who think thus must be re- 
minded that, for peoples as for individuals, the narrow- 
ness of self-centered vision is in the long run as ruinous 
as it is contemptible. The present war has come to affect 
the collective interests of the human race; its outcome 
will determine the character of the relations between na- 
tions, and the course of the political and moral evolution 
of mankind for generations to come. The people of the 
United States happen to be a part of the human race ; 
it is not to be believed that, at this world-crisis, they 
will forget the fact — or permit others to forget it ; nor can 
they indulge the folly of imagining that America's future 
could be secure if Europe should be dominated by the 
ambitious designs and sinister power which brought about 
the present war, and forced the United States to enter it. 

In the practical use of this Handbook, the speaker or 
writer will not overlook the arrangement. The Table 
of Contents furnishes an easy guide to the classification 
of the material. The "Summary Statements" suggest the 
vital matters in each of the principal topics. "The List 
of Events" will enable the speaker to place diplomatic and 
military happenings exactly. The greater part of most 
of the chapters consists of classified "Extracts" 
drawn from many sources ; these, as will be seen, 
are meant partly to provide pertinent evidence, in 
which German writers furnish material for self- 
conviction, upon certain of the main questions 
about the war; partly to furnish useful illustra- 
tive material ; and partly to make easily accessible some 
of the best and most thought-arousing passages which 
have been written or spoken, during these historic months, 
concerning the meaning of America's war, the tasks con- 
fronting the Government, and the duty of the citizen. It 
has been thought needless to include the principal ad- 
dresses of President Wilson on the war ; these, it has 
been assumed, are already in the possession — and it is 
to be hoped, are in the memories — of all Americans de- 
serving the name. The "Vital Questions" in §2 include a 
variety of topics upon which inquiries are likely to be 
made in conversation or before an audience. The general 
and chapter references carry the reader to wider fields in 
which material can be found to supplement and expand 
the necessarily brief statements in the Handbook. The 



EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION. 5 

recommended books have been selected with a view to 
their convenience and accessibility as well as to their in- 
trinsic value. The Committee on Patriotism through 
Education undertakes to reply to any user of the book 
who is perplexed by a question to which he cannot find 
an answer in this book, if he will write to the Committee 
(31 Pine Street, New York City). 

ALBERT BUSHNELL HART, 
ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY. 
August 20, 1917. 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER I. 

General Aids to An Understanding of the War, 

A.— LIST OF PRINCIPAL EVENTS LEADING UP TO 
WAR BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND 
GERMANY (1914-1917).. [§1] 

B.— SOME VITAL QUESTIONS AND THEIR 
ANSWERS. [§§2-8] 

C— SELECT LISTS OF AUTHORITIES SUITABLE 
FOR PRIVATE COLLECTIONS AND SMALL 
PUBLIC LIBRARIES. [§§9-17] 

1. A Ten Dollar List. [§9] 

2. A Twenty-five Dollar List. [§10] 

3. Additional Books. [§§11-14] 

4. Serviceable Periodicals. [§15] 

5. Compendiums and Books of Reference. [§16] 

6. Government Publications Bearing on the War. [§17] 

CHAPTER II. 

Why the United States Had to Enter the War. 

A.— SUMMARY STATEMENT. [§§18-25] 

B.— ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS. [§§26-34J 

A Warning to Germany (1902). By Richard Olney. [§26.] 
American Protest against War-Zone Decree. [§27] 
Record of American Ships attacked and Lives destroyed 

by German Submarines. By John Jacob Rogers. [§28] 
Warning to Germany after the Destruction of the Lusi- 

tania. [§29] 
International Rights of American Citizens. By Woodrow 

Wilson. [§30] 
Would any Other Country have done what Germany did? 
• [§31] 
Should the United States have laid an Embargo on the 

Shipment of Arms to the Allies? By U. S. Bureau 

of Public Information. [§32] 
German Intrigues against America in Time of Peace. By 

U. S. Bureau of Public Information. [§33] 
Germany's Attempt to Rouse IMexico and Japan. [§34] 

C— SPECIAL REFERENCES. [§35] 

[7] 



8 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

CHAPTER III. 
Why the United States Must Continue the War. 
A.— SUMMARY STATEMENT. [§§36-45] 
B.— ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS. [§§46-66] 

/. GERMAN SPIRIT AND GOVERNMENT. 

The Superiority of Germanic Culture. By Various Ger- 
mans. [§46] 
The German God. By Various German Writers. [§47] 
Why Germany Is Not a Democracy. [§48] 
A King by "Divine Right.'" By William II. [§49] 
Thor's Hammer-Cast. By Felix Dahn. [§50] 
A Pan-Germanist's Program. By Otto Richard Tannen- 
herg. [§51] 

//. GERMAN METHODS IN WAR. 

German Theory of the Conduct of War. By German 

Military Writers. [§52] 
German Proclamations in Occupied Territory. [§53] 
The Deportations at Lille. By Three French Women. 

[§54] 
A German Eye-Witness on the Armenian Massacres. By 

Martin Niepage. [§55] 

///. GERMANY'S WAR AIMS. 

What Germans Hope to Win by a Victory. By Charles 

H. Beard. [§56] 
Project of a Mitteleuropa. By Bruno Lasker. [§57] 

IV. MEANING AND OBJECTS OF AMERICA'S WAR. 

Why We Must Fight. By Franklin K. Lane. [§58] 
"Liberty of National Evolution" vs. The Monroe Doctrine. 

By Elihu Root. [§59] 
Pan-German Plans for Annexation in South America. By 

Otto Richard Tannenberg. [§60] 
The Real Issue of the War. By Members of the American 

Com,mission for Relief in Belgium. [§61] 
A War Between Opposing Principles. By Talcott Wil- 
liams. [§62] 
The War and the Irish-Americans. By James E. Cassidy. 

[§63] 
The War and the German-Americans. By Otto H. Kahn. 

[§64] 
Where Would Sigel Stand Now? By Franz Sigel, Jr. 

[§65] 
A German Liberal's Recognition of the Main Object of 

the Allies. By W. Foerster. [%()6\ 

C— SPECIAL REFERENCES. [§67] 



CONTENTS 9 

CHAPTER IV. 
Who Is Responsible for the War in Europe? 
A.— SUMMARY STATEMENT. [§§68-78] 

B.— ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS. [§§79-85] 

English Statement on the Causes of the War. By Sir Ed- 
ward Grey. [§79] 

Austria's Proposal to Attack Serbia in 1913. By Giovanni 
Giolitti. [§80] 

Germany's Real Casus Belli. [§81] 

Russia's Final Efforts at Conciliation. [§82] 

Last Effort of England to Avert War. By Sir Edzvard 
Grey. [§83] 

German Reply to the Proposals of Russia and England : 
the Ultimatum. [§84] 

How the War Came to Belgium. By Baron Moncheur. 
[§85] 

C— SPECIAL REFERENCES. [§86] 



CHAPTER V. 

What the Government Must Do to Make the War 
Successful. 

A.— SUMMARY STATEMENT. [§§87-92] 

B.— ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS. [§§93-100] 

Democratic Government and Success in War. By Arthur 
O. Love joy. [§93] 

What Adequate Preparedness Means. By /. A. Moss and 
M. B. Stewart. [§94] 

Conscription the Only Just, Democratic and Efficient Way 
to Raise an Army. By The Senate Committee on Mil- 
itary Affairs. [§95] 

A War President on Obligatory Service. By Abraham. 
Lincoln. [§96] 

Advantages of the Selective Draft. By Julius Kahn. [§97] 

How Voluntary Service Worked in the American Revolu- 
tion. Condensed from Emory Upton. [§98] 

Why We Fight Abroad. By Theodore Roosevelt. [§99] 

The Hard Facts of the War. By Pomeroy Burton. [§100] 

C— SPECIAL REFERENCES. [§101] 



10 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

CHAPTER VI. 

What the Citizen Must Do to Make the War Suc- 
cessful. 

A.— SUMMARY STATEMENT. [§§102-109] 

B.— ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS. [§§110-121] 

No Fifty-Fifty Allegiance. 'S>y Theodore Roosevelt. [§110] 
National Service for Every Man, Woman, Boy and Girl. 

By A Patriotic Society. [§111] 
The Necessary Means. By Hiram W. Johnson and Others. 

[§112] 
"I Didn't Raise ]My Boy." By Abbie Farwell Brown. 

[§113] 
Why We Cannot Have Business as Usual. By Frank A. 

Vanderlip. [§114] 
The Food Question. By Herbert C. Hoover. [§115] 
Hints to Farmers. By Mrs. Horace Brock. [§116] 
Don"t Can — Dry. By Hamlin Garland. [§117] 
What Our Country Asks of Its Young Women. By Mrs. 

Percy V. Pcnnybacker. [§118] 
What Can She Do? By Albert Bushncll Hart. [§119] 
You and the Red Cross. By Hildegarde Hawthorne. 

[§120] 
Safeguarding Childhood in War. By Ow'en R. Lovejoy. 

[§121] 

C— SPECIAL REFERENCES. [§122] 



CHAPTER VII. 

World-Peace After World-War. 
A.— SUMMARY STATEMENT. [§§123-129] 
B.— ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS. [§§130-136] 

The Foundations of Peace. By Woodrow Wilson. [§130] 
Plan of the League to Enforce Peace. By Walter L. 

Fisher. [§131] 
Plan of the World Court League. [§132] 
The Failure of Pacifism. By Robert Goldsmith. [§133] 
The Two Programs at a Glance. [§134] 
Demand for Peace Only After the Defeat of Germany. 

By Franklin H. Giddings. [§135] 
A Federation of Nations. By Lord Northcliffc. [§136] 
Removal of International Mistrust. By G. Heymans. 

[§137] 
The Test of Every Plan of Peace. By Woodrow Wilson. 

[§138]. 
A Alessage to America. By Romain Rolland. [§139] 

C— SPECIAL REFERENCES. [§140] 



CHAPTER I. 

General Aids to an Understanding of the War. 

1^ A. LIST OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS LEAD- 
ING TO WAR BETWEEN THE UNITED 
STATES AND GERMANY, 1914-1917. 

1914. 

August 4. Proclamation by the President of the United States 
of neutrality of the United States. 

November 13. Proclamation by the President of the United 
States of neutrality of the Panama Canal Zone. 

1915. 

January 20. American neutrality explained and defended by 
Secretary of State Bryan. 

January 28. American merchantman William P. Frye sunk 
by German cruiser Prinz Eitel Friedrich. 

February 4. Germany's proclamation of "war zone'' around 
tne British Isles after February 18. 

February 10. United States note holding German Government 
to a "strict accountability" if any merchant vessel of the United 
States is destroyed or any American citizens lose their lives. 

February 16. Germany's reply, stating "war-zone" act is an 
act of self-defense against illegal methods employed by Great 
Britain in preventing commerce between Germany and neutral 
countries ; disclaims all responsibility for such accidents and 
their consequences. 

February 20. United States sends identic note to Great Britain 
and Germany suggesting an agreement between these two pow- 
ers respecting the conduct of naval warfare. 

February 28. Germany's reply to identic note. 

March 28. British steamship Falaba attacked by submarine 
and sunk; 111 lives lost; 1 American. 

April 8. Steamer Harpalyce, in service of American Commis- 
sion for Relief in Belgium, torpedoed; 15 lives lost. 

April 22. German Embassy publishes a warning against em- 
barkation on vessels belonging to Great Britain. 

April 28. American vessel Gushing attacked by German aero- 
plane. 

May 1. American steamship Gulflight sunk by German sub- 
marine ; 2 Americans lost. 

May 7. Cunard Line steamship Lusitania sunk by German 
submarine; 1,152 lives lost, 114 being Americans. 

May 9. Germany's note in regard to treatment of neutral 
vessels in war zone. 

May 10. Message of sympathy from Germany on loss of 
American lives by sinking of Lusitania. 

[11] 



12 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

May 13. American note protesting against submarine policy 
culminating in the sinking of the Lusitania; expects Germany to 
disavow such acts and declares United States will not be ex- 
pected to "omit any word or any act" necessary to maintain the 
rights of its citizens. 

May 13. Publication of Bryce Committee's Report on German 
Atrocities. 

May 25. American steamship Nebraskan attacked by sub- 
marine. 

May 28. Germany's answer to note of May 13 on the subject 
of the impairment of American interests by German submarine 
war. 

June 1. Supplementary note from Germany in regard to the 
Gulflight and Gushing. 

June 8. Resignation of William J. Bryan, Secretary of State. 

June 9. United States sends second note on Lusitania case. 

July 8. Germany sends reply to note of June 9, and pledges 
safety to United States vessels in war zone under specified con- 
ditions. 

July 9. English passenger steamer Orduna attacked without 
warning by a German submarine; not hit. 

July 15. Germany sends memorandum acknowledging sub- 
marine attack on Nesbraskan, and expresses regret. 

July 21. Third American note on Lusitania case declares 
Germany's communication of July 8 "very unsatisfactory."' 

July 25. American steamship Leelanaw sunk by submarine; 
carrying contraband; no lives lost. 

August 19. White Star liner Arabic sunk by submarine; 16 
victims ; 2 Americans. 

August 24. German Ambassador sends note in regard to 
Arabic. Loss of American lives contrary to intention of the 
German Government and is deeply regretted. 

September 1. Letter from Ambassador von Bernstorfif to Sec- 
retary Lansing giving assurance that German submarines will 
sink no more liners without warning. 

September 4. Allan liner Hesperian sunk by German sub- 
marine; 26 lives lost; 1 American. 

September 7. German Government sends report on the sink- 
ing of the Arabic. 

September 14. United States sends summary of evidence in 
regard to Arabic. 

October 5. German Government regrets and disavows sinking 
of Arabic and is prepared to pay indemnities; orders issued to 
German submarine commanders are so stringent that a similar 
incident is out of the question. 

October 20. German note on the evidence in the Arabic case. 

December 4. United States Government demands recall of 
Capt. Karl Boy-Ed, naval attache, and Capt. Franz von Papen, 
military attache, of the German Embassy, for "improper activi- 
ties in naval and military matters." 

December 10. United States Government renews demand for 
recalls and urges immediate action. 

December 10. German Ambassador informs Secretary of State 



GENERAL AIDS 13 

that the Emperor has been pleased to recall Boy-Ed and von 
Papen. 

December 30. British passenger steamer Persia sunk in Medi- 
terranean, presumably by submarine; 2 Americans lost. 

1916. 

January 7. German Embassy issues a memorandum stating 
submarines in Mediterranean have received orders to conform 
to general principles of international law. 

January 18. United States Government addresses informal 
and confidential notes to diplomatic representatives of Allies 
setting forth a declaration of principles regarding submarine 
attacks and asking whether the Governments would subscribe 
to such an agreement. 

February 10. Germany sends memorandum to neutral powers 
that armed merchant vessels will be treated as warships and 
will be sunk without warning. Asks neutral powers to warn 
their citizens not to intrust their lives or property on such 
vessels. 

February 15. Secretary Lansing makes statement that by in- 
ternational law commercial vessels have right to carry arms in 
self-defense. 

February 16. Germany sends note acknowledging her liability 
in the Lusitania affair. 

February 24. President Wilson replies to letter (February 
24) of Mr. Stone, chairman of Committee on Foreign Relations, 
Senate, in which he refuses to advise American citizens not to 
travel on armed merchant ships, because this would renounce 
the inalienable rights of American citizens. 

March 8. German Ambassador communicates memorandum 
regarding U-boat question, stating it is a new weapon not yet 
regulated by international law. 

March 23. Diplomatic response of Allies declining to accept 
proposals contained in Secretary Lansing's note of January 18. 

March 24. French steamer Sussex is torpedoed without warn- 
ing; about 80 passengers, including American citizens, are killed 
or wounded. 

March 25. Department of State issues memorandum prepared 
by direction of President in regard to status of armed merchant 
vessels in neutral ports and on the high seas. 

March 27, 28, 29. United States Government instructs Amer- 
ican Ambassador in Berlin to inquire into sinking of Sussex 
and other vessels. 

April 10. German Government replies to United States notes 
of March 27, 28, 29, on the sinking of Sussex and other vessels. 

April 18. United States delivers what is considered an ulti- 
matum, that unless Germany abandons present methods of sub- 
marine warfare United States will sever diplomatic relations. 

May 4. Reply of Germany acknowledges sinking of the Sus- 
sex, and in the main meets demands of United States announcing 
new orders issued to its naval forces, but declares it would 
expect the United States to demand and insist that Great Britain 
observe the rules of international law. 

May 8. United States Government accepts German position 



14 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

as outlined in note of May 4, but makes it clear that the fulfill- 
ment of these conditions cannot depend upon negotiations be- 
tween the United States and any other belligerent Government. 

October 8. German submarine appears off American coast and 
sinks British passenger steamer -Stephano. 

October 28. British steamer Marina sunk without warning; 
6 Americans lost. 

November 6. British liner Arabia torpedoed and sunk with- 
out warning in Mediterranean. 

December 12. Germany and her allies offer to enter into peace 
negotiations. 

December 14. British horse transport ship Russian sunk in 
Mediterranean by submarine; 17 Americans lost. 

December 16. President Wilson transmits German peace note 
of December 12 to entente powers. 

December 18. President Wilson's peace note sent to belligerent 
powers. 

December 26. Germany replies to President Wilson's peace 
note. 

December 30. Reply of the entente allies to the central pow- 
ers' note of December 12. 

1917. 

January 10. Entente powers reply to President Wilson's note 
of December 18. 

January 22. President Wilson addresses the Senate, giving 
his idea of steps necessary for world peace. "Peace without 
victory." 

January 31. Germany's note announcing her intention of ruth- 
less use of submarine, outlining barred zones and prescribing 
conditions for American vessels. 

February 3. President Wilson addresses joint session of Con- 
gress on the German submarine order and announces the break- 
ing of diplomatic relations with Germany. 

February 3. Dismissal of German Ambassador. 

February 3. American steamship Housatonic torpedoed and 
sunk by submarine after warning. 

February 4. President Wilson notifies neutrals of break with 
Germany; hopes they "can find it possible to take similar action." 

February 7. Senate indorses President Wilson's position in 
severing diplomatic relations. 

February 7. British ship Vedamore sunk by submarine; 10 
Americans lost. 

February 10. American Ambassador James W. Gerard leaves 
Germany. 

February 13. American schooner Lyman M. Law sunk in the 
Mediterranean, presumably by Austrian submarine. 

February 14. German Ambassador von Bernstorff sails from 
New York. 

February 25. Cunard liner Laconia torpedoed and sunk with- 
out warning; 12 persons, including 2 American women, lose their 
lives. 

February 26. President Wilson addresses joint session of Con- 
gress, recommending "arrned neutrality." 



GENERAL AIDS IS 

February 28. Associated Press makes public a proposed alli- 
ance between Germany and Mexico in the event of war between 
United States and Germany. 

March 1. Resolution introduced in the Senate relating to the 
authenticity of the "Zimmermann" letter. 

March 2. Authenticity of the note signed "Zimmermann" at- 
tested by President Wilson and Secretary of State Lansing. 

March 9. Proclamation by the President of the United States, 
calling an extra session of Congress on April 16, 1917. 

March 12. United States gives formal notice that it has de- 
cided to place an armed guard on all American merchant vessels 
sailing through barred zone. American steamship Algonquin 
sunk without warning by German, submarine. 

March 16. American steamship Vigilancia sunk without warn- 
ing by German submarine; 5 Americans lost. 

March 17. American tanker Illinois sunk by German sub- 
marine. American freighter City of Memphis sunk by German 
submarine; 8 lives lost. 

March 21. Proclamation by the President of the United 
States, calling an extra session of Congress on April 2, 1917. 
American steamship Healdton sunk in safety zone without warn- 
ing; 21 persons lost, 7 being Americans. 

March 24. United States orders withdrawal from Belgium of 
Minister Brand Whitlock and members of American Relief Com- 
mission. 

March 26. United States refuses Germany's proposals to in- 
terpret and supplement the Prussian treaty of 1799. 

April 1. American steamer Aztec (armed) sunk without 
warning; 11 lives lost. 

April 2. President Wilson addresses joint session of Congress 
on the existence of a state of war. 

April 3. Executive order (No. 2571) constituting the Public 
Health Service a part of the military forces of the United 
States. 

April 5. Executive order (No. 2584) of the President of the 
United States establishing defensive sea areas and regulations 
for carrying this order into effect. 

April 5. American steamer Missourian (unarmed) torpedoed 
and sunk without warning. 

April 6. Resolution of Sixty-fifth Congress, first session, de- 
claring that a state of war exists passed and signed by the 
President. 

April 6. Proclamation by the President of the United States, 
declaring war and defining the status of alien enemies. 

(H. H. B. Moyer, Compiler, The United States at War, 8-13.) 

B.— SOME VITAL QUESTIONS AND THEIR 
ANSWERS. 

These questions are such as are likely to be put to the public 
speaker; the cross-references lead to sections of the Handbook 
in which there is material for an answer. Additional answers 



16 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

can»be found in the general and chapter references, especially 
in America at War, where the extracts and citations are more 
minutely subdivided than in this book. 

[§2] Aids to an understanding of the general question. 

(a) Has the United States the duty of maintaining a demo- 
cratic government? (See Lincoln's Hope, Warning and 
Prophecy.) 

(b) Can a democratic government successfully wage war? 
(Hope, Warning and Prophecy.) 

(c) Is the United States really isolated from the other conti- 
nents? (Introduction, §§62, 99.) 

(d) How can one verify the dates of important events in the 
negotiations of the United States before our entrance into the 
war? [§1] 

(e) What are some of the best books on the causes, progress 
and efifect of the war? [§§9-12] 

(/) Where can one find the official documents on the war? 
[§§13-15, 17] 

(^r) How can one find the best periodicals dealing with war 
questions? [§15] 

(h) Where are the President's messages to be found? [§9] 

[§3] Why the United States had to enter the war. 

(a) Could the United States honorably have kept out of 
war with Germany? [§§18-20] 

(b) Could the United States safely have kept out of the war? 
[§§21-25, 29, 30, 33, 34] 

(c) Were American citizens entitled to travel in British ships 
while Great Britain was at war with Germany? [§§19-21, 27] 

(d) Was Germany justified in submarine warfare as neces- 
sary for success in the war? [§§23, 24, 27, 29-31] 

(e) Was the Lusitania on a lawful voyage when sunk? 
[§29] 

(/) Did the United States begin war on Germany? [§§19-25, 
27-30, 33] 

(g) Did the United States ever admit the right of submarine? 
to sink merchant ships without warning so as to allow the 
escape of crews and passengers? [§§27, 30] 

(h) How many American ships were attacked by German 
submarines while the United States was at peace (up to April 1st, 
1917) ? [§28] 

(i) How many American lives were taken by German sub- 
marines while the United States was at peace? [§28] 

(;■) Did the United States give fair warning to Germany that 
it would consider submarine warfare hostile? [§§1, 27, 29, 30] 

(k) Did the Germans give the Americans a proper warning 
not to sail on the Lusitania? [§29] 

(/) Was the United States in honor bound to protect its citi- 
zens against submarine warfare? [§§29, 30] 

(m) Did Germany do only what any other country would 
have done? [§31] 

[n) Did the Confederate commerce destroyers in our Civil 
War set an example which the Germans followed [§31] 



GENERAL AIDS 17 

(o) Ought the United States to have laid an embargo on the 
shipment of arms to the Allies? [§32] 

(p) Did the German government act in a manner friendly to 
the United States in other countries of America? [§§33, 34] 

(q) Were German officials responsible for destruction of lives 
and .property in the United States? [§§22, 33] 

(r) Did Germany respect the integrity of territory of the 
United States? [§34] 

3. [§4] Why the United States must continue in the war. 

(a) Are the past overt acts of Germany against the United 
States the only reasons for war? [§36] 

(&) Were the power and international influence of the United 
States endangered so that she was obliged to go to war? [§37] 

(c) Could the United States have simply closed her ports and 
refrained from hostilities? [§38] 

(d) Has the United States reason to fear the military methods 
of Germany? [§39, lOO] 

(e) Would treaties have any force or validity if Germany's 
principles were dominant? [§40] 

(/) Is the United States concerned in the possible annexation 
by Germany of Belgium and northern France? [§41] 

(g) Would the Monroe Doctrine be menaced by a German 
victory? [§§42, 61] 

(h) Would it be safe to allow Germany to form a mid- 
European combination including Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey? 
[§43] 

(i) Are we fighting the people of Germany? [§44] 

'0') Do many educated Germans consider Germans superior to 
all other peoples? [§§46, 47] 

(k) Do representative Germans believe God is the special 
friend of Germany? [§47] 

(/) Since Germany has a written constitution and a Reichstag 
elected by universal male suffrage, how can it be called an autoc- 
racy? [§48] 

(m) Is it the assumption of the Prussian Constitution that the 
king rules by Divine Right? [§§48, 49] 

(n) What are the principles governing the conduct of war by 
German armed forces? [§§52-56] 

(o) Were the Germans obHged to treat the Belgians with 
frightfulness in order to ensure their own safety? [^53] 

(p) Did the Germans carry off men and women into servitude? 
[§54] 

(q) Have the Germans made a practice of sinking hospitai 
ships? [§39] 

(r) Were German authorities morally responsible for the Ar- 
menian massacres? [§55] 

(s) Did the Germans expect wide conquests in Europe and 
elsewhere? [§§51, 56, 57] 

(0 What countries compose the Central European Federation 
which Germany hopes to establish? [§§43, 125, 57] 



18 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

(m) What was the primary reason for the United States' going 
to war in April, 1917? [§58] 

(v) Does the Monroe Doctrine resemble the German principles 
of conquest? [§59] 

(w) Is the war worth fighting to prevent the triumph of the 
dominant German theories of the state and society? [§§40, 43- 
45, 61, 62, 64] 

(x) Is the United States bound to make war in order to main- 
tain the political principles to which we are committed? [§§45, 62] 

(y) Are the foreign-born and the children of the foreign-born 
interested in the war of the United States against Germany? 
[§§63, 64, 65] 

(;:) Can Americans of Irish descent honestly be "for the 
United States but against England" in this war? [§63] 

(aa) Are the sons of Germans bound to take up arms against 
the Germans? [§§64, 65] 

(hb) Are the German people unanimous in support of con- 
quest and aggression? [§66] 

4. [§5] Who is responsible for the war in Europe? 

(a) Had the Germans designs upon the Balkans before the 
war? [§§69,70,80] 

(b) Had Germany and Austria threatened war to secure their 
supremacy in the Balkans before 1914? [§§70, 71, 80] 

(r) Was the murder of the heir to the Austrian throne the 
real cause of the war? [§§72, 73] 

(d) Was Germany really threatened with Russian aggression 
in 1914? [§§74, 76, 81, 82] 

(e) What is the official German theory of the responsibility 
for the war? [§75] 

(/) Is this theory justified by the facts? [§76] 

(g) Did Russia make all the concessions to Germany and 
Austria which she could reasonably have been expected to make? 
[§§73, 79, 82, 83] 

(h) Can the German government give any satisfactory reason 
for its refusal to accept these concessions? [§§76, 79, 81c, 84] 

(i) Why did Germany prefer to make Russia's mobilization, 
rather than the issue concerning Serbia, the ground upon which 
she declared war against Russia? [%77] 

(/) Was the war really "forced upon Germany''? [§§76, 77, 
78, 79, 81-84] 

(k) Was Belgium bound to refuse Germany's demand for the 
passage of German troops over Belgian soil? [§§78, 85] 

(/) Was Germany bound to respect the neutrality of Belgium? 
[§§78, 85] 

(w) Are other nations under special obligation to Belgium for 
her action on August 3, 1914? [§§78. 85] 

(n) Of what nature were the grounds alleged by Germany 
for her declaration of war upon France? [%77n] 

(o) Had these allegations any basis in fact? [77n] 



GENERAL AIDS 19 

5. [§6] What the Government must do to make the war 
successful. 

(a) Do the previous military preparations of the United States 
tend to prove thst it desired war with Germany? [§§87-94] 

(b) Would a volunteer army have been better than an army 
raised by draft for the purposes of the war? [§§87, 95-98] 

(c) Is the organization of the Federal Government able to 
carry on a great war? [§§90, 93] 

(d) Have other governments besides the Federal Government 
any duty in this war? [§91] 

(e) Is a democratic government able to successfully meet a 
centralized monarchy? [§§92, 93, 99] 

(/) Can a democratic country keep its usual procedures of 
government unmodified during a great war? [§93] 

(g) Has the United States the means to carry on so great a 
war? [§§88, 93, 100] 

(h) Is raising men by draft constitutional? [§§95-97] 

(0 Is raising men by draft democratic? [§§95-97] 

(;■) Is the draft system fair? [§§96, 97] 

(k) Did the volunteer system make good in the Revolution? 

[§98] 

(/) Is it necessary for us to send armies abroad? [§§58, 99] 
(m) Suppose the Allies were defeated, would that do any 

harm to the United States? [§§51, 57, 59-61, 63, 100] 

6. [§7] What the citizen must do to make the war suc- 
cessful. 

(o) Are the obligations of naturalized citizens different from 
those of native born citizens? [§§63-65, 102, 110] 

(b) Are alien enemies entitled to go freely about the country? 

[§§33, 103] 

(c) What can Americans do to help the soldiers? [§§104, 111] 

(d) What can Americans do to help the country? [§§105, 109, 
111] 

(e) Can we have "business as usual'" durmg the war? [§§106, 

114] 

(/) Who is going to do the work while the men are at war? 
[§§107, 111] 

(g) What can children do for the cause? [§§108, 116] 

(h) What can women do for the cause? [§§107, HI, 112, 
113, 115, 117, 118, 119] 

(0 How can the business of the country be organized for war? 

[§§121, 114] 

(/) Have we raised our boys to be soldiers? [§113] 

Ik) How is labor to be organized during the war? [§§107. 

Ill, 112, 114] 

(I) How can the food supply be kept adequate during the war? 

[§§106, 112, 115-117] 

(m) What can farmers do for the cause? [§116] 

(n) What can the housewife do for the cause? [§§115, 117, 

1181 

(o) What can we do to help the sick and wounded? [§§104, 

111, 118-120] 



20 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

(/>) Is it a proper or necessary part of our war policy to relax 
our child-labor laws? [§121] 

7. [§8] World-Peace after World-War. 

(a) What is the great hope which inspires Americans in this 
war? [§123] 

(&) Are the Germans favorable to a just peace? [§124] 

(c) Should the United States support a peace which left Ger- 
many in control of the Balkans and Turkey? [§§57-59, 125, 126] 

(d) Has the United States done its duty toward securing 
world peace? [§§127, 131-134] 

(e) What are the difficulties in the way of world peace? 
[§§129, 130-135] 

(f) Are we fighting for the equality of nations? [§§130, 138] 

(g) What is the plan of the League to Enforce Peace? [§131] 
(h) What is the plan of the World Court League? [§§132-134] 
(i) What is the difficulty with pacifism? [§§133, 137] 

(/) Why has the United States a special responsibility for 
peace? [§§130-136] 

SELECT LIST OF AUTHORITIES SUITABLE 

FOR PRIVATE COLLECTIONS AND 

SIVIALL PUBLIC LIBRARIES. 

[§9.] A.— A TEN DOLLAR LIST. 

These books may be ordered through any bookseller or directly 
from the publishers. 



American Association for International Conciliation. Interna- 
tional Conciliation. Nos. 83-114 passim. (N. Y., Am. Assoc, 
for Int. Con.) Substation 84, free on application. Very con- 
venient set of the documents issued by the various countries 
at the outbreak of the war. 

Beck, James M. The War and Humanity. (2d. ed., N. Y., Put- 
nam, 1917; $1.50.) On America's concern in the war. 

Bernhardi, Friedrich von. Germany and the Next War. (N. Y., 
authorized Am. translation, Longmans, 1912; $.75.) By the 
chief exponent of the philosophy of Prussian militarism, a 
general who has had a command in the European war. 

Cheradame, Andre. The Pan-German Plot Unmasked. (N. Y., 
Scribners, 1917; $1.25.) On Germany's war aims and the 
menace of a German peace. 

Hart, Albert Bushnell, Editor. America at War. For speakers, 
writers and readers. (N. Y., 1917, $1.50.) Companion vol- 
ume to the Handbook: analysis of the war; abundant clas- 
sified references; full and comprehensive extracts from 
speeches, documents, articles and books. 

Meyer, H. H. B., compiler. United States in War; Organization 
and Literature. (Wash. Gov't. Printing Office, 1917.) Free 
on application to Library of Congress. A very useful 



GENERAL AIDS 21 

pamphlet, giving condensed information concerning the or- 
ganization and activities of the various bodies, governmental 
and other, which the war has called into existence, with 
other material on the war. 

Morgan, John H. German Atrocities, an Official Investigation. 
(N, Y., Dutton, 1916; $1.00.) By the professor of constitu- 
tional law in the University of London. Based upon Belgian, 
French, British, and especially German, official documents. 

National Security League. Patriotism Through Education 
Series. (N. Y., Nat. Security League, 31 Pine St., 1917— 
free to members of the League on application.) 

Toynbee, Arnold Joseph. Armenian Atrocities, the Murder of a 
Nation. (N. Y., Dutton; $.25.) Brief but authoritative 
account of the massacres in Armenia, and of the relation of 
German officials thereto. 

U. S. Bureau of Public Information. How the War Came to 
America. (Washington, June IS, 1917; free on application.)* 
"Red, white and blue" pamphlet. 

Visscher, Ch. de. Belgium's Case : a Juridical Enquiry. (London 
and N. Y., Hodder and Stoughton, 1916; $1.25.) A careful 
review of the German occupancy and oppression of Belgium 
and of the moral and legal aspects of Germany's violation 
of Belgian neutrality. 

Wilson, Woodrow. Why We Are At War. (N. Y., Harpers, 
1917; $0.50.) A convenient collection of the President's 
speeches and messages. 

Wood, Leonard. Our Military History, Its Facts and Fallacies. 
(Chicago, Reilly & Britton, 1916; $1.00.) Brief account of 
the difficulties and sacrifices of volunteer armies. 

[§10] B.— A TWENTY-FIVE DOLLAR LIST. 

The foregoing ten-dollar list of books, together with the 

following : 

Archer, William. Gems of German Thought. (N. Y., Double- 
day, Page, 1917; $1.25.) 

Beck, James M. The Evidence in the Case. (N. Y., Putnam, 
1914; $1.00.) Searching analysis of the responsibility for the 
European war, by an eminent lawyer, formerly assistant 
attorney-general of the United States. 

Beith, John Hay. [Ian Hay, pseud.] Getting Together. (Gar- 
den City, Doubleday, Page, 1917; $.50.) 

Cobb, Irwin S. "Speaking of Prussians." (N. Y., Doran, 1917; 
$.50.) 

Dawson, Wm. H. What Is the Matter zvith Germany. (London, 
Longmans, 1915; $1.00.) By a writer who has long inter- 
ested himself in German affairs. 

Hart, Albert Bushnell. The War in Europe, Its Causes and 
Results. (N. Y., Appleton, 1914; $1.00.) 

A brief account of the conditions of the war and relations 
of the United States. 

Headlam, James W. The Issue. (Bost., Houghton, 1917; $1.00.) 
Germany's war-aims, in case of a "German Peace." 



22. HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

Holmes, Edmond. The Nemesis of Docility. (N. Y Dutton 
1916; $1.75.) 

An acute study of the psychology of the German char- 
acter. 

O'Brien, Charles, rood Preparedness for the United States. 
(Boston, Little, Brown, 1917; $.60.) 

Rinehart, Mary Roberts. The Altar of Freedom. (Bost., Hough- 
ton, Mifflin, 1917; $.50.) An appeal to American mothers, 
by one of them. 

Rogers, Lindsay. America's Case Against Germany. (N. Y., 
Dutton; $1.50.) An untechnical presentation of the legal 
aspect of America's case, and a review of the diplomatic 
correspondence, with citations of the principal passages. 

Stowell, Ellery C. The Diplomacy of the War of 1914. The 
Beginnings of the War. (Boston, Houghton, Mifflin, 1915; 
$5.00.) Careful review and analysis by an expert in inter- 
national affairs. 



3. ADDITIONAL BOOKS. 

(a) [§11] Discussions. 

Barker, J. Ellis. Modern Germany: Her Political and Eco- 
nomic Problems. (5th ed., N. Y., Dutton, 1915.) 

Beck, James M. The Evidence in the Case. (N. Y., Put- 
nam, 1914.) Searching analysis of the responsibility 
for the European war, by an eminent lawyer, formerly 
assistant attorney-general of the United States. 

Beveridge, Albert J. What is Back of the War. (Indian- 
apolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1915.) Personal impressions on 
the ground early in the war. 

Bullard, Arthur. The Diplomacy of the Great IVar. (N. 
Y., Macmillan, 1916.) A gossipy sketch of the his- 
torical background of the war. 

Chitwood, Oliver P. The Immediate Causes of the Great 
War. (N. Y., Crowell, 1917.) Resume of the out- 
break ©f the war. 

Coolidge, Archibald C. Origins of the Triple Alliance. 
(N. Y., Scribner, 1917.) On the building up of Ger- 
many's position in Central Europe. 

Freeman, William. Awake, U. S. A.! Are We in Danger^ 
Are We Prepared? (N. Y., Doran, 1916.) Study in 
popular form of international complications and dan- 
gers. 

Hart, Albert Bushnell. The War in Europe; Its Causes 
and Results. (N. Y., Appleton, 1914.) A brief ac- 
count of the conditions of the war and relations of the 
United States. 

Kilbourne, Maj. Charles E. (Ed. in chief), National Ser- 
vice Library. (5 vols., N. Y., Collier & Son, 1917.) 
All volumes by military officers, on organization 
and methods of modern war. 



GENERAL AIDS 23 

Lippmann, Walter. The Stakes of Diplomacy. (N. Y., 
Holt, 1915.) On the actual forces that control Amer- 
ican diplomacy. 

North American (Philadelphia). The War From This 
Side. (Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1915.) Reprint of 
good editorials. 

Reynolds, Francis J. and others. The Story of the Great 
War. (5 vols, to 1916, N. Y., Collier & Son, 1916.) 
Admirable narrative of conditions, diplomacy and v^^ar- 
fare, illustrated. 

Seton-Watson, Robert W., and others. The War and Di- 
plomacy. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1914.) Study of the 
political causes of the war. 

(b) [§12] First-Hand Narratives. 

Anonymous. A German Deserter's War Experience. (N. 

Y., Huebsch, 1917.) Details of German army life. 
Davis, Richard Harding. With the Allies. (N. Y., Scrib- 

ner, 1914.) Famous American war correspondent. 
Hay, Ian [pseudonym for Ian Hay Beith]. The First 

Hundred Thousand. (Bost., Houghton Mifflin, 1916.) 

British troops in training and at the front. 
Hedin, Sir Sven. With the German Armies in the West. 

(London, Lane, 1915.) By the famous Scandinavian 

traveler, inside the German lines. 
Kreisler, Fritz. Four Weeks in the Trenches. (Bost., 

Houghton Mifflin, 1915.) Life in the Austrian army. 
Powell, E. Alexander. Fighting in Flanders. (N. Y., 

Scribner, 1914.) By an English journalist. 
Seeger, Alan. Letters and Diary. (N. Y., Scribner, 1917.) 

An American soldier and poet in the trenches, where 

he lost his life. 

(c) [§13] Collections of Documents. 

American Association for International Conciliation. In- 
ternational Conciliation. (Nos. 83-90, 94-96, 101-104, 
110, 111, 114; N. Y., the Assoc, 1914-1917.) Very 
convenient and valuable. 

Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak 
of the European War. (N. Y., Doran, 19! 5.) Official 
publications of the belHgerent countries; inexpensive. 

American Journal of International Lazv. Special supple- 
ments to IX (July, 1915); X (Oct., 1916). (N. Y., 
Baker, Voorhis.) Reprints of government publica- 
tions. 

Fess, Simeon D., Compiler. The Problems of Neutrality 
When the World Is at War. {House Docs., 64 Cong., 
2 Sess., No. 2111 ; Wash., Govt. Priming Office.) Doc- 
uments on the controversy with Germany. 

The German White-Book. How Russia and Her Rulers 
Betrayed Germany's Confidence and Thereby Caused 
the European War. (Boston, 1914). Official justifica- 
tion of Germany, published in English. 



24 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

Scott, James Brown. The American View of the War 
Against the Imperial German Government. (N, Y., 
Oxford Univ. Press, 1917.) Official documents form 
Part. II. 

Scott, James Brown. Diplomatic Documents Relating to 
the Outbreak of the European War. (2 vols.; N. Y., 
Oxford Univ. Press, 1916.) Good collection for the 
first period. 

United States, Department of State. Diplomatic Cor- 
respondence with Belligerent Governments Relating to 
Neutral Rights and Commerce. (5 Nos. : May 7, 1915; 
Oct. 21, 1915; Aug. 12, 1916; Oct. 10, 1916; April 4, 
1917. Wash., Govt. Printing Office, 1915-1917.) The 
official United States set of war documents. 

(d) [§14] Select Brief Documents and Extracts. 

Bang, J. P. Hurrah and Hallelujah! (N. Y,, Doran, 
1916.) Compilation of passages showing German at- 
titude, chiefly by theologians and preachers ; by a Dan- 
ish professor of theology. 

Bingham, Alfred (Editor). Handbook of the European 
War. (Handbook Series; White Plains, Wilson, 1916.) 
Continuation of Sheip's book (see below), useful and 
quotable extracts. 

Hart, Albert Bushnell (Editor). American Patriots and 
Statesmen — From Washington to Lincoln. (5 vols.; 
N. Y., Collier, 1916.) Patriotic and prophetic utter- 
ances down to 1865. 

Members of the Faculty of the University of Minnesota. 
Facts About the War. Memoranda, Synopses and Sig- 
nificant Items. (Minneapolis, Univ. of Minn., 1917.) 
"Prepared especially for the use of patriotic speakers 
and writers." 

"Out of Their Own Mouths." (N. Y., Appleton, 1917.) 
A collection of utterances of German statesmen, 
scholars, and publicists, illustrating the spirit of Ger- 
man leaders, their standards of international conduct 
and their aims in the war. 

O'Regan, John R. H. (Editor). The German War of 
1914. Illustrated by Documents of European History, 
1815-1915. (London, Oxford, Univ. Press, 1915.) Val- 
uable documents on neutrality and the war. 

Reeley, Mary Katharine (Editor), Selected Articles on 
World Peace, including International Arbitration and 
Disarmament. (Handbook Series; 2 ed. ; White Plains, 
Wilson Co., 1916.) 

Sheip, Stanley S. (Editor). Handbook of the European 
War. (Handbook Series; White Plains, Wilson Co., 
1914.) Brief discussions and classified extracts. Use- 
ful. 

The New York Times. Current History, The European 
War. (10 vols, to March, 1917, N. Y. Times Co.) 



GENERAL AIDS 25 

Bound volumes of this periodical Current History, 
with special introduction and volume indexes. A re- 
pository of most interesting and valuable articles, 
speeches and documents. 

4. [§15] SERVICEABLE PERIODICALS. 

In the references at the end of each chapter will be found 

titles of a few select articles to periodicals; in America at War, 

the companion book to this Handbook, these references are much 

more numerous and are classified under numerous sub-titles. 

The number can be still further enlarged by using the following 

standard indexes to periodicals. 

Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. (White Plains, Wil- 
son Co., monthly.) 

Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature, Supplement. (White 

Plains, Wilson Co., 5 times a year.) Both those works are 

from time to time condensed into "Annual Cumulations" 

and five-year volumes. 

The periodicals most useful to the speaker and writer on the 

war are the following : 

American Academy of Political and Social Science, Annals. 
(Bi-monthly.) 

American Journal of International Law. (Quarterly.) 

American Political Science Review. (Quarterly.) 

The American Reznew of Reviews. (Monthly, illustrated.) 

Atlantic Monthly. 

Collier's Weekly. 

Current History. (Monthly, Published by N. Y. Times, and gath- 
ered into volumes. [Set §14] 

History Teacher's Magasine. (Monthly.) 

Independent. (Weekly, illustrated.) 

Literary Digest. (Weekly.) 

Outlook. (Weekly.) 

5. [§16] COMPENDIUMS AND BOOKS OF 
REFERENCE. 

The speaker and writer will find it convenient to have at com- 
mand a few periodicals and other digests of information, com- 
piled from time to time. Several of these authorities contain 
chronological lists of notable events, so that a particular date or 
happening may be verified. They also include summarized nar- 
rative and tabular statements. 

The American Library Annual, Including Index to dates of cur- 
rent Events, Library work. Committees, Bibliographies, etc. 
(N. Y., Bowker, Annual since 1901.) 
The American Year Book; a Record of Events and Progress. 
(N. Y., Appleton, Annual since 1910.) Includes convenient 
summaries and discussions of international events and issues. 
Well indexed. 
Information Annual, A continuous Cyclopedia and Digest of Cur- 
rent Events. (N. Y., Cumulative Digest Co., Annual since 
1915.) 



26 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

The International Year Book: a compendium of the World's 
Progress. (N. Y., Dodd, Mead, Annual 1896-1902, and since 
1907.) Articles on current international questions. 

McLaughlin, Andrew C, and Hart, Albert Bushnell (Editors). 
Cyclopedia of American Government. (3 vols.; N. Y., Apple- 
ton, 1914.) Three thousand five hundred articles, w^ith recent 
bibliography, includes discussions of international law and 
international relations. 

The World Almanac and Eticyclopedia. (N. Y. Press Publish- 
ing Co., Annual since 1873.) Many useful lists and 
tables. 

Department of Commerce. Statistical Abstract of the United 
States. (Wash., Govt. Printing Ofiice, Annual since 1878.) 
Official material on population, trade, industry, commerce, etc. 

6. [§17] GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS BEARING 
ON THE WAR. 

Besides the regular government issues since the outbreak of 
the war the government has set on foot a variety of publications 
containing reprints of documents and speeches, and suggestions 
for patriotic service. Most of these publications are listed and 
described in Library of Congress, The United States at War 
(see below), especially sections 4, 12, 33, 35, 37-38, 41, 50, 51, 55, 
59-60, 66, 69, 73, 86-90, 94, 100, 103, 111-112, 123, 128-130, 137, 139, 
141, 152, 154, 156. The following are the most important for the 
speaker or writer (except the Congressional Record, they are 
free on application) : 
Bureau of Education. Home Economics Letters. (Wash., since 

April 4, 1916.) On duties of civilians. 
Committee on Public Information. Official Bulletin. (Wash., 
daily since May, 1917.) Contains official precedents and noti- 
fications. 
Committee on Public Information. Manual of War Service. 
(Wash., Govt. Printing Office, 1917.) Description and doc- 
trine of the army and the navy. 
Committee on Public Information. War Message and Facts 
Behind It. (Rev. ed., Wash., Govt. Printing Offict, 1917.) 
President's Message with comments and explanations. 
Committee on Public Information. War Information Series. 
(Wash., The Committee, 1917.) Speeches, articles and re- 
prints. 
Congress. Congressional Record. (Wash., Govt. Printing Office, 
frequent parts during sessions of Congress, and bound vol- 
umes afterwards.) Verbatim record of the debates of the 
two houses of Congress, obtainable on terms stated in U. S. 
at War. 
Department of State. Diplomatic Correspondence With Bellig- 
erent Governments Relating to Neutral Rights and Com- 
merce. (5 Nos.: May 27, 1915; Oct. 21, 1915; Aug. 17, 1916; 
Oct. 10, 1916; Mar. 4, 1917.) (Wash., Govt Printing Office, 
1915-1917) The official United States set. 
Library of Congress (H. H. B. Meyer, compiler). The United 
States at War, Organizations and Literature. (Wash.. Govt. 



GENERAL AIDS 27 

Printing Office, 1917.) The most helpful guide to the war 
publications of the government and of private societies. 

National Board for Historical Service. History and the Great 
War — Opportunities for History Teachers. (Wash., Bureau 
of Education, Circular, Sept., 1917.) Relation of present war 
to the world's history. 

Secretary of the Navy. Annual Reports. (Wash., Govt. Print- 
ing Office.) Details of naval organization and operations. 

Secretary of War. Annual Reports. (Wash., Govt. Printing 
Office.) Details of military organization and operations. 



CHAPTER II. 

WHY THE UNITED STATES HAD TO ENTER 
THE WAR. 

A.— SUMMARY STATEMENT. 

[§18] This generation of Americans, like other generations 
before it, finds itself called upon to face the perils and the 
tragic sacrifices of war. What are the reasons which impose 
upon us, a people more than others devoted to peace, and 
happy and prosperous in the enjoyment of it, the hard neces- 
sity of such sacrifices? 

The participation of the United States in the European 
conflict has been made necessary by two classes of circum- 
stances. The first of these, sufficient yet less significant, con- 
sists of past events — of hostile acts against us committed by 
the German Government. The second, and incomparably 
more important, class of reasons for our entrance into the 
war and our continuance in it consists in the character of 
the future to which we should have to look forward, the kind 
of world in which we and those who come after us would 
have to live, in the event of the victory of Germany and her 
allies. The former — the past events which forced war upon 
us — are set forth in this chapter. 

1 [§19] Some two hundred and fifty American citizens, ex- 
ercising rights unquestioned under the law of nations, and 
traveling under the presumed protection of their Government, 
have been killed by agents of the Imperial German Government. 
(For the total losses of American ships and lives, see §28.) 

2 [§20] The German Government was solemnly warned 
by the Government of the United States on February 10, 
1915, that such acts were "an indefensible violation of neutral 
rights," and that our Government "would take any steps it 
might be necessary to take, to safeguard American lives, and 
to secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of their 
acknowledged rights on the high seas." (For the American 
note, see §27.) 

3 [§21] In spite of this protest and warning, more than 
once repeated, such unlawful killing of Americans continued 
at intervals during two years. (For protest over Lusitania, see 
§29.) 

4 [§22] In addition to the submarine attacks, the Ger- 
man Government, through its diplomatic representatives and 
other agents, carried on throughout 1915 and 1916 a secret 
campaign against our domestic security and order, by fo- 
menting strikes, hiring criminals to destroy munition plants 
and other property, subsidizing a propaganda of disloyalty 
among citizens of German birth, placing spies in our offices 
of government, and organizing upon American soil unlaw- 

[28] 



WHY WE ENTERED THE WAR 29 

ful conspiracies and military expeditions against countries 
with which we were at peace. (For details of this conspiracy, 
see %33.) 

5 [§23] On January 31, 1917, the German Government 
proclaimed that it would destroy without warning, and with- 
out safeguarding the lives of passengers and seamen, ships of 
any nationalities (regardless of the character of their car- 
goes and their destinations) which might be found by Ger- 
man submarines in certain vast areas of the high seas. 

6 [§24] This renewed and enlarged threat, and defiance of 
the warnings of our Government, was speedily carried out, 
several American ships, some of them bound for American 
ports, being destroyed, with loss of American lives, during 
February and March, 1917. 

7 [§2S] These acts constituted acts of war by Germany 
against the United States, and were formally recognized as 
such by the two houses of Congress on April 4th and 6th, 
1917. IV e (ire at war, then, in the first place, because Germany 
made war upon us. We had no alternative, except abject sub- 
mission to lawless coercion. 



B.— ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS. 

[§26] A WARNING TO GERMANY (1902). 
By Richard Olney, Former Secretary of State. 

We are now entering upon a contest for industrial su- 
premacy, the most intense and arduous the world has ever 
seen. Fortunate will it be if this contest does not, like so 
many others, degenerate into grim-visaged war with all its 
unutterable brutalities and horrors ! The errand here of your 
Royal Highness, with the hearty welcome tendered and the 
favorable impression produced, should do much to preclude 
so dire a result. Under its influence the two countries are 
recognizing each other as generous and worthy rivals — are 
joining in a sort of handshake as a courteous but significant 
preliminary to the combat before them — and are thus in a 
way pledging themselves that, whatever the stress of the 
contest, it shall not transgress the rightful rules of the game 
nor overstep the limits which Christianized and civilized 
peoples ought to observe under whatever provocation. 

(Welcome to Prince Henry of Prussia : Independent, Sept. 
25, 1916.) 

[§27] AMERICAN PROTEST AGAINST THE WAR- 
ZONE DECREE. (FEB. 10, 1915.) 

It is of course not necessary to remind the German Gov- 
ernment that the sole right of a belligerent in dealing with 
neutral vessels on the high seas is limited to visit and search, 
unless a blockade is proclaimed and effectively maintained, 
which this Government does not understand to be proposed 
in this case. To declare or exercise a right to attack and 



30 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

destroy any vessel entering a prescribed area of the high 
seas without first certainly determining its belligerent na- 
tionality and the contraband character of its cargo would be 
an act so unprecedented in naval warfare that this Govern- 
ment is reluctant to believe that the Imperial Government of 
Germany in this case contemplates it as possible. The sus- 
picion that enemy ships are using neutral flags improperly 
can create no just presumption that all ships traversing a 
prescribed area are subject to the same suspicion. It is to 
determine exactly such questions that this Government un- 
derstands the right of visit and search to have been rec- 
ognized. * * * 

If the commanders of German vessels of war should act 
upon the presumption that the flag of the United States was 
not being used in good faith and should destroy on the high 
seas an American vessel or the lives of American citizens, it 
would be difificult for the Government of the United States 
to view the act in any other light than as an indefensible 
violation of neutral rights which it would be very hard indeed 
to reconcile with the friendly relations now so happily sub- 
sisting between the two governments. 

If such a deplorable situation should arise, the Imperial 
German Government can readily appreciate that the Govern- 
ment of the United States would be constrained to hold the 
Imperial German Government to a strict accountability for 
such acts of their naval authorities and to take any steps it 
might be necessary to take to safeguard American lives and 
property and to secure to American citizens the full enjoy- 
ment of their acknowledged rights on the high seas. 

(From note sent by Secretary of State William Jennings 
Bryan to the Imperial German Government.) 



[§28] RECORD OF AMERICAN SHIPS ATTACKED 

AND LIVES DESTROYED BY GERMAN 

SUBMARINES (TO APRIL 1, 1917). 

By Congressman John Jacob Rogers. 

AMERICAN VESSELS ILLEGALLY ATTACKED. 

Name of Vessel Date Particulars 

Gulflight May 2, 1915 . . Torpedoed 

Nebraskan May 25, 1915. .Torpedoed 

Leelanaw July 25, 1915. .Torpedoed and shelled 

Seaconnet June 16, 1916. .Damaged by mine or tor- 
pedo 
Oswego Aug. 14, 1916. . Fired on 10 times by sub- 
marine 
Lano (Philippine) ..Oct. 28, 1916. .Sunk by submarine 

Columbian Nov. 7, 1916.. Sunk by submarine 

Colena Nov. 26, 1916.. Fired on 

St. Helen's Dec. 10, 1916. .Attacked by submarine 

Rebecca Palmer ...Dec. 14, 1916. .Fired on; slight damage 



WHY WE ENTERED THE WAR 31 

Sacramento Jan. 9, 1917 . . Fired on 

Housatonic Feb. 3, 1917.. Sunk 

Lyman M. Law Feb. 13, 1917. .Burned by submarine 

Vigilancia Mar. 16, 1917. .Torpedoed 

City of Memphis... Mar. 17, 1917.. Sunk by gunfire 

Illinois Mar. 17, 1917. .Torpedoed 

Aztec Apr. 1, 1917. .Torpedoed 

SHIPS SUNK WITH LOSS OF AMERICAN LIVES. 

British ship Falaba, torpedoed March 28, 1915 (warned); 
1 American lost. 

British ship Lusitania, torpedoed May 7, 1915 (no warn- 
ing); 114 Americans lost. 

American ship Gulflight, torpedoed May 1, 1915 (no warn- 
ing); 2 Americans lost. 

British ship Armenian, torpedoed June 28, 1915 (ordered 
to stop; tried to escape); 23 Americans lost. 

British ship Iberian, sunk July 31, 1915 (tried to escape; 
stopped by shell fire); 3 Americans lost. 

British ship Anglo-Californian, sunk July 4, 1915; 2 Ameri- 
cans lost. 

British ship Hesperian, torpedoed September 4, 1915 (no 
warning) ; 1 American lost. 

British ship Arabic, torpedoed August 19, 1915 (no warn- 
ing) ; 2 Americans lost. 

Italian ship Ancona, torpedoed November 9, 1915 (no warn- 
ing) ; 7 Americans lost. 

British ship Persia, believed to have been torpedoed; sunk 
December 30, 1915 (no warning); 2 Americans lost. 

British ship Englishman, torpedoed March 27, 1916; 6 
Americans lost (1 more whose nationality is doubtful). 

British ship Sabota, sunk by gunfire October 20, 1916; 1 
American lost. 

British ship Marina, sunk by gunfire October 28, 1916 
(v/cirned); 6 Am.ericans lost. 

British ship Russian, torpedoed December 14, 1916 (no 
warning); 17 Americans lost. 

British ship Eaveston, sunk by shell fire February 5, 1917; 
1 American lost (1 other whose nationality is doubtful). 

British ship Vedamore, torpedoed February 7, 1917 (no 
warning) ; 10 Americans lost. 

British ship Turino, torpedoed February 7, 1917 (no warn- 
ing) ; 1 American (?) lost. 

French ship Athos, torpedoed February 22, 1917 (no warn- 
ing) ; 1 American lost. 

British ship Laconia, torpedoed February 25, 1917 (no warn- 
ing) ; 2 Americans lost. 

Norwegian ship Sjostad, believed torpedoed March 2, 1917 
(no warning) ; 1 American lost. 

American ship Vigilancia, torpedoed March 16, 1917 (no 
warning) ; 5 A.mericans lost. 

American ship Healdton, torpedoed March 21, 1917 (no 
warning); 7 Americans lost. 



32 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

British ship Crispin, torpedoed March 29, 1917 (no warn- 
ing); 68 Americans on board, 1 killed, 18 missing. 

Total, 216 American lives lost. 

On the Lusitania there were also 24 children born of foreign 
parents on American soil. 

(Congressional Record, April 5, 1917; corrected for this Hand- 
book.) 

[§29] WARNING TO GERMANY AFTER THE 

DESTRUCTION OF THE LUSITANIA. 

(MAY 13, 1915.) 

The Government of the United States has been apprised 
that the Imperial German Government considered themselves 
to be obliged by the extraordinary circumstances of the 
present war and the measures adopted by their adversaries 
in seeking to cut Germany off from all commerce, to adopt 
methods of retaliation which go much beyond the ordinary 
methods of warfare at sea, in the proclamation of a war zone 
from which they have warned neutral ships to keep away. 
This Government has already taken occasion to inform the 
Imperial German Government that it cannot admit the adop- 
tion of such measures or such a warning of danger to operate 
as in any degree an abbreviation of the rights of American 
shipmasters or of American citizens bound on lawful errands, 
as passengers on merchant ships of belligerent nationality; 
and that it must hold the Imperial German Government to a 
strict accountability for any infringement of those rights, 
intentional or incidental. It does not understand the Imperial 
German Government to question those rights. It assumes, 
on the contrary, that the Imperial Government accept, as of 
course, the rule that the lives of non-combatants, whether 
they be of neutral citizenship or citizens of one of the nations 
at war, cannot lawfully or rightfully be put in jeopardy by the 
capture or destruction of an unarmed merchantman, and rec- 
ognize also, as all other nations do, the obligation to take the 
usual precaution of visit and search to ascertain whether a 
suspected merchantman is in fact of belligerent nationality, 
or is in fact carrying contraband of war under a neutral flag. 

The Government of the United States, therefore, desires 
to call the attention of the Imperial German Government 
with the utmost earnestness to the fact that the objection 
to their present method of attack against the trade of their 
enemies lies in the practical impossibility of employing sub- 
marines in the destruction of commerce without disregarding 
those rules of fairness, reason, justice and humanity, which 
all modern opinion regards as imperative. It is practically 
impossible for the officers of a submarine to visit a merchant- 
man at sea and examine her papers and cargo. It is prac- 
tically impossible for them to make prize of her; and, if 
they cannot put a prize crew on board of her, they cannot sink 
her without leaving her crew and all on board of her to the 
mercy of the sea in her small boats. These facts it is under- 
stood the Imperial German Government frankly admit. We 



WHY WE ENTERED THE WAR 33 

are informed that in the instances of which we have spoken 
time enough for even that poor measure of safety was not 
given, and in at least two of the cases cited not so much as 
a warning was received. Manifestly submarines cannot be 
used against merchantmen, as the last few weeks have shown, 
without an inevitable violation of many sacred principles of 
justice and humanity. 

American citizens act within their indisputable rights in 
taking their ships and in traveling wherever their legitimate 
business calls them upon the high seas, and exercise those 
rights in what should be the well-justified confidence that 
their lives will not be endangered by acts done in clear vio- 
lation of universally acknowledged international obligations, 
and certainly in the confidence that their own government 
will sustain them in the exercise of their rights. 

There was recently published in the newspapers of the 
United States, I regret to inform the Imperial German Gov- 
ernment, a formal warning, purporting to come from the 
Imperial German Embassy at Washington, addressed to the 
people of the United States and stating, in effect, that any 
citizen of the United States who exercised his right of free 
travel upon the seas would do so at his peril if his journey 
should take him within the zone of waters within which the 
Imperial Germany Navy was using submarines against the 
commerce of Great Britain and France, notwithstanding the 
respectful but very earnest protest of his Government, the 
Government of the United States. I do not refer to this for 
the purpose of calling the attention of the Imperial German 
Government at this time to the surprising irregularity of a 
communication from the Imperial German Embassy at Wash- 
ington addressed to the people of the United States through 
the newspapers, but only for the purpose of pointing out 
that no warning that an unlawful and inhumane act will be 
committed can possibly be accepted as an excuse or palliation 
for that act or as an abatement of the responsibility for its 
commission. . . . 

The Imperial German Government will not expect the Gov- 
ernment of the United States to omit any word or any act 
necessary to the performance of its sacred duty of main- 
taining the rights of the United States and its citizens and 
of safeguarding their free exercise and enjoyment. 

(Sent by the State Department.) 

[§30] INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS OF AMERICAN 
CITIZENS. 

By President Woodrow Wilson, (Feb. 24, 1916.) 
You are right in assuming that I shall do everything in 
my power to keep the United States out of war. I think 
the country will feel no uneasiness about my course in that 
respect. Through many anxious months I have striven for 
that object, amidst difiiculties more manifold than can have 
been apparent upon the surface, and so far I have succeeded. 
I do not doubt that I shall continue to succeed. The course 



34 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

which th>_ Central European Powers have announced their in- 
tention of following in the future with regard to undersea 
warfare seems for the moment to threaten insuperable 
obstacles, but its apparent meaning is so manifestly incon- 
sistent with explicit assurances recently given us by those 
Powers with regard to their treatment of the merchant 
vessels on the high seas that I must believe that explanations 
will presently ensue which will put a different aspect upon it. 
We have had no reason to question their good faith or their 
fidelity to their promises in the past, and I for one feel 
confident that we shall have none in the future. 

But in any event our duty is clear. No nation, no group 
of nations, has the right while war is in progress to alter 
or disregard the principles which all nations have agreed 
upon in mitigation of the horrors and sufferings of war; 
and if the clear rights of American citizens should ever 
unhappily be abridged or denied by any such action we 
should, it seems to me, have in honor no choice as to what 
our own course should be. 

For my own part, I cannot consent to any abridgement of 
the rights of American citizens in any respect. The honor 
and self-respect of the nation are involved. We covet peace, 
and shall preserve it at any cost but the loss of honor. To 
forbid our people to exercise their rights for fear we might 
be called upon to vindicate them would be a deep humilia- 
tion indeed. It would be an implicit, all but an explicit, 
acquiescence in the violation of the rights of mankind every- 
where, and of whatever nation or allegiance. It would be a 
deliberate abdication of our hitherto proud position as 
spokesmen, even amidst the turmoil of war, for the law and 
the right. It would make everything this Government has 
attempted, and everything that it has achieved during this 
terrible struggle of nations, meaningless and futile. 

It is important to reflect that if in this instance we allow 
expediency to take the place of principle, the door would 
inevitably be opened to still further concessions. Once 
accept a single abatement of right, and many other humili- 
ations would certainly follow, and the whole fine fabric of 
international law plight crumble under our hands piece by 
piece. What we are contending for in this matter is of the 
very essence of the things that have made America a sover- 
eign nation. She cannot yield them without conceding her 
own impotency as a nation, and making virtual surrender of 
her independent position among the nations of the world. 

{Letter to Senator Stone.) 

[§31] WOULD ANY OTHER COUNTRY HAVE DONE 
WHAT GERMANY DID? 

From The Outlook (June 6, 1917) 

Some have said with reference to Germany's use of the 
submarine: "Under the same circumstances Germany would 
use it again as she is using it now, and so would any nation, 



WHY WE ENTERED THE WAR 35 

including the United States, which was being blockaded by a 
superior fleet and was in danger of being crushed as a result 
of the blockade." 

If this statement is true, so far as our nation is concerned, 
the United States has no excuse for having entered the Euro- 
pean war. If this statement is true, Germany is right in 
declaring that military necessitj' knows and needs to know 
no moral law. If this statement is true, ravaged Belgium, 
ruined Rheims, and the martyred Lusitania should no longer 
be considered as the watchwords of aroused and menaced 
civilization, but only thought of as the cynical catch phrases 
of hypocritical national egotism. 

Such a theory as this has in it the seeds of moral treason. 
Even the thoughtless betrayal of an American ideal may 
cause more lasting injury than the betrayal of a military 
secret. 

"Subtle sedition" is the characterization rightly applied to 
this theory by the New York Globe, and in vigorously com- 
bating it the Globe cites a chapter of American history 
which should be made familiar to every one tempted to doubt 
the moral character of the American spirit. The Globe's 
summary of this chapter of our history is so pertinent that 
we republish it: 

"During the Civil War the Southern Confederacy was 
blockaded far more rigorously than is Germany, for there 
were no back entries as are provided by Holland, the Scan- 
dinavian countries, and Switzerland. The Southern people 
were not only deprived of a chance to buy military supplies, 
but to buy anything. No less than three thousand vessels 
watched every inch of Southern coast. We denied to neu- 
trals the privilege of shipping to their own or neutral ports 
when in our opinion the cargoes, contraband or non-con- 
traband, were destined for the Confederacy. . . 

"Suffering from the rigor of our blockade and in danger 
of being crushed to a degree that no one proposes to crush 
Germany, the Confederate Government sent out cruisers to 
prey on our commerce and to stop contraband coming to 
Northern ports. But two things that Germany has done the 
Confederacy in its extremity never did, or, so far as known, 
ever considered doing. It did not stake out huge areas of 
the ocean and declare that any neutral ship venturing therein 
was subject to instant destruction. It did not authorize its 
cruiser commanders to carry on the destruction even against 
their enemies, much less against neutrals, without regard to 
what happened to civilians. 

"Captain Raphael Semmes, with the Alabama, went raging 
up and down the high seas. No ports were open to which 
he could send prizes and their crews, yet when he made a 
capture he provided for the safety of the captured. He was 
a sailor, not a pirate or a murderer. It was inconvenient for 
him to visit and search, and the crews he took on board 
impeded his movements. But he never thought of doing 
otherwise. He was an American, not a German of the Prus- 
sian school. There were things he would not do. He applied 
on the sea the same spirit displayed on land by General 



36 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

Longstreet in the Peninsula campaign, when he forbade the 
mining of the road along which the Union armies were 
advancing, for the reason that such mining was contrary to 
the then code of war." 

As the New York Globe infers, the man who does not 
understand the difference between the record of Captain 
Semmes and the record of the man who sank the Lusitania 
has something fundamentally the matter with his Ameri- 
canism. 

[§32] SHOULD THE UNITED STATES HAVE LAID 

AN EMBARGO ON THE SHIPMENT OF 

ARMS TO THE ALLIES? 

By the U. S. Bureau of Public Information. (June, 1917) 

In the first year of the war the Government of Germany 
stirred up among its people a feeling of resentment against 
the United States on account of our insistence upon our 
right as a neutral nation to trade in munitions with the 
belligerent powers. Our legal right in the matter was not 
seriously questioned by Germany. She could not have done 
so consistently, for as recently as the Balkan Wars of 1912 
and 1913 both Germany and Austria sold munitions to the 
belligerents. Their appeals to us in the present war were 
not to observe international law, but to revise it in their 
interest. And these appeals they tried to make on moral 
and humanitarian grounds. But upon "the moral issue" 
involved, the stand taken by the United States was con- 
sistent with its traditional policy and with obvious common 
sense. For if, with all other neutrals, we refused to sell 
munitions to belligerents, we could never in time of a war 
of our own obtain munitions from neutrals, and the nation 
which had accumulated the largest reserves of war supplies 
in time of peace would be assured of victory. The militarist 
state that invested its money in arsenals would be at a fatal 
advantage over the free people who invested their wealth in 
schools. To write into international law that neutrals should 
not trade in munitions would be to hand over the world to 
the rule of the nation with the largest armament factories. 
Such a policy the United States could not accept. 

(Pamphlet: How the War Came to America.) 

[§33] GERMAN INTRIGUES AGAINST AMERICA IN 
TIME OF PEACE. 

By the U. S. Bureau of Public Information. (June, 1917) 

Evidence of the bad faith of the Imperial German Gov- 
ernment soon piled up on every hand. Plonest efforts on our 
part to establish a firm basis of good neighborliness with the 
German people were met by their Government with quibbles, 
misrepresentations, and counter accusations against their ene- 
mies abroad. And meanwhile in this country official agents 



WHY WE ENTERED THE WAR Z7 

of the Central Powers — protected from criminal prosecution 
oy diplomatic immunity — conspired against our internal 
peace, placed spies and agents provocateurs throughout the 
length and breadth of our land, and even in high positions 
of trust in departments of our Government. While express- 
ing a cordial friendship for the people of the United States, 
the Government of Germanj^ had its agents at work both in 
Latin America and Japan. They bought or subsidized papers 
and supported speakers there to rou'se feelings of bitterness 
and distrust against us in those friendly nations, in order to 
embroil us in war. They were inciting to insurrection in 
Cuba, in Haiti, and in Santo Domingo; their hostile hand 
was stretched out to take the Danish Islands; and every- 
where in South America they were abroad sowing the seeds 
of dissension, trying to stir up one nation against another 
and all against the United States. In their sum these various 
operations amounted to direct assault upon the Monroe doc- 
trine. And even if we had given up our right to travel on 
the sea, even if we had surrendered to German threats and 
abandoned our legitimate trade in munitions, the German 
offensive in the New World, in our own land and among our 
neighbors, was becoming too serious to be ignored. 

So long as it was possible, the Government of the United 
States tried to believe that such activities, the evidence of 
which was already in a large measure at hand, were the 
work of irresponsible and misguided individuals. It was only 
reluctantly, in the face of overwhelming proof, that the recall 
of the Austro-Hungarian ambassador and of the German 
military and naval attaches was demanded. Proof of their 
criminal violations of our hospitality was presented to their 
Governments. But these Governments in reply offered no 
apologies nor did they issue reprimands. It became clear 
that such intrigue was their settled policy. 

(Pamphlet: How the War Came to America.') 

[§34] GERMANY'S ATTEMPT TO ROUSE MEXICO 
AND JAPAN. (JAN. 19, 1917.) 

On the 1st of February we intend to begin submarine war- 
fare unrestricted. In spite of this, it is our intention to en- 
deavor to keep neutral the United States of America. 

If this attempt is not successful, we propose an alliance on 
the following basis with Mexico: 

That we shall make war together and together make peace. 
We shall give general financial support and it is understood 
that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in New Mexico, 
Texas and Arizona. The details are left to you for settle- 
ment. 

You are instructed to inform the President of Mexico of 
the above in the greatest confidence as soon as it is certain 
that there will be an outbreak of war with the United States, 
and suggest that the President of Mexico, on his own initia- 
tive, should communicate with Japan suggesting adherence 
at once to this plan; at the same time, offer to mediate be- 
tween Germany and Japan. 



38 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

Please call to the attention of the President of Mexico that 
the employment of ruthless submarine warfare now promises 
to compel England to make peace in a few months. 

(Signed) ZIMMEJIMANN. 

(Intercepted despatch of the German Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs to the German Minister in Mexico.) 



[§35] C— SPECIAL REFERENCES. 

Books. 

Jones, John Price. America Entangled ; the Secret Plot- 
ting of German Spies in the United States, etc. (N. Y., 
Laut, 1917.) 

New York Times Current History. (N. Y., 1914-1917.) 
(The successive volumes contain much of the diplo- 
matic correspondence, and a record of the events 
which led America into the war.) 

Ohlinger, Gustavus. Their True Faith and Allegiance. 
(N. Y., Macmillan, 1917.) 

Scott, James Brown. The American View of the War 
Against 'the Imperial German Government. (N. Y., 
Oxford Univ. Press, 1917.) (Part II contains the 
official documents.) 

Story of the Great War. (N. Y., .Colliers, 1916.) (Vols. 
III-V give accounts of the submarine campaign and 
of the diplomatic correspondence.) 

U. S. Department of State — Diplomatic Correspondence 
between the United States and Belligerent Govern- 
ments Relating to Neutral Rights and Commerce. 
(Special supplements, Ain. Jour, of Int. Law, IX, 
1915; X, 1916.) 

U. S. Bureau of Public Information. How the War 
Came to America. (Wash., Govt. Print. Office, 1917.) 

Articles. 

Am. Acad, of Pol. and Soc. Sci., "American Interests as 

Affecting the European War," in Annals IX (July, 

1915.) 
Cabot, Richard W. "America's Duty To-day." Outlook 

(April 4, 1917.) 
Garner, J. W. "Some Questions of International Law in 

the European War." Am. Jour, of Int. Law (IX, X, 

XI). 
Hart, A. B., "Unarmed Neutrality" in Ibid, LX (July 19, 

1916). 
Hill, D. J., "An Impending Danger to the Republic." Ibid, 

pp. 801-811 (Dec, 1911). 



WHY WE ENTERED THE WAR 39 

Low, A. M, "Freedom of the Seas'^' in No. Am Re- 
view, Vol. 202, pp. 395-403 (Sept., 1915). 

Munroe, Smith. "American Diplomacy in the European 
War." Poltt. Sci. Quarterly (XXXI, 481). 

Ohlinger, Gustavus. "German Propaganda in the US" 
Atlantic (April, 1917). 

Stowell, Ellery C., "Not Blockade, But War." Independ- 
ent. (Feb. 12, 1917.) 

"The Facts behind the Phrase." New Republic (Feb 3 
1917). • V u. o, 

"The War and the Common Welfare." Survev (Tulv 7 
1911). -^ ^ ' 



CHAPTER III. 

WHY THE UNITED STATES MUST CONTINUE 
^ IN THE WAR. 

A.— SUMMARY STATEMENT. 

[^36] Though the immediate occasion of the entrance of the 
United States into the war was Germany's aggression upon 
our maritime rights, and her announced determination to con- 
tinue to murder our nationals' upon the high seas, a mere 
enumeration of Germany's acts of war against us does not 
make clear the deeper grounds for our decision, nor the reasons 
why we must continue to bear our part in the struggle until its 
essential objects are accomplished. Germany's wrong-doing 
against us served to bring the American mind at last to a full 
realization of the larger issues of the struggle in Europe, of the 
great human interests at stake, and of the spirit and character 
of the enemy we have to face. A failure to intervene would 
have been equivalent to a deliberate acceptance by us of the 
following results of such failure : 

[%S7] (1) Submission to Germany's denial of our rights 
would have meant, not simply the sacrifice of our material in- 
terests ; it would have meant that the American Republic would 
have become a legitimate object of contempt to all peoples, in 
view of so unmistakable a proof that the most solemn declara- 
tions of our government were empty words, without power or 
genuine purpose behind them. Thereafter the United States 
would have neither received nor deserved consideration in the 
councils of the nations. The ability of America in the future to 
serve those ideals for which it stands would thus have been 
incalculably weakened. 

[§38] (2) By submission, even without armed aid to Ger- 
many, we should have made ourselves effectual allies of the 
Central Powers against Great Britain, France, Belgium, Russia 
and Italy. For, if Germany could coerce us into closing our ports 
against exports to Europe, her submarine campaign would be 
virtually won. Germany compelled us to choose whether we 
would fight for her or against her. For the consequences of her 
victory we should thus have shared the moral responsibility. But 
to avert those consequences was a duty to which we were called 
by every consideration of loyalty to our national ideals and of 
prudence in safe-guarding our national security. 

[§39] (3) A partial or complete victory of Germany would 
mean that the German manner of initiating and conducting war 
would be vindicated by success, and would be the model to be 
followed in future wars by Germany herself, or by any other 
ambitious nation which might be tempted by her victory to 
imitate her methods. The essential principle of those methods 

[4C] 



WHY WE MUST CONTINUE IN WAR 41 

is that no considerations of humanity, good faith, honor or 
chivalry are to be allowed to stand in the way of any military 
advantage of Germany; that neutrals have no rights which a 
belligerent is bound to respect, if it finds it advantageous to 
violate them; and that the presence of German armies on foreign 
soil is to be made so terrible to the civilian population that all 
peoples may be made afraid to oppose so ruthless a force. In 
their details, these methods have included the killing of innocent 
hostages in occupied territory; the drowning on the high seas of 
women and children of neutral nationality; the deportation of 
thousands of non-combatants, including women and young girls, 
from their homes, to serve at forced labor in Germany; the 
tnassacre of more than half a million Armenians (by Turkish 
troops subject to the control of resident German officials) ; the 
sinking of hospital ships and drowning of wounded soldiers and 
Red Cross nurses. It must be made clear by this war that any 
country that adopts such principles and employs such methods 
will bring upon itself, not merely the condemnation, but the 
effectual opposition, of the whole civilized world. 

[§40] (4) A German victory would be based wholly upon 
treaty-breaking and violation of international law and interna- 
tional compacts. It would therefore mean that all such laws and 
compacts would hereafter have little or no force. After this 
great example of their futility, and of the advantage to be gained 
by regarding solemn treaties as "scraps of paper," no nation 
could afford to place reliance in them. A victory over Germany 
is therefore essential to all peace-loving peoples that desire that, 
among nations, as among individuals, respect for contracts shall 
be enforced and a reign of law shall prevail. 

[§41] (5) Germany's victory (if her European antagonists 
should be compelled to accept the terms upon which, in that 
case, she would unquestionably insist) would involve the annexa- 
tion of part or all of Belgium and of the most valuable part of 
Northern France. America could not without shame stand by 
and see these wrongs triumphantly consummated. 

[§42] (6) Victorious Germany, with ambitions unsatiated, 
would menace the security of the United States, and especially 
the INIonroe Doctrine. That danger this country would be com- 
pelled to face without allies or friends anywhere, if it had 
refused to support the common cause of humanity in this crisis. 

[§43] (7) A peace without either such a defeat of Germany 
as will weaken the German power and influence over central 
Europe, or else a radical transformation of the temper as well 
as the form of the German government, would mean that the 
most formidable political and military combination in the world 
— a compact body of more than one hundred and fifty million 
people, comprising Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and 
Turkey, and, probably, eventually other countries — would be con- 
trolled in its foreign and rriilitary policy by the spirit and the 
ambitions of the hereditary rulers and the miHtary leaders of 
Prussia. Their prestige would be heightened through success in a 
great war; they would be confirmed in their belief in the profit- 
ableness of aggression ; they would be animated by bitter hostil- 
ity to the democracies which had recently opposed them. Under 



42 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

such conditions it would be impossible that the world should be 
"safe for democracy," or that there should be any prospect of a 
lasting peace. The object of this war should be, if it be possible, 
to end war; but the success of Germany would cause the shadow 
of war to rest for generations upon mankind. The affairs of the 
entire globe would be dominated by a vast Empire seated upon 
nine seas — a Power contemptuous of other peoples, without 
regard for its plighted word, alien to the spirit of kindliness 
and fraternity, looking upon force and sinister intrigue as the 
only means for the adjustment of the relations between states, 
and inimical to the ideals of free government. 

[§44] To the unhappy and misguided people of Germany, 
Americans wish no ill. But the world can never be secure and 
wholesome again, nor its peoples dwell together in quietness and 
confidence, until those who have first misled and corrupted the 
German conscience, and then brought this immeasurable disaster 
upon mankind, are utterly discredited, by the failure of their 
methods and the defeat of their purposes and ambitions ; so that 
all men may know that henceforth the human race will not 
permit so evil a spirit to triumph upon the earth. 

[§4S] What, then, h now being settled on the battlefields of 
Europe, is the character of the coming world-order. Is it to be 
ruled by the temper and the moral and political ideas of which 
the Prussian system has become the chief embodiment in the 
modern world, or by those to which America is dedicated — by 
the spirit of William the Second or the spirit of Lincoln? A 
war in which such a question is at issue is the concern of every 
people that loves peace and justice and freedom; but of none is 
it so greatly the concern as of the people of the United States. 
It is America's war more than it is any other nation's ; for in it 
is at stake all that America has stood for, and that has made 
the name of America a symbol of hope to mankind. 



B.— ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS. 

/. GERMAN SPIRIT AND GOVERNMENT. 

[§46] THE SUPERIORITY OF GERMANIC CULTURE. 

By Various Germans. 

One single highly cultured German warrior, of those who are, 
alas ! falling in thousands, represents a higher intellectual and 
moral life-value than hundreds of the raw children of nature 
{N attirmenschen) whom England and France, Russia and Italy, 
oppose to them. — (Ernst Haeckel, celebrated zoologist.) 

Our belief is that the salvation of the whole Kultur of Europe 
depends upon the victory which German "militarism" is about 
to achieve. — (Manifesto signed by 3,500 professors and lecturers.) 

We must win, because, if we were defeated, no one in the 



WHY WK MUST CONTINUE IN WAR 43 

zvhole world could any longer cherish any remnant of belief in 
truth and right, in the Good, or, indeed, in any higher Power 
which wisely and justly guides the destinies of humanity. — (W. 
Helm.) 

No nation in the world can give us anything worth mention- 
ing in the field of science or technology, art or literature, which 
we should have any trouble in doing without. Let us reflect on 
the inexhaustible wealth of the German character, which con- 
tains in itself everything of real value that the Kultur of man 
can produce. — (Werner- Sombart, a well-known German econo- 
mist.) 

Archer's Gems (?) of German Thought, passim. 

[§47] THE GERMAN GOD. 

By Various German Writers. 

Now we understand why the other nations pursue us with 
their hatred : they do not understand us, but they are sensible 
of our enormous spiritual superiority. So the Jews were hated 
in antiquity, because they were the, representatives of God on 
earth.— (Prof. W. Sombart.) 

There is a gospel saying which burst the bonds of its original 
historical meaning and takes new wings in the storm of the 
world-war, a saying which we may well take as the consecration 
of our German mission: "Ye are the salt of the earth! Ye are 
the light of the world!" — (Prof. A. Deissmann.) 

Germany is the centre of God's plan for the world. — ("On the 
German God," by Pastor W. Lehmann.) 

It was the hidden meaning of God that He made Israel the 
forerunner (Vordeuter) of the Messiah, and in the same way He 
has by His hidden intent designated the German people to be 
His successor. — (Dr. Preuss.) (The foregoing taken from 
Archer, Gems (?) of German Thought, passim.) 

In a modern German school book we read that "Christ shall 
be a German Christ for us Germans," and that God has a special 
mission for Germany, as distinct from the rest of the world, in 
virtue of which Germany "cannot succumb and die, but must 
live and conquer.'" — (J. P. Bang, Professor of Theology at the 
University of Copenhagen, Christianity and Nationality.) 

The more exclusively Jesus is preached, the less does He help 
to form States; and where Christianity attempted to come for- 
ward as a constructive force, that is, to form States, to domi- 
nate civilization, there it was furthest away from the Gospel of 
Jesus. Now this means, for our practical life, that we construct 
our house of the State, not with the cedars of Lebanon, but 
with the building stones from the Roman Capitol. . . . Hence 
we do not consult Jesus when we are concerned with things 
which belong to the domain of the construction of the State 
and of Political Economy. This sounds harsh and abrupt for 
every human being brought up a Christian, but appears to be 
sound Lutheranism. — (From Friedrich Naumann's Brief e iiber 
Religion, 5th ed., Berlin, 1910, 86, 87; in Friedrich von Hiigel's 
The German Soul, p. 58.) 



44 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

Lift up your heads ! Look to the heights, bend your knees 
before the Great Ally, who has never forsaken the Germans, 
and who, if He has at times allowed them to be sorely tried and 
discouraged, has again raised them from the dust. — (Speech of 
William II at Koenigsberg, June 30, 1903; from Gauss, The 
German Emperor, 231.) 

Just as the great King (William I) was never left in the 
lurch by the old Ally, so our Fatherland and this beautiful 
province will always be near His heart. — (Speech at Breslau, 
Sept. 8, 1906; ibid, 246.) 



[§48] WHY GERMANY IS NOT A DEMOCRACY. 

1. Because Prussia, which dominates the German Empire and 
comprises two-thirds of its population, is ruled by a king who 
professes to hold his crown by divine right. The Prussian Con- 
stitution exists only by the king's pleasure, and may be revoked 
by him whenever he sees fit. 

2. Because the entire executive power of the German Empire 
is wielded by the Imperial Chancellor, appointed by the Em- 
peror, to whom' alone he is responsible, and by whom alone he 
can be removed. 

3. Because the greater part of the legislative power of the 
Empire is wielded by the Bundesrat, which represents solely the 
rulers of the twenty-five federated states. In this body most 
legislation is initiated; its consent is necessary to every law 
passed by the Reichstag; and through it the Princes of Germany, 
and chiefly the Emperor (as King of Prussia), who directly 
controls one-third of its votes, have an absolute veto upon the 
action of the Reichstag. 

4. Because the Emperor, in conjunction with the Bundesrat, 
has power to declare war without consulting the Reichstag. In 
case of alleged attack by a foreign country, he may — as in 1914 
— declare war without even the consent of the Bundesrat. 

5. Because the electoral districts of the Reichstag (which 
have not been changed since 1871) are so unequal that, while a 
Berlin deputy represents on the average 125,000 voters, a deputy 
from the Junker districts of East Prussia represents only 24,000. 
This gives a wholly disproportionate voting power to the agrarian 
interests and the landed aristocracy. 

6. Because the kingdom of Prussia is likewise ruled by an 
executive responsible neither to Parliament nor to the people, 
but only to the sovereign. 

7. Because the upper house of the Prussian Diet consists of 
members of the nobility, created and selected by the king, and 
is for all practical purposes completely subject to his control. 

8. Because the House of Representatives in the Prussian 
Diet is elected in the following manner : the voters in each dis- 
trict are divided into three classes according to the taxes paid 
by them. Those few who pay the first third of the entire tax 
constitute one class; those who pay the second third, another; 
while the third class consists of those who pay the remainder 
of the taxes. Each of these groups, voting separately, elects an 



WHY WE AlUST CONTINUE IN WAR 45 

equal number of delegates to a convention, which chooses the 
representatives of that constituency in the lower house of the 
Diet. By this unequal franchise, the 4% of the population, 
making up the first -class, have as much representation in the 
Diet as the 82% making up the third class. In one district, for 
example, 370 rich men had the same voting capacity as 22,000 
poor men ; in some districts a single individual constitutes the 
first class, and exercises one-third of the voting power. 

9. Because the Great General Staff of the German army, which 
is subject to no civil or elective authority but only to the Em- 
peror, is practically one of the principal organs of government, 
exercising in many matters an authority superior to that of 
either the Diet or the Reichstag. An eminent German publicist. 
Professor Delbriick, has recently declared : "The essence of our 
monarchy resides in its relations with the army. Whoever 
knows our officers must know that they would never tolerate 
the government of a minister of war issuing from parliament." 

(Summarized for this Handbook. For an excellent brief ac- 
count of the German constitution, see Germany, Last Stronghold 
of Autocracy, by Professor C. D. Hazen of Columbia Univer- 
sity, in N'eiu York Times, June 22, 1917, from which some of 
the above statements are abridged. Another convenient sum- 
mary may be found in "Germany's Long Road to Democracy," 
World's Work, June, 1917.) 

[§49] A KING "BY DIVINE RIGHT." 
By Emperor William II. (Aug. 25, 1910.) 

Here it was that the Great Elector, by his own right, created 
himself the Sovereign Duke in Prussia; here his son crowned 
himself as King; and the sovereign house of Brandenburg thus 
became one of the European powers. . . . And here my 
grandfather, again by his own right, set the Prussian crown upon 
his head, once more distinctly emphasizing the fact that it was 
accorded him by the will of God alone, and not by Parliament, 
or by any assemblage of the people, or by popular vote, and 
that he thus looked upon himself as the chosen instrument of 
heaven and as such performed his duties as regent and sovereign. 

(Speech as King of Prussia, at Koenigsberg; from Gauss, The 
German Emperor, 279.) 



[§50] THOR'S HAMMER-CAST. 
By Felix Dahn (1878). 

Thor stood at the midnight end of the world, 
His battle-mace flew from his hand : 

"So far as my clangorous hammer I've hurled 
Mine are the sea and the land !" 

And onward hurtled (.he mighty sledge 
O'er the wide, wide earth, to fall 

At last on the Southland's furthest edge 



46 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

In token that His was all. 
Since then 'tis the joyous German right 

With the hammer lands to win. 
We mean to inherit world-wide might 

As the Hammer-God's kith and kin. 

(Used by Tannenberg as motto for his Gross-Deutschland. 
Translation cited from Archer, Gems of Gerinan Thought.) 

[§51] A PAN-GERMANIST'S PROGRAM. 

By Otto Richard Tannenberg. 

The German- people must take possession of Central Africa 
from the mouth of the Orange River to Lake Tchad, and from 
the Kamerun Mountains to the mouth of the River Ro- 
vuma; of the Near East; of the Malayan Islands; and finally, 
of the southern half of South America. It will then have .a 
colonial empire commensurate with its power. A politics of 
fine sentiments (GefUhlspoIitik) is stupidity; humanitarian 
dreams are mere silliness. Charity begins at home. Politics 
is business. Right and wrong are ideas that have a necessary 
place only in the life of the private citizen. The German people 
is always right, because it is German and because it numbers 
eighty-seven millions. Our fathers have left us much still to do. 

(Tannenberg, Gross-Deutschland, 1911, p. 231, translated for 
this Handbook.) 



II. GERMAN METHODS IN WAR. 

[§52] GERMAN THEORY OF THE CONDUCT OF 

WAR. 

By German Military Writers, 

Whoever uses force, without any consideration and without 
sparing blood, has sooner or later the advantage if the enemy 
does not proceed in the same way. One cannot introduce a 
principle of moderation into the philosophy of war without com- 
mitting an absurdity. It is a vain and erroneous tendency to 
wish to neglect the element of brutality in war merely because 
we dislike it. — (Von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, I, 4.) 

It would be giving up ourselves to a chimera not to realize 
that war in the present will have to be conducted more reck- 
lessly, less scrupulously, more violently, more ruthlessly, than 
ever in the past. . . . Distress, the deep misery of war, must 
not be spared to the enemy State. The burden must be and 
must remain crushing. The necessity of imposing it follows 
from the very idea of national war. . . . That individuals 
may be severely affected when one makes an example of them 
intended to serve as a deterrent, is truly deplorable for them. 
But for the people as a whole this severity exercised against 



WHY WE AfUST CONTINUE IN WAR 47 

individuals is a salutary blessing. When national war has broken 
out, terrorism becomes a principle which is necessary from a 
military standpoint. — (General J. Von Hartmann, cited in Lavisse 
and Afidler, German Theory and Practice of War.) 

[§53] GERMAN PROCLAMATIONS IN OCCUPIED 
TERRITORY. 

The following are a few examples of proclamations issued by 
German military commanders in occupied towns in Belgium and 
France, illustrating chiefly the practice of taking hostages, to be 
shot in case of any disorder, or even of injury to railways and 
telegraph lines (whether or not such injury is shown to be 
committed by inhabitants of the town). The French text of the 
proclamation at Brussels is here printed; the others are given 
only in translation. An extensive collection of these proclama- 
tions may be found in photographic reproductions, in Scraps of 
Paper, New York, Hodder & Stoughton, 1916. 

Proclamation at Brussels. 

A I'avenir les localites situees pres de I'encroit ou a eu lieu la 
destruction des chemins de fer et lignes telegraphiques seront 
punies sans pitie (il n"importe qu'elles soient coupables ou non 
de ces actes). Dans ce but des otages ont ete pris dans toutes 
les localites situees pres des chemins de fer qui sont menaces de 
pareilles attaques ; et au premier attentat a la destruction des 
lignes de chemins de fer, de lignes telegraphiques ou lignes 
telephoniques, ils seront immcdiatement fusilles. 

Bruxelles, le 5 Octobre 1914. 

Le Gouverneur, 
VON DER GOLTZ. 

Proclamation at Brussels. 

In future the inhabitants of places situated near railways and 
telegraph lines which have been destroyed will be punished with- 
out mercy (whether they are guilty of this destruction or not). 
For this purpose, hostages have been taken in all places in the 
vicinity of railways in danger of similar attacks; and at the first 
attempt to destroy any railway, telegraph, or telephone line, 
they will be shot immediately. 

Brussels, 5th October, 1914. 

The Governor, 
VON DER GOLTZ. 

Proclamation at Rheims. 

Notice to the Popxilation. 

In order sufficiently to ensure the safety of our troops and 
the tranquility of the population of Rheims the persons men- 
tioned have been seized as hostages by the Commander of 
the German Army. These hostages will be shot if there is 
the least disorder. On the other hand, if the town remains 



4G ■ HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

perfectly calm and quiet, these hostages and inhabitants will 
be placed under the protection of the German Army. 

THE GENERAL COMMANDING. 
Rheims, 12th September, 1914. 

Proclamation at Luneville. 

Inhabitants of both sexes are strictly forbidden to leave 
their houses so far as this is not absolutely necessary for 
making short rounds, in order to buy provisions or water 
their cattle. They are absolutely forbidden to leave their 
houses at night under any circumstances whatever. 

Whoever attempts to leave the place, by night or day, upon 
any pretext whatever will be shot. 

Potatoes can only be dug with the Commandant's consent 
and under military supervision. 

The German troops have orders to carry out these direc- 
tions strictly, by sentinels and patrols, who are authorized to 
fire on any one departing from these directions. 

THE GENERAL COMMANDING. 



[§54] THE DEPORTATIONS AT LILLE. 

By Three French Women. 

This week has been terrible for our unhappy town: 1,200 to 
1,500 people have been carried off every night, escorted by 
soldiers with fixed bayonets and bands playing, machine guns 
at the corners of the streets, principally girls and young women 
of all sorts, also men from 15 to 50, sent off promiscuously in 
cattle trucks with wooden benches, for unknown destinations and 
employments, nominally to work on the land. You can imagine 
the despair and agony of their relations. We learn this after- 
noon that the horrible business is over and our quarter has been 
spared. 



Horrible affair at Lille, tell it everywhere; the deportation of 
6,000 women and 6,000 men ; for eight nights at two in the morn- 
ing, districts invested by the 64th Regiment (spread it in France 
that it came from Verdun), forcibly dragged off girls of 18 
and women up to 45 ; 2,000 a night. Herded in a factory ; sorted 
out during the day and carried off in the evening; scattered 
from Seclin to Sedan in abandoned villages, farms, etc. ; cook 
and wash for the soldiers, replacing orderlies sent to the front ; 
working on the land, especially servants and working girls, few 
girls of good family. Rue Royale, hardly any servants left; 
crowded in with men of all ages without distinction; horrible 
immorality; some German officers refused to obey, some soldiers 
were crying, the rest brutal. Ernest W. carried off, his brother 
C. was one day in the fortress for having protested, sons have 
remained; X. is near Hirson. Mile. B. and Mile, de B. carried 



WHY WE MUST CONTINUE IN WAR 49 

ih"". vvanted vo follow some poor girls who were their protegees; 
came to my house at four in the morning, no one taken ; no one 
came to No. 14. Protests by the mayors and the sousprefets. 
Useless. Same operations at Tourcoing (6,000) and at Roubaix 
(4,000). The town is in despair. 



Mme. J. R. , aged 25, maker of paper-bags, deported from 

S writes: "All we women were subjected to inspection 

every' five days, like women of the town. Those who did not 
accomplish their task (namely, sewing 25 sacks) were beaten by 
the Germans, especially with a cat-o' -nine-tails. This ill-treat- 
ment was mostly inflicted by a sergeant named Franz; I cannot 
give the name of his regiment. There were four to look after 
us For the least thing the Germans used to insult and threaten 

us' . One girl, J. G , of S (I cannot give her 

exact address), was beaten with the cat and had a jug of water 
poured over her head because she asked for somethmg to eat 

A certain A (I cannot give any further description of her) 

v.as so severely beaten that she was taken to the hospital, and 

we did not see her again." ^ ^. , . t;ii.^ 

(From The Deportation of Women and Girls from Lille.) 

[§55] A GERMAN EYE-WITNESS ON THE ARMENIAN 
MASSACRES. 

By Dr. Martin Niepage. 

(A word to Germany's Accredited Representatives by Dr^ Martin 
Niepage, Higher Grade Teacher in the German Technical 
School at Aleppo, at present at Wernigerode.) 
When I returned to Aleppo in September, 1915. from a three 
months' holiday at Beirout, I heard with horror that a new 
phase of Armenian massacres had begun which were far more 
terrible than the earlier massacres under Abdul-Hamid and 
which aimed at exterminating, root and branch, the mtelligent. 
industrious, and progressive Armenian nation, and at trans- 
ferring its property to Turkish hands. _ 

Such monstrous news left me at first incredulous. I was told 
that, in various quarters of Aleppo, there were lying masses ot 
half-starved people, the survivors of so-called "deportation con- 
voys." In order, I was told, to cover the extermination of the 
Armenian nation with a political cloak, military reasons were 
being put forward, which were said to make it necessary to drive 
\he Armenians out of their native seats, which had been theirs 
for 2,500 years, and to deport them to the Arabian deserts. I 
was also told that individual Armenians had lent themselves to 

acts of espionage. j , , j^ 

After I had informed myself about the facts and had niade 
inquiries on all sides, I came to the conclusion that all these 
accusations against the Armenians were, in fact, based on tnflmg 
provocations, which were taken as an excuse for slaughtering 
10000 innocents for one guilty person, for the most savage out- 



so HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

rages against women and children, and for a campaign of starva- 
tion against the exiles which was intended to exterminate the 
whole nation. 

To test the conclusion derived from my information, I visited 
all the places in the city where there were Armenians hf<- 'jehind 
by the convoys. In dilapidated caravansaries (hans) I found 
quantities of dead, many corpses being half-decomposed ad 
others, still living, among them, who were soon to breathe their 
last. In other yards I found quantities of sick and starving 
people whom no one was looking after. In the neighborhood of 
the German Technical School, at which I am employed as a 
higher grade teacher, there were four such hans, with seven or 
eight hundred exiles dying of starvation,- We teachers and our 
pupils had to pass by them every day. Every time we went out 
we saw through the open windows their pitiful forms, emaciated 
and wrapped in rags. In the mornings our school children, on 
their way through the narrow streets, had to push past the two- 
wheeled ox-carts, on which every day from eight to ten rigid 
corpses, without coffin or shroud, were carried away, their arms 
and legs trailing out of the vehicle. 

After I had shared this spectacle for several days I thought 
it my duty to compose the following report : 

"As teachers in the German Technical School at Aleppo, we 
permit ourselves with all respect to make the following report : 

"We feel it our duty to draw attention to the fact that our 
educational work will forfeit its moral basis and the esteem of 
the natives, if the German Government is not in a position to 
put a stop to the brutality with which the wives and children of 
slaughtered Armenians are being treated here. 

"Out of convoys which, when they left their homes on the 
Armenian plateau, numbered from two to three thousand men, 
women and children, only two or three hundred survivors arrive 
here in the south. The men are slaughtered on the way; the 
women and girls, with the exception of the old, the ugly and 
those who are still children, have been abused by Turkish 
soldiers and officers and then carried away to Turkish and 
Kurdish villages, where they have to accept Islam. They try to 
destroy the remnant of the convoys by hunger and thirst. Even 
when they are fording rivers they do not allow those dying of 
thirst to drink. All the nourishment thoy receive is a daily 
ration of a little meal sprinkled over their hands, which they 
lick off greedily, and its only effect is to protract their starva- 
tion. 

"And what becomes of these poor people who have been driven 
in thousands through Aleppo and the neighborhood into the 
deserts, reduced almost entirely, by this time, to women and 
children They are driven on and on from one place to another. 
The thousands shrink to hundreds and the hundreds to tiny 
remnants, and even these remnants are driven on till the last is 
dead. Then at last they have reached the goal of their wander- 
ing, the 'New Homes assigned to the Armenians,' as the news- 
papers phrase it. 

"r&'ahrn ei aleman' ('the teaching of the Germans') is the 



WHY WE MUST CONTINUE IN WAR 51 

simple Turk's explanation to everyone who asks him about the 
originators of these measures. 

"The educated Moslems are convinced that, even though the 
German nation discountenances such horrors, the German Gov- 
ernment is taking no steps to put a stop to them, out of con- 
sideration for its Turkish Ally. 

"Mohammedans, too, of more sensitive feelings — Turks and 
Arabs alike — shake their heads in disapproval and do not con- 
ceal their tears when they see a convoy of exiles marching 
through the city, and Turkish soldiers using cudgels upon 
women in advanced pregnancy and upon dying people who can 
no longer drag themselves along. They cannot believe that their 
government has ordered these atrocities, and they hold the Ger- 
mans responsible for all such outrages, Germany being considered 
during the war as Turkey's schoolmaster in everything. Even 
the mollahs in the mosques say that it was not the Sublime 
Porte but the German officers who ordered the ill-treatment and 
destruction of the Armenians. 

"The things which have been passing here for months under 
everybody's eyes will certainly remain as a stain on Germany's 
shield in the memory of Orientals. . . . 

"I know for a fact that the Embassy at Constantinople has 
been informed by the German Consulates of all that has been 
happening. As, however, there has not been so far the least 
change in the system of deportation, I feel myself compelled by 
conscience to make my present report." 

What we saw with our own eyes here in Aleppo was really 
only the last scene in the great tragedy of the extermination of 
the Armenians. It was only a minute fraction of the horrible 
drama that was being played out simultaneously in all the other 
provinces of Turkey. Many more appalling things were re- 
ported by the engineers of the Bagdad Railway, when they came 
back from their work on the section under construction or by 
German travellers who met the convoys of exiles on their jour- 
neys. Many of these gentlemen had seen such appalling sights 
that they could eat nothing for days. 

The German Consul from Mosul related, in my presence, at 
the German club at Aleppo, that, in many places on the road 
from Mosul to Aleppo, he had seen children's hands lying hacked 
off in such numbers that one could have paved the road with 
them. In the German hospital at Ourfa there was a little girl 
who had had both her hands hacked off. 

In an Arab village on the way to Aleppo Herr Holstein, the 
German Consul from Mosul, saw shallow graves with freshly- 
buried Armenian corpses. The Arabs of the village declared 
that they had killed these Armenians by the government's orders. 
One asserted proudly that he personally had killed eight. 

(Dr. Martin Niepage, The Horrors of Aleppo. The full state- 
ment in English translation may be had from G. H. Doran Co., 
N. YD 



52 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

III. GERMANY'S WAR AIMS. 

[§56] WHAT GERMANS HOPE TO WIN BY A 
VICTORY. 

By Charles H. Beard, Professor in Columbia University. 

Herr Grumbach, with Teutonic thoroughness, has brought 
together a stout volume of papers and documents which 
prove that the dominant figures in Germany (with few ex- 
ceptions) consider peace without annexations and indemni- 
ties in no other light than that of a humiliating defeat. 
Here are hundreds of extracts from German speeches, official 
declarations, party resolutions, editorials, pamphlets, maga- 
zine and newspaper articles (in the original tongue, with 
authorities cited), all showing that in almost every circle, 
high and low, throughout the German Empire the Russian 
formula has been a hated phrase. The persons quoted 
include the Emperor and the King of Bavaria, ministers of 
state, high imperial officers, important men of affairs, generah 
in the army (active and retired), professors, members of the 
Reichstag, members of the Prussian Landtag, socialists, pub- 
licists, and pamphleteers. All upper-class parties and all 
interests are fully represented; the Conservatives, the Cen- 
ter, the National Liberals, the Progressive People's Party, 
and the minor factions are all on record. As if with one 
voice they proclaim to the world that for Germany the ter- 
ritorial status quo ante is impossible, unthinkable. Against 
this doctrine can be marshalled only a few protests from 
Social Democrats and scattered individuals. 

The Kaiser calls for peace that will offer to Germany "free 
seas" and "necessary military, political, and economic secur- 
ities." The King of Bavaria declares that "a strengthening 
of the German Empire and an expansion beyond its present 
boundaries, so far as this is necessary to guarantee security 
against future '^attacks — such is to be the fruit of this war." 
The Duke of Mecklenburg demands a peace that will give 
the empire a mighty colonial dominion in Africa and a suf- 
ficient number of strongholds scattered throughout the world 
for coaling stations, wireless towers, and trading posts. 
Bethmann-Hollweg calmly informs us that the conditions 
before the war cannot be restored and that peace can only 
come when Germany is established in an impregnable posi- 
tion. He further adds that if anyone thinks that Germany 
will, surrender the conquered territories of the west without 
guaranties that Belgium will not again become a vassal state 
of England and France, he is sadly mistaken. "This means," 
he continues significantly, "no status quo ante — Germany 
cannot again abandon the long oppressed Flemish people to 
alien dominion" fVerwelschung). The Secretary of State 
for the Colonies announces that Germany has no intention 
of surrendering her oversea dominions, but will, on the con- 
trary, seek to strengthen and develop her colonial posses- 
sions. 



WHY WE MUST CONTINUE IN WAR 53 

The former Chancellor, Fiirst Biilow, fankly holds that 
the simple restoration of the condition before the war would 
be not a gain but a loss {nicht Gewinn, sondern Verlust) — 
not victory, but defeat. Therefore he demands annexations 
east and west. "The French simply cannot understand the 
fact that what they regard as the brutal harshness of a 
conqueror is merely national necessity for us Germans. Per- 
haps the French will in the course of time acquiesce in the 
provisions of the Frankfort peace (1871) if it is at last real- 
ized that they are unchangeable, and especially if we succeed 
in developing our still unfavorable strategic position over 
against France." The poor French, they cannot understand 
that German brutality is at bottom necessitarian generosity! 

According to Ernst Haeckel's program: (a) Belgium is to 
be divided, the greatest portion to go to Germany direct, a 
second part to Luxemburg (which is to become a German 
state), and a third part [astounding generosity] to fall to 
Holland (b) Germany is to seize most of the British colonies 
and the Belgian Congo; (c) the northeastern provinces of 
France are to go to Germany; (d) the kingdom of Poland is to 
be restored and united with Austria-Hungary; (e) the Baltic 
provinces to be "restored" to Germany. Such was the rea- 
soned answer which the learned doctor gave to the inquirmg 
president of the Berlin Monist Association. 

(Review of S. Grumbach's "Das annexionistische Deutsch- 
land'' in New Republic, July 14, 1917). 

[§57] PROJECT OF A MITTELEUROPA. 

By Bruno Lasker. 

Friedrich JSIaumann, as a member of the Reichstag, editor of 
Die Hilfe, founder and leader of the Deutsche Volkspartei, is one 
of the greatest powers in the Germany of today. Starting from 
an intense interest in legislative, social and fiscal reform, he did 
not, like Bryan in this country, and Lloyd George in England, 
take for granted the stability of his country's foreign relation- 
ships, but for long included in the objects of his political activity 
far-reaching aims of external economic and imperialist expan- 
sion. His Neudeutsche Wirtschaftspolitik, published about ten 
years ago, was one of the most widely read expositions of the 
policy of pan-Germanism applied to the economic and diplomatic 
lields 

His book, while it carefully avoids to name the child of his 
desire, is propaganda for a greater German empire, taking in the 
whole of Austria and Hungary and their dependent states— with 
a distant view to incorporation of Denmark, Holland, Switzer- 
land, the Kurland provinces of Russia, the Flemish half of 
Belgium, Luxembourg, of course, and possibly Poland— an em- 
oire loosely knit as was the Holy Roman Empire of the German 
nation, yet dominated by the political ideals and actual control 
of Prussia. He is careful not to call his "Mid-Europe" an em- 
pire; but it is clear from his detailed considerations of necessary 



54 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR i 

future developments that he has in mind a constellation at least 
as coherent and as centralized as is the British empire with its '• 
vast self-governing dominions beyond the seas. ' 

No one who believes in world empires or who accepts as a ' 
fact the assertion that the future progress of civilization is j 
bound up with the maintenance of an equilibrium between two or 
more large and politically compact groups of nations, can logically 
dispute the soundness of Naumann's argument that the security | 
of Germany lies in the renascence of that greater Germany ■ 
which Bismarck tried to create, until he realized that a nation- 
alized lesser Germany, if it could be formed without detriment ' 
to the grander idea, was an aim of more immediate promise. 
Now, a closer reunion with Austria would seem both an economic ' 
and a military necessity— would seem, for in this contention the ' 
author makes a number of assumptions which cannot be granted 
as valid beyond dispute. ' 

One of them is that "after the experiences of the present war 
no isolated country can remain unintrenched" ; that Austria 
and Germany, no matter what their present political relations, 
must face the alternative of cancelling their' separate foreign 
offices and making a joint cause in every external issue affecting 
them both, or of entrenching their respective frontiers on the 
ridges of the Erzgebirge,. the Riesengebirge and the Boehmer- 
wald. He will admit of no other form of effective military 
preparedness. ... 

If the war ends with the creation of mid-Europe as planned 
by Naumann— federation, super-state, military and economic 
alliance, or whatever name may disguise its essentially imperial 
structure — the fate of the smaller nationalities of Europe will 
be sealed. The tragedy of Bohemia, of Poland, of Bosnia, of 
Alsace-Lorraine, of Schleswig — of every territory inhabited by 
freedom-loving peoples with cultural and political ideas of their 
own — will be re-enacted on an even larger scale. For the con- 
centration of power in central Europe must also lead to a similar 
centralization in the rest of the world, threatening once more 
the political autonomy now almost assured for Ireland and the 
constituent nationalities of Russia. 

Review by Bruno Lasker of Naumann's Central Europe in 
The Survey, July 21, 1917.) 

IV. MEANING AND OBJECTS OF AMERICA'S WAR. 

[§58] WHY WE MUST FIGHT. 

By Franklin K. Lane, Secretary of the Interior. (July 5, 1917) 

[Message to the Chautauqua Conference of the National Security 

League.] 

This is to be a nation in arms for an indefinite time. We 
cannot know how long. We have no delusions as to the way 
being easy; for if there is a horror or a terror or a cruelty 
that has not been used in this war there is but one explanation — 
it has not been thought of. The chivalry of war is a thing for 
the grim humor of a Dante to deal with. Those gentlemen of 
the middle ages who poured burning lead from besieged walls 



ip 



WHY WE MUST CONTINUE IN WAR 55 



upon their enemies were amateurs. We are scientists. The 
cunning Medici, who pressed a poisoned ring upon his enemy's 
finger, was a piker. We sweep a field of ten thousand young 
college students with poisoned gas. We make a harmless look- 
ing cloud that drifts across the hillside encompass and burn 
out the insides of the soldier. We turn night into day with 
artificial stars, so that we may spy out those who dare to give a 
glass of water to the groaning wounded in "No Man's Land." 
We spray with burning liquid those who come near us, and 
from a mile in the air let fall bombs on babies in school houses. 
The captured soldiers are tortured, not a la Iroquois, but a la 
Junker. The captured civilian is enslaved; not sold, simply 
starved. Thus does German science make war. To be a soldier 
now is to summon the skill and spirit of a scientist's hell and set 
it at work without curb of conscience or humanity. 

And why is all this? Who caused all this Was the world 
not a very agreeable place on August 1, 1914? Were we not 
playing the game of life with some^degree of satisfaction when 
^his upheaval came, — this lifting from the bottom of the sea of 
life the vilest and the most horrible of our abilities and qualities? 
What has caused this ring of fire and hatred and brutality to 
run round this smiling world? There is but one answer,— the 
will of Germany to make subject the world. No one has said 
that Germany should not live. The seas were as free to her 
as to us. Her people were multiplying rapidly; her marvelous 
and conquering system of industry was the product of disciplined 
purpose. But Germany could not have her way with Servia, 
with Belgium and with France, and so the world must be 
crucified. 

The United States would not surrender to Germany what it 
had fought England to win,— our rights upon the sea. The 
United States would not stand aside with indifference until the 
world has been strangled into submission; The United States 
would not stay its hand until its own frontiers, were not only 
threatened, but actually invaded. Our unwillingness to partici- 
pate was no protection against plots and combinations that would 
forever force us into the business of making armies. And at 
the end we were to be left friendless and alone, at the mercy 
of the diplomacy of a Zimmermann and the aggressions of a 
Hindenburg and a Tirpitz. The great republics of the world 
would have gone down, and we would stand in isolated terror. 
To meet this invasion of our rights we have gone abroad where 
the war is being fought,— to keep it from being fought where 
the stubborn, short-sighted George III fought his war with us, in 
New York, New Jersey and Virginia. The power that threatens 
us in spirit and by act, that has told us where we can use the 
seas and to what extent, that promises a world made up of a 
ruling class and subservient soldiers, is in Europe, not in 
America — and there we have gone to meet it, with Pershing 
and with Sims. 

(Special message sent to Speakers' Training Camp and Con- 
ference at Chautauqua, N. Y.) 



56 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

[§59] "LIBERTY OF NATIONAL EVOLUTION" 
VERSUS THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 

By Elihu Root, Former Secretary of State. (Jan. 25, 1917.) 

The German note proposing a peace conference used a phrase 
which aptly describes the concrete application of the principle 
about which I am talking. It said, "We were forced to take 
the sword for justice and for liberty of national evolution." 
Liberty of national evolution! It was national evolution that 
overran Servia. It was national evolution that crushed Belgium. 
And national evolution has* not confined itself to the pathway 
to the Channel or to the pathvi^ay to the Bosporus; it has 
extended over Asia and Africa, all over the world— except 
America, North and South— eager and grasping and resolute, 
gathering in under its flag, under its domination, under national 
control, the territory of the earth. 

All nations have been at fault during this last half century. 
Many crimes have been committed ; no nations that I know have 
been guiltless— none. Neither England, nor France, nor Russia, 
nor Germany, nor Austria, nor the United States. For we still 
have to answer for Mexico. But the world is partitioned— Asia, 
Africa, Australasia, the islands of the sea, all taken up— except 
America. And we stand here with the Monroe Doctrine; we 
stand here with the Monroe Doctrine against the push and 
sweep of that mighty zvorld tendency of national evolution and 
to its progress under the principle that neither faith of treaties 
nor obligation of law nor rule of morality should stand in the 
way of a state that finds its interest to take what it zvants for 
its national interest. How long will the Monroe Doctrine be 
worth the paper it vi^as written on in 1823, if that condition is 
to go on? That Doctrine is that the safety of the United 
States forbids any foreign military power to obtain a foothold 
upon this continent from which it may readily make war upon 
the United States — that is the Monroe Doctrine; it is a declara- 
tion of what, in the opinion of the United States, is necessary 
for the safety of the United States. Now, that doctrine is not 
international law. It has been maintained by these things: In 
the first place, the men of Monroe's time never thought of such 
a thing as not being ready to fight for their rights. They were 
Belgians, those people. The second has been that the balance 
of power in Europe has been so even, so close, and everybody 
has been so doubtful about what the other fellows were going 
to do, that nobody found it worth while to take on a row with 
the United States. And, third, England's fleet. 

Now, I ask what that Monroe Doctrine will be worth if we 
aren't ready to protect it? Suppose the result of this war is 
such that these foreign influences that have helped preserve the 
Monroe Doctrine disappear, and we aren't ready to defend it? 
Worthless! What will it mean if a foreign naval power— a 
real naval power, a real military power— obtains a naval base 
in the Caribbean or in those islands of the Pacific ofl' Panama? 
Our interests in the Panama Canal will be as worthless to us as 



WHY WE MUST CONTINUE IN WAR 57 

the Bosporus is to Russia today. And instead of having what 
we have spent four hundred millions to accomplish, the means 
of transferring our navy from ocean to ocean, our navy will be 
shut up again on one side or the other of the continent. And 
then we will have to live as poor, peaceable France has lived 
for the last forty years — with a sentinel always on the lookout 
for an approaching foe. Then the fancied security and sweet, 
comfortable ease of our people will be replaced by alarms and 
rumors of war and attack upon occasion. For the Monroe 
Doctrine was based upon sound wisdom, and the abandonment 
of it or the destruction of it will be the end of our security. 

It seems to me that we have reached a point now where we 
can say that a prudent man — a man competent to be a trustee of 
property — will see that it is necessary for us to prepare to defend 
our rights. For why should not this principle of national ag- 
gression be applied to us ? Why shouldn't it be applied to South 
and Central America and the West Indies? Here we all are, 
rich, undefended, supine — fair game for anybody who wants 
national evolution. 

(Address before the National Security League's Congress for 
Constructive Patriotism.) 

[§60] PAN-GERMAN PLANS FOR ANNEXATION IN 
SOUTH AMERICA. 

By Otto Richard Tannenberg. 

The German colonies in southern Brazil and Uruguay are 
the one bright spot in this gloomy picture of South American 
civilization. Here dwell some half million Germans; and it 
is to be hoped that by the reorganization of South America, 
when the half-breed population — a cross between the Indians 
and the Latin races — has disappeared, the vast basin of the 
La Plata will become German territory. The Germans in 
Southern Brazil— like the Boers in South Africa— have, on 
the average, twelve to fifteen children; so that, by this nat- 
ural increase alone, the country is assured to us. In these 
circumstances is it not wonderful that the German people 
has not long since decided to take possession of this terri- 
tory? For the people of the republics which have inherited 
the former domains of Spain and Portugal, it would be alto- 
gether a blessing to become subject to German power. They 
will soon be reconciled to our rule and be proud of their 
part in the world-wide glory of the German name. 

(Tannenberg, Gross-Deutschland, 295 ; translation for this 
Handbook.) 

[§61] THE REAL ISSUE OF THE WAR. 

Ey Members of the American Commission for Relief in 
Belgium. 

Of all Americans, the members of the Commission for 
Relief in Belgium have had the best opportunity to know 
what the spirit and the methods of German militarism are. 



58 HANDBOOK OP^ THE WAR 



The chairman of that commission, Mr. Herbert C. Hoover, 
telegraphed Mr. Wilson as follows on April 3, 1917: ^ 

"We wish to tell you that there is no word in your historic ' 
statement that does not find a response in all our hearts. ' 
Although we break with great regret our association with | 
many German individuals, there is no hope for democracy ' 
unless the system which brought into the world this un- j 
fathomable misery can be stamped out once for all." | 

Professor Vernon Kellogg, chief representative of the Com- ' 
mission in Northern France, and afterwards director at 
Brussels, thus describes how he, a pacifist, became convinced ' 
by his talks with German officers that this war must be ' 
fought to a decisive end: 

"I say it dispassionately but with conviction. If I under- 
stand their point of view, it is one that will never allow any j 
land or people controlled by it to exist peacefully by the side 
of a people governed by our point of view. For their point ! 
of view does not permit of a live-and-let-live kind of carry- 
mg on. . . . Perhaps I can state his argument clearly , 
enough, so that others may see and accept his reasons, too. 
Unfortunately for the peace of our evenings, I was never 
convinced. That is, never convinced that for the good of 
the world the Germans should win this war, completely and 
terribly. I was convinced, however, that this war, once 
begun, must be fought to a finish of decision— a finish that 
will determine whether or not Germany's point of view is 
to rule the world. And this conviction, thus gained, meant 
the conversion of a pacifist to an ardent supporter, not of 
war, but of this war; of fighting this war to a definitive end 
— that end to be Germany's conversion to be a good Germany, 
or not much of any Germany at all. My 'Headquarters 
Nights' are the confessions of a converted pacifist. . , . 
The creed of the Allmacht [omnipotence] of a natural selection 
based on violent and fatal competitive struggle is the creed of 
the German intellectuals— all else is anathema and illusion. 
... As with the dififerent ant species, struggle— bitter, ruth- 
less struggle— is the rule among the different human groups. 
This struggle not only must go on, but it should go on, so that 
this natural law may work out in its cruel inevitable way the 
salvation of the human species. By its salvation is meant its 
desirable natural evolution. That human group which is in the 
most advanced evolutionary stage as regards internal organiza- 
tion is best, and . . . should win in the struggle for exist- 
ence . . . and impose its kind of social organization— its 
Kultur— on the others, or, alternatively, destroy and replace them. 
This is the disheartening kind of argument that I faced at 
Headquarters. . . . Add to these assumed premises the addi- 
tional assumption that the Germans are the chosen race, and the 
German social and political organization the chosen type of 
human community life, and you have a wall of logic and con- 
viction that you can break your head against, but can never 
shatter — by headwork. . . . The danger from Germany is, I 
have said, that the Germans believe what they say. And they 
act on this belief. Professor [X] says that this war is necessary 



WHY WE MUST CONTINUE IN WAR 59 

as a test of the German position and claim. If Germany is 
beaten, it will prove that she has moved along the wrong evo- 
lutionary line, and should be beaten. If she wins, it will prove 
that she is on the right way, and that the rest of the world, at 
least that part which we and the Allies represent, is on the 
wrong way, and should, for the sake of the right evolution of 
the human race, be stopped, and put on the right way — or else 
be destroyed as unfit. . . . He opposes all mercy, all com- 
promise with human soft-heartedness. Apart from his horrible 
academic casuistry and his conviction that the individual is 
nothing, the State all, he is a reasoning and a warm-hearted man. 
So are some other Germans. But for him and them the test of 
right in this struggle is success in it. So let every means to 
victory be used. The only intelligence Germans should fol- 
low in these days is the intelligence of the General Staff; the 
only things to believe and to repeat are the statements of the 
oflficial bureau of publicity. 

"There is no reasoning with this sort of thing, no finding 
of any heart or soul in it. There is only one kind of answer: 
resistance by brutal force; war to a decision. It is the only 
argument in rebuttal understandable of these men at Head- 
quarters into whose hands the German people have put their 
destiny " 

("Headquarters Nights," in Atlantic Monthly, August, 1917.) 



[§62] A WAR BETWEEN OPPOSING PRINCIPLES. 
By Talcott Williams. (Feb. 8, 1915.) 

We may as well understand that what we have long looked 
for, which through earth's mists men have seen as the coming 
of the dawn, the World State, is already here. 

There is not a man in business who has not found himself 
affected by what has taken place. There is not a single man 
here or a single man between the oceans, who is not per- 
fectly well aware that in a fashion he had never dreamed, in 
a manner he had never imagined, and which no statesman had 
predicted and no university had taught, there has suddenly 
dawned upon us all, that humanity is one, that all states are 
part of it, that we have ceased to look upon peoples, but 
instead we see humanity as a whole, and that every great 
act affects all humanity alike. Face to face with the World 
State we need to be aware that what we are watching is not 
a war between nations any longer. It is civil war. It is a 
war between two great opposing principles of humanity; one 
looking to the organization of the State from above, and the 
other looking to its organization from below. One believing 
that authority can be conferred upon a few to exercise for 
the benefit of the many, and the other believing that nobody 
is wise enough to exercise authority in behalf of anyone else 
except by their choice and their consent. 

It will be seven centuries next June since the corner-atone 
ot the second of those principles was laid in the Great Char- 



-60 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

ter signed by the barons and King John. The great question 
is whether this principle shall widen, until it is recognized by 
all the world. 

We cannot avoid it if we would, and we would not avoid 
it if we could. The great service which the United States 
can do towards obtaining peace is to continue to stand upon 
the protest which it uttered against the violation of the 
neutralization of one country until it has secured the accept- 
ance, in the reorganization of the World State which is at 
hand, of this principle by the entire world. 

This is the task which is before this country; this is the 
task which is slowly establishing itself before you; and there 
is not a single man here who does not believe that upon this 
principle and upon this principle alone the United States 
should endeavor to secure peace. Peace, when it comes, 
must begin a World State ruled either by militarism or by 
Republics; and in that great conflict, although victory may 
be delayed, although sacrifice may be required, here, in this 
city, with Concord and Bunker Hill at hand, no man can 
doubt as to the final and ultimate result. 

(Address before the Economic Club of Boston; in National 
Economic League Quarterly I, No. 1.) 

[§63] THE WAR AND THE IRISH-AMERICANS. 
By Rt. Rev. Mgr. James E, Cassidy, V. G. (July 29, 1917.) 

For well nigh three long years, across the wide expanse of 
ocean with fearful fearing souls, we watched this consuming 
conflagration, and prayed that its fires might die away ere the 
whole world became a holocaust. Injury and insult, yea and 
infamj'^, we suffered, our peaceful souls revolting from this 
sight of humanity slaughtering itself, hoping and trusting and 
praying that means compatible with honor might be found to 
avoid our adding our portion to the sea of human blood that 
was alike crimsoning a continent and bleeding white a world 
of peoples. 

Our rights were transgressed, our commerce interrupted, our 
properties destroyed, our safety jeopardized, our citizens slain 
and yet we kept the peace. We objected, we remonstrated, we 
protested, we threatened, but to no purpose. 

Our patience and long-suffering was misinterpreted. Our 
horror of war and our love of peace were thought to be born of 
a lack of courage to fight. War was being made continually 
upon us; blow after blow was struck against our sovereign 
rights until the hour arrived when, all other means exhausted, 
we must either defend ourselves by force or forever forfeit 
our right to take our place among the nations of the earth. 
Even then, some, whose motive I shall not judge, counselled 
submission and continued toleration of wrong. Thank God, 
their counsels did not prevail. Dark though be the hour and 
sad though be our hearts as we face the bloody future, how 
infinitely darker would be the days, and how filled with shame 



WHY WE MUST CONTINUE IN WAR 61 

and ignominy the future, if we had been led by those who would 
have had peace at any price ! 

The words of our Lord in the Gospel: "What shall a man 
be profited, if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own 
soul?" (Matt, xvi: 26.) I cannot refrain from applying them 
to our national situation kst April. For if our President and 
our Congress had not then acted as they did, we would have 
been a soulless nation, and shame and reproach and everlasting 
infamy would have been the profit of our peace. But the nation 
did not sell its soul for peace. We loved not war, but we loved 
dishonor less, and when compelled to choose we unhesitatingly, 
though regretfully, chose war, and in the chosen words of Holy 
Writ, "You go forth to war out of your land against the enemies 
that fight against you." . . . 

Again, some would lessen your merits by maintaining that we 
should never have gone into this war. To these I have already 
given answer, but to these now I say in shorter words : 

The time for discussion as to the propriety of our entering 
the war has passed. This is a representative government. We 
delegate others to represent us. We elect a President to lead us. 
Our President and our Congress, with much wider knowledge of 
events, and with as great abhorrence of war as we have, have 
decided that a state of war exists. Who are we that we should 
pit our individual judgment against the decision of those whom 
we have legally and voluntarily constituted our representatives? 
Democracy demands delegation of power and should we refuse 
to abide by the decision of those whom we have delegated to 
speak for us what confusion would come upon us! If Russia 
today is wrecked in ruins it is because this very exercise of 
individual judgment has made chaos of organized government, 
and if we were to pay attention to every individual judgment 
we, too, would shortly become another Russia. 

Therefore, I say the time for individual judgment has passed. 
Whatsoever previous opinions we may have entertained, they 
should now be laid aside and we should all follow the flag in 
unquestioned and in unquestionalile loyalty. You see, I dare to 
speak of matters rarely publicly discussed, nor have I yet said 
all. 

There are too many of ancestry like to mine, Irish-Americans, 
if you will, whose judgment is blinded by their hatred toward 
England. Let them beware' lest their animosity toward England 
be interpreted as disloyalty to the United States. 

Out of the loins of a Fenian arrested in arms against the 
English I came. I was nursed at the breasts of as true an 
Irishwoman as ever came out of Ireland. Indelibly written 
in my soul is the story of England's rule of blood and iron 
in Ireland. But what has that to do with the honor of my own 
country? Incidentally and accidentally, we may be fi.ghting for 
England, just as England is now fighting for us, but essentially 
and fundamentally we are not fighting for England; we are 
fighting for ourselves. Had Germany by its own overt acts, 
repeated again and again, not made it impossible for us to keep 
peace with honor, had she respected our rights, had she not 
murdered our citizens, she might have beaten England to her 



62 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

knefes and we would not have interfered. We did not go to war 
to save England ; we went to war to save ourselves, to save our 
sovereign rights, to save all and everything that a nation in 
honor prizes. 

You men of all births, for there are men of many bloods 
and births bearing a grievance against England, in your blind 
desire for retribution, you forget that in this war all must stand 
or fall together. If England stands, we stand; if England 
falls we fall; victory and honor or defeat and dishonor shall 
come upon all alike. And God forbid that there should be any 
so base and low and blind as to wish to strike at the heart of 
England through the soul of their own country. God forbid 
that there should be any who would rejoice at the losses of any 
of the Allies when they know that such losses mean only greater 
losses and multiplied deaths among you. Let this insanity pass 
forever from these States. . . . 

The heroic figure [of Cardinal Mercier], the very personifica- 
tion of patriotism and love of country, I hold out to you as 
your model and your ideal. No enemy boast, no enemy bribe, 
no enemy threat, no enemy pressure, no suffering, no want, no 
pain, no loss, no fear has shaken him from his high resolve to 
render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the 
things that are God's Far away across the wide Atlantic, he 
stretches out his arms to you for help against the common 
enemy. 

(From a sermon at St. Mary's Cathedral, Fall River, Mass., to 
the Catholic members, Coast Artillery Corps, N. G. M. ; reported 
in Boston Transcript, July 31, 1917.) 

[§64] THE WAR AND THE GERMAN-AMERICANS. 
By Otto H. Kahn. (June 1, 1917.) 

What we are now contending for, by the side of our splen- 
didly brave and sorely tried Allies, after infinite forbearance, 
after delay which many of us found it hard to bear, are the 
things which are amongst the highest and most cherished that 
the civilized world has attained through the toil, sacrifices and 
suffering of its best in the course of many centuries. 

They are the things without which darkness would fall upon 
hope, and life would become intolerable. 

They are the things of humanity, liberty, justice and mercy, 
for which the best men amongst all the nations — including the 
German nation — have fought and bled these many generations 
past, which were the ideals of Luther, Goethe, Schiller, Kant, 
and a host of others who had made the name of Germany great 
and beloved until fanatical Prussianism run amuck came to make 
its deeds a by-word and a hissing. 

This appalling conflict which has been drenching the world 
with blood is not a mere fight of one or more peoples against 
one or more other peoples. 

It goes far deeper. 

It sharply divides the soul and conscience of the world. 



WHY WE MUST CONTINUE IN WAR 63 

It transcends vastly the bounds of racial allegiance. 

It is ethically fundamental. 

In determining one's attitude towards it, the time has gone 
by — if it ever was — when race and blood and inherited affilia- 
tions were permitted to count. 

A century and a half ago Americans of English birth rose to 
free this country from the oppression of the rulers of England. 
To-day Americans of German birth are called upon to rise, to- 
gether with their fellow-citizens of all races, to free not only 
this country but the whole world from the oppression of the 
rulers of Germany, an oppression far less capable of being 
endured and of far graver portent. 

Speaking as one born of German parents, I do not hesitate to 
state it as my deep conviction that the greatest service which 
men of German birth or antecedents can render to the country 
of their origin is to proclaim, and to stand up for those great 
and fine ideals and national qualities and traditions which they 
inherited from their ancestors, and to set their faces like flint 
against monstrous doctrines and acts of a rulership which have 
robbed them of the Germany which they loved and in which 
they took just pride, the Germany which had the good will, 
respect and admiration of the entire world. 

I do not hesitate to state it as my solemn conviction that the 
more unmistakably and whole-heartedly Americans of German 
origin throw themselves into the struggle which this country has 
entered in order to rescue Germany, no less than America and 
the rest of the zvorld from those sinister forces that are, in 
President Wilson's language, the enemy of all mankind, the 
better they protect and serve the repute of the old German name 
and the true advantage of the German people. 

Gentlemen, I measure my words. They are borne out all too 
emphatically by the hideous eloquence of deeds which have ap- 
palled the conscience of the civilized world. They are borne 
out by numberless expressions, written and spoken, of German 
professors employed by the State to teach its youth. 

The burden of that teaching is that might makes right, and 
that the German nation has been chosen to exercise morally, 
mentally and actually, the over-lordship of the world and must 
and will accomplish that task and that destiny whatever the cost 
in bloodshed, misery and ruin. 

The spirit of that teaching, in its intolerance, its mixture of 
sanctimoniousness and covetousness and its self-righteous as- 
sumption of a world-improving mission, is closely akin to the 
spirit from which were bred the religious wars of the past 
through the long and dark years when Protestants and Catholics 
killed one another and devastated Europe. 

I speak in sorrow, for I am speaking of the country of my 
origin and I have not forgotten what I owe to it. 

I speak in bitter disappointment, for I am thinking of the 
Germany of former days, the Germany which has contributed its 
full share to the store of the world's imperishable assets and 
which, in not a few fields of human endeavor and achievement 
held the leading place among the nations of the earth. 

And I speak in the firm faith that, after its people shall have 



64 HANDBOOK ^. mi:, WAR 

shaken off and made atonement for the dreadful spell which an 
evil fate has cast upon them, that former Germany is bound to 
arise again and, in due course of time, will again deserve and 
attain the good-will and the high respect of the world and the 
affectionate loyalty of all those of German blood in foreign 
lands. 

But I. know that neither Germany nor this country nor the 
rest of the world can return to happiness and peace and fruitful 
labor until it shall have been made manifest, bitterly and un- 
mistakably manifest, to the rulers zvho bear the blood-guilt for 
this wanton war and to their misinformed and misguided peo- 
ples that the spirit which unchained it cannot prevail, that the 
hateful doctrines and methods in pursuance of which and in 
compliance with which it is conducted are rejected with abhor- 
rence by the civilized world, and that the over-weening ambi- 
tions which it was meant to serve can never be achieved. 

The fight for civilization zvhich we all fondly believed had 
been won many years ago must be fought over again. In this 
sacred struggle it is now our privilege to take no mean part, 
and our glory to bring sacrifices. 

[§65] WHERE WOULD SIGEL STAND NOW? 

By Franz Sigel, Jr. 

To the credit of the German immigrants of later years 
let it be said that, as a class, they became citizens. Our 
naturalized citizenship has been drawn in larger percentage 
perhaps from these Germans than from any other element 
except the Irish, and there has not been a better, more 
law-abiding, more valuable class. But they stood aloof, they 
fostered a certain separateness from the every-day life of 
the nation ; the American spirit touched them lightly. The 
recent crisis overwhelmed them; their political conceptions 
were a muddle of complicated loyalties. They could not, by 
the very confusion of ideas, think and act straight; they 
couM not, because of the cloud of sentiment that obscured 
their political vision see clearly. The forces that brought 
them here were not the same that brought the earlier immi- 
grants ; the newcomers had not come to escape the tyran- 
nies of a home land of over thirty almost absolute rulers; 
a love of freedom and liberty was not what had led them 
here to found a new, free home. 

Their spirit ruled the home in which their sons grew up; 
in this home was heard much of Germany's new greatness 
and little of the basic difference in principle between gov- 
ernment from the top down as applied in Germany, and from 
the bottom up as applied in our country. The father stayed 
hfere, became a citizen, his family was reared here. Because 
his was the equal privilege of grasping the "unlimited op- 
portunity" the country offered, because he enjoyed the 
equal protection of the law, he prospered. Government pro- 
tected him and his property with the same care that it 



WHY WE MUST CONTINUE IN WAR 65 

protected the native-born and his; it made no distinction of 
rights between him and his native-born neighbor. 

The sons of these Germans have grown up here with all 
the advantage offered to all sons, not only of citizens but 
also tliose of resident aliens. It is conceivable that the 
home and social influences under which the son grew to 
manhood did not tend to develop so highly the average 
native-born's pride of country; he might not be convinced 
that the United States was the greatest nation of all time. 
Handicapped by what may be termed a congenital spiritual 
weakness that was not strengthened in the home life, and 
suddenly brought face to face with an apparent conflict be- 
tween love of the land of his fathers and his duty as an 
American citizen, he found it difficult to steer a straight 
course. He was not fortified by the oneness of mind of the 
American whose ancestors had fought the British in the 
Revolution. The German spirit pulled hard at the heart- 
strings; it would have been unnatural had it been other- 
wise. 

But although his difficulties have been great, by reason of 
home training and temperament, yet I " am sure that now 
the die is cast and there is presented to him a clear-cut 
issue that permits of no question, he will at last see 
straight; he will see that duty does not require him to sur- 
render reverence, worship if you will, for the great achieve- 
ment of the German race in all fields, does not require him 
to forego his love for the German people, their language, 
literature and traditions, the fine and noble and good in 
the German nation and the German family life. . . . Be- 
yond this, duty demands from him complete, unswerving 
devotion to his native land, the land of his birth, under all 
circumstances. 

But what of the sons descended from that earlier genera- 
tion, most definitely characterized by the spirit of the Ger- 
man immigrant of the decade 1850-1860? . . . Most, if not 
all, of these German "Forty-eighters" are dead, but many 
of their descendants, sons and grandsons, constitute a large 
part of our citizens. I am a full-blooded German descended 
from German "Forty-eighters." My father. General Franz 
Sigel, his brothers and my maternal grandfather were driven 
from Germany on account of their participation in the revo- 
lution of 1848 in Germany. My forebears had all sacrificed 
the home of their birth in their devotion to the cause of 
liberty. Later they fought for the Union and the freedom 
of the slaves. . . , 

In April, 1861, my father enlisted in the same struggle. 
He is frequently referred to as one who did much for the 
nation in the crisis of '61; he is at times mentioned in the 
public press as one whose example might well be emulated 
now by the youth of German descent. What during his 
lifetime was his attitude on Americanism and "German- 
Americanism"? If we sons are to follow where he w^nld 
have led, where does the path lead? . . . 

Franz Sigel knew the Constitution of the United States 



66 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

and what it meant for the rights of humanity long before 
he came to this country, and he knew it better than many 
Americans who were born and died here. His passion was 
the liberty of man. When he revolted against the govern- 
ment of Baden, he knew the goal he was aiming to reach. 

In 1897, a few years before his death, he wrote : "Germany 
will survive the storms of another century — great questions 
involving its domestic and foreign policies, its social and 
economic conditions, its existing militarism, the status of its 
common people — 'these must be settled; they will not and 
cannot be avoided by foreign operations, by new burdens 
imposed on the people, nor by the mere ipse dixit of power." 

There is prophecy in these words that may come true. 
Franz Sigel had not, in fifty years, forgotten "militarism," 
the "status of the common people." Germany was united, 
powerful, yes, but there were questions "still to be set- 
tled," not to be "avoided by foreign operations," by "new 
burdens to be imposed on the people," by "the mere ipse dixit 
of power." Did he not in old age dream the dreams of his 
youth, even yet not realized? Did he not still cherish, for 
the German people, the "common" people, the hopes of fifty 
years ago, and look toward their ultimate realization? And 
is the present not moving toward such a realization? 

Does the life of Franz Sigel show that he had no hope 
for the release of the German people from the absolutism 
he combated in youth? Would he not now stand true to 
his lifelong convictions, true to the ideals for which he 
fought on two continents, true to the inscription on his 
tombstone, placed there at his written request — "An Ameri- 
can Citizen and Soldier"? Would he not array himself on 
the side of America in the struggle to "make the world 
safe for democracy"? His article on "The American Repub- 
lic'" in the International Magazine concluded with the 
words : "If there are any utterances specially appropriate to 
the great task before us, they are those which breathe the 
spirit of the sturdy and heroic English sailor at Trafalgar 
— to apply the words of Nelson to our own situation — The 
American Republic expects every man to do his duty'." I 
know he would repeat these words today. 

In the fires of the Civil War the North and the South 
were welded into one great union of States. If the fires of 
the present war will weld the many nationalities and burn 
away the adjectives of nationalism from "American," then 
will there be a national profit that will more than balance 
the terrible sacrifices we shall be required to make. 

Where do we, the sons of men like Franz Sigel and his 
companions in the struggle for liberty, stand? If we are 
to be true to them and the ideals for which they fought, 
we must stand tuday on the side of America and freedom 
against the German Government and autocracy. We shall 
not then fight against our blood kindred, but, in the broader 
sense, we shall fight for them, against a government not of 



WHY WE MUST CONTINUE IN WAR 67 

their own creation. We shall secure for them the right of 
self-government, the right of a people and not of a Kaiser, 
to find its place "in the sun" — the sun of liberty and equality. 

If we are to emulate the example of Franz Sigel, what 
shall we do? Let him answer in the words of the last 
public speech he ever made in German to "German- \meri- 
cans": 

"Politically, I am an American and nothing else; but I 
am proud to be a German. I would consider myself less 
than a man were I to forget the tremendous sacrifices made 
by the immigrant Germans in defense of their new Father- 
land. Shall this blood have flowed in vain? Shall we now 
attack this country to which we gave all we had to give? 
This country is our country; our interests are its interests; 
here we are, here will our descendants be, here we shall 
stay. The Union, now and forever." 

("Sons of the Germans of '48 are for Democracy,'' by Franz 
Sigel, in the Nczv York Times Magazine, July 22, 1917.) 

f§66] A GERMAN LIBERAL'S RECOGNITION OF 
THE MAIN OBJECT OF THE ALLIES. 

By Professor W. Foerster, of the University of Munich. 

The kernel of the situation is the fact that the supreme 
object with which the nations of the Entente are waging war 
is that competition in armaments shall absolutely cease, and 
that an international reign of peace (Fricdcnsordnung) shall 
be established ; moreover, that the Entente is determined 
to fi?;ht on until, in one way or another, it can obtain from 
Germany a trustworthy guarantee for the realization of 
those objects, be it by means of a military defeat of Germany 
or by her economic starvation, or by a domestic transforma- 
tion which will once for all put an end to the predominance 
of those classes and castes to which the Entente attributes an 
incuruble preference for dealing with questions of interna- 
tional interests by purely military methods. All the rest of 
the Entente's demands, however exaggerated and unstatesman- 
like may be the terms in which they were advanced in the 
well-known Note, are most intimately connected with this 
international programme: they are intended to obviate all 
occasion for future conflicts' by according to every nation, 
however small, the right to choose the larger State to which 
it wishes to be joined. . . . 

Anyone who has grasped the fundamental idea of that 
international programme of justice, and who has remarked 
with what passion the nations of the Entente have espoused 
it, and especially how profoundly the New Russia is moved 
by it, will know this: That the cause of the peace of the 
world now decisively depends upon whether the overwhelm- 
ing majority of the German people declares itself on principle 
and unambiguously against all annexations, and thereby at- 
tests its sincere acquiescence in the idea of a new interna- 



68 . HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

tional order and its abhorrence of any continuation of the 
miserable old policy of armaments. . . . 

So long as influential circles among us cry for the acquisi- 
tion of the coast of Flanders, and thereby reveal that they 
do not desire a New Europe, but still believe in iron guaran- 
tees, so long will the nations of the Entente continue to fight; 
and a peace conference where Germany could "play her 
trumps" will simply be out of the question. He who does not 
yet see this is the victim of the most fatal delusions, al- 
though his language be that of Realpolitik. The peace that 
is coming will not be a matter of haggling and "trumping." 
No! This is the mightiest moral problem that has ever con- 
fronted humanity, and the inexorable moral condition of the 
conclusion of peace is so glaringly patent that, outside Ger- 
many, large sections of those even who are governed by 
material interests recognize that all future economic security 
and prosperity depend upon the fulfilment of that moral con- 
dition, which is, the final and unambiguous triumph of a new 
heart and mind. It is for this reason that the French nation, 
for example, would rather perish in the struggle for these 
new ideas of international justice than relapse into the hell 
of the old Europe. Any one who does not attach decisive 
importance to this psychological factor is making a false 
calculation, although he may employ all the jugglery in tl^e 
world in grappling with the problem of peace. . . . 

The annexationists advance their demands as strategic ns- 
cessities; they demand securities for Germany without the 
slightest regard for the state of Europe which these securi- 
ties would create. They are thus declaring themselves in 
favor of the continuance of the state of armed peace as it has 
hitherto existed — that is to say, for the permanent menace of 
war. And the peace which they propose would in reality be 
nothing but a truce. This sort of peace is precisely the kind 
that the whole world now arrayed against Germany rejects 
with desperate determination. 

In Neue Ziircher Zeitung of June 1. 2, 1917. Translated in 
Nineteenth Century and After, July, 1917.) 

[§67] C— SPECIAL REFERENCES. 
Books. 

Andler, Charles. Pan-Germanism, Its Plans for German 
Expansion in the World. (Paris, Colin, 1915.) 

Cholmondeley, Alice. Christine. (N. Y. Macmillan, 
1917.) (A vivid picture, in the form of letters, of the 
tendencies of German thought and feeling just before 
the war.) 

Dampierre, Jacques de. German Imperialism and Interna- 
tional Law. (London, Constable, 1917.) 

Hiigel, Baron Friedrich von. The German Soul. (N. Y., 
Button, 1916.) (A valuable study of the teachings and 
tendencies which have produced the state of mind 
predominant in Germany before the war.) 



WHY WE MUST CONTINUE IN WAR 69 

Johnson, W. Douglas. The Menace of Prussianism. (N. 

Y., Putnam, 1917.) 
Krueger, Fritz Konrad. Government and Politics of the 
German Empire. (Yonkers, World Book Co., 1916.) 
(Elementary treatise on the German political system, 
from a German point of view. Contains useful biblio- 
graphies.) 
Morgan, J. H. (translator). The War-Book of the Ger- 
man General Staff. (Professor Morgan, of the Uni- 
versity of London, a well-known authority on inter- 
national law, has written an elaborate introduction to 
the main work. The latter is the official German 
statement, before the war, of the principles concerning 
the conduct of military operations by German forces.) 
Murray, Sir Gilbert L. Faith, War and Policy. (Bost., 

Houghton, 1917.) 
Naumann, Friedrich. Central Europe. Trans, by C. M. 
Meredith. (N. Y., Knopf, 1914.) The most import- 
ant German exposition of the Mitteleuropa scheme. 
Palmer, Frederick. With Our Faces to the Light. (N. Y., 

Dodd, Mead Co., 1917.) 
Roosevelt, Theodore. Fear God and Take Your Own 

Part. (N. Y., Doran, 1916.) 
Weyl, Walter E. American World Policies. (N. Y., 
Macmillan, 1917.) 

Articles. 

Archer, W. "Fighting a Philosophy." No. Am. Review 

(Jan. 1915). 
Giddings, Franklin H. "The Larger Meaning of the 

War." Survey (March 4, 1914). 
Gibbons, Herbert Adams. "The World Monroe Doctrine." 

Century (May, 1917). 
Hadley, A. T. "Political Teachings of Treitschke." Yale 

Review (Jan., 1915). 
Jastrow, Joseph. "A Pacifist Defense of America's War." 

North American Review (August, 1917). 
Kellogg, Vernon. "Headquarters Nights." Atlantic (Aug., 

1917). 
Middleton, James. "Germany's Long Road to Democracy." 

World's Work (June, 1917). 
Pollard, A. F. "Death Grapple with Prussian Militar- 
ism." Yale Review (Oct., 1916). 



CHAPTER IV. 

Who Is Responsible for the War in Europe? 
A.— SUMMARY STATEMENT. 

[§68] The question of the responsibility for the outbreak 
of war in Europe in 1914 concerns Americans at the present 
time less immediately than the matters dealt with in the two 
preceding chapters. Yet it is by no means of merely aca- 
demic interest. For nothing throws so much light upon the 
spirit, and the probable future policy and conduct of the 
present ruling powers in Germany as the facts which estab- 
lish their responsibility for this greatest catastrophe of 
modern history. Only a small part of that evidence can be 
presented here. 

[§69] Tn 1912 four of the Balkan States at last joined 
forces against their ancient enemy, Turkey, the oppressor of 
their Christian brethren in Macedonia. To the surprise of all 
the world, they won a decisive victory over the German- 
trained Turkish forces, and all but expelled the Ottoman 
Empire from Europe. At the conclusion of these struggles, 
Serbia stood with greatly enlarged territory, with increased 
military prestige, and with intensified national feeling. Ger- 
many and Austria were thus confronted with a prospect of 
the development of a group of vigorous and independent 
states, chiefly Slavic in race, occupying the greater part of 
the Balkan peninsula, and supported by Russia, the traditional 
"big brother" of the smaller Slavic nations. But Germar 
had long been working out a program for the domination 
of the vast region stretching "from the North Sea to the 
Persian Gulf." Austria was to be a subordinate partner, 
linked to Germany in a close economic union, if not by still 
stronger ties; Turkey was rapidly becoming virtually a Ger- 
man protectorate. But the results of the Balkan Wars threat- 
ened to block this project of the Central Powers for expan- 
sions southeastward, and to cut them off from their tool, Tur- 
key, which had, moreover, been weakened by its recent 
defeat. The Austrian government also feared the effect of the 
development of a strong Serbian state upon its own subjects of 
Serb race. 

[§70] The evidence is abundant that, as soon as this situa- 
tion became clear, Germany and Austria determined to crush 
Serbia and establish definitely their dominance in the Balkan 
Peninsula, and did so fully realizing — as the German White 
Book admits — that "a possible warlike attitude of Austria- 
Hungary against Serbia might bring Russia upon the field 
and might therefore involve'' Germany — in other words, that 

[70] 



THE EUROPEAN WAR 71 

a general European war was likely to follow. In the spring 
of 1913 the German army was suddenly enlarged by a fifth; 
taxes of unprecedented severity were voted by the Reichstag 
(including an "Extraordinary Non-Repeatable Contribution 
for National Defense" which amounted to about VA per 
cent of the capital of the larger property-holders); the gold 
reserve in the German "war-chest" was trebled; and in 
August Italy w-as invited by Austria (certainly not without 
a prior understanding with Germany), to join in military 
action against Serbia. Italy refused on the ground that she 
was bound by treaty only to a defensive alliance, whereas 
what was proposed was a war of aggression. (See §80.) 
Disappointed in their hope of Italy's co-operation, Germany 
and Austria continued their preparations. 

[§71] In November, 1913, both the German Emperor and 
the Chief of the General Staff were reported to have said in 
conversation that war was inevitable. (French Yellow Book, 
No. 6.) In December a German military mission was sent 
to Constantinople, and its head assumed virtual command of 
the Turkish forces there. Throughout the winter and spring 
there were indications that Germany was making ready for 
an early war. As it was manifest that the other Powers 
were all absorbed in grave internal difficulties, and that no 
attack upon Germany was imminent, such measures could 
only mean that Germany was preparing for attack. Thus, the 
events of June and July, 1914, were not the causes of the 
war, but only a convenient opportunity for the execution 
of a long premeditated plan to establish Austro-German 
supremacy in the Balkans. A general European war, which 
was likely to result, might at the same time be expected to 
extend Germany's colonial empire at the expense of France. 

[§72] On June 28, 1914, the heir to the Austrian throne was 
murdered in the capital of Bosnia by an Austrian subject of 
Serb race. On July 23 the Austrian government suddenly 
presented an ultimatum to Serbia, alleging that this crime 
had been instigated by secret societies having their head- 
quarters on Serbian soil and devoted to agitation against the 
Austrian rule in the recently annexed provinces. Demands 
involving extensive interference by Austria in Serbian do- 
mestic affairs were made, and an unqualified acceptance of 
them was required within two days. Though these demands 
v.^ere humiliating in the extreme, Serbia accepted all of them 
except two; these she did not reject, but offered to submit 
them to the Hague Tribunal or the Great Powers. It im- 
mediately became evident that Austria's object had been not 
to secure guarantees against the continuance of the agitation 
of which she complained, but to find a ground of quarrel 
with her neighbor. Serbia's submissive reply was rejected 
without examination. Austria declared war on the 28th, and 
began hostilities on the 29th. 

[^73] This action was a plain challenge to Russia. Would 
she leave the smaller Slav state unsupported and helpless in 
the hands of Austria — and thereby also abdicate her long- 
recognized claim to a voice in the disposition of Balkan ques- 



72 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

tions? While Austria declared that she contemplated no an- 
nexation of Serbian territory, it was evident that without for- 
mal annexation she could reduce her neighbor to the position 
of a vassal state. Russia, while refusing to abandon Serbia, 
asked only that some impartial method be found for determin- 
ing the justice of Austria's demands — either by a conference 
of the Powers as proposed by England, by friendly mediation, 
or by a reference to the Hague Tribunal. Though England, 
France and Italy spared no pains to bring about some such 
pacific solution, Austria (up to July 30) refused all proposals 
of conference, mediation, arbitration or even delay, and in- 
sisted that she be permitted to wreak her will upon Serbia 
without interference. (See §79.) No convincing, or even 
plausible, evidence has ever been offered that she was not 
supported (if not inspired) in this attitude by her ally; the 
German White Book, indeed, declares plainly that Austria 
throughout had Germany's approval and backing. 

[§74] On July 31 Austria-Hungary seems finally to have 
consented to discuss with Russia the character of the action 
to be taken against Serbia. This concession, however, was of- 
fered only after war had already become certain, in conse- 
quence of a new and preposterous demand made by Germany 
upon Russia, and rejected by Russia (July 29-30). The 
eflfect of this demand was (see the next §) to provide the 
Central Powers with a more plausible casus belli than the 
Serbian issue alone would have been, and to lay the founda- 
tion for the official German explanation of the outbreak of 
the war. 

[^75] That Russia desired and deliberately provoked the 
war has been repeatedly argued by Germany's official spokes- 
men on the following grounds: Germany had early (July 26) 
warned Russia that "the ordering of general mobilization 
must make war with Germany inevitable." Yet on the night 
of July 30-31, at the moment when Austria (under the urg- 
ing, it is alleged, of Germany) "had declared itself ready to 
enter upon a till then stubbornly declined discussion of the 
material contents of the note to Servia," the general Russian 
mobilization was ordered. In short, just when a peaceful so- 
lution seemed assured, the Russian government took the step 
which it knew would make war certain — (See article of Dr, 
Karl Helfiferich, German Finance Minister, N. Y. Times, 
March 14, 1915 ; also the German White Book and speeches of 
the German Chancellor, Aug. 4, 1914, and Nov. 9, 1916.) 

[^76] This argument falsifi.es the main fact, besides ignoring 
others, (a) Germany had warned Russia (July 26 and 29) 
not that a general mobilization, but that any "preparatory 
military measures" on Russia's part — even a partial mobiliza- 
iton "against Austria-Hungary" — would "mean war" with 
Germany. Again on the night of July 29-30 (before the 
Russian general mobilization was ordered) the German Em- 
peror telegraphed the Tsar warning him not to mobilize 
"against Austria," and telling him that upon his decision 
(i. e., with respect to this point) must rest "the responsi- 
bility for war or peace." (See §81.) But Austria had al- 



w 



THE EUROPEAN WAR ' 73 



ready mobilized large forces and had invaded Serbia. Ger- 
many's demand, then, was that while Austria armed and 
overran Serbia, Russia should take no preparatory military 
measures whatever. If Russia had submitted to this demand 
she would not only have imperilled her own security, but 
would have surrendered, under duress, all claim and all ability 
to influence the settlement of the Serbian question. It was 
certain in advance that no Great Power, if capable of resist- 
ance, would, in similar critical circumstances, accept such 
peremptory dictation concerning its own internal measures 
of national defense. Since Russia, therefore, could not avoid 
partial mobilization against Austria, and since she had twice 
been warned that any military preparation by her would cause 
Germany to attack, she was bound to make her mobilization 
complete. Germany's threat and Austria's action operated 
together with certainty and precision to force Russia to take 
those military precautions out of which, when taken, Ger- 
many made a pretext for declaring war. (b) Germany, how- 
ever, had already done what she declared war upon Russia 
for doing. It was then believed by the Russian authorities, 
and is now known to be true, that the German military 
preparations were much farther advanced than those of 
Russia. A great part of the German army was already mo- 
bilized (under another technical term) and was being directed 
towards the frontiers of Belgium, Luxemburg and France, 
(c) Meanwhile, in a last effort for peace, Russia had actually 
offered (July 31) to arrest her mobilization, upon two con- 
ditions : that Austria would march no farther into Serbia, and 
would "admit that the Great Powers may examine how 
Serbia can accord satisfaction to the Austro-Hungarian gov- 
ernment without impairment of her rights as a sovereign and 
independent state." A favorable reply to this extraordi- 
narily conciliatory offer would in all probability have averted 
war. (See §§81-83.) No reply to it was ever sent — except 
Germany's ultimatum, demanding of Russia complete, imme- 
diate and unconditional demobilisation. (See §84.) 

To this demand Russia returned no answer within the time 
limit set, and on August 1 Germany declared war. 

[%77] The motives for Germany's shifting of the issue are not 
obscure. An attack upon Russia directly on the ground of 
the Austro-Serbian quarrel would have been a manifestly 
aggressive war. It would therefore have appealed less 
strongly to the more moderate element among the German 
people; and war could not constitutionally have been de- 
clared upon such a ground without consulting the Federal 
Council (Bundesrat). But by first manoeuvring Russia into 
complete mobilization, and then treating this step as a threat 
against the safety of Germany itself, it was possible to per- 
suade the not too critical German public that war had been 
"forced upon Germany," and to plunge the empire into the 
conflict without awaiting the express consent of the other 
federated states. Moreover, there was hope that the third 
member of the Triple Alliance, Italy, might also be persuaded 
that this was a "defensive war," and that she was therefore 



74 ■ HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

pledged to assist the Central Powers. The Italian govern- 
ment, however, was not deceived, and pointed out to its 
allies that the war was as clearly one of aggression as that 
which had been proposed to Italy a year earlier.* 

[§78] On the same day Germany demanded of the Belgian 
government that it break its solemn treaty obligations and be- 
tray its neighbor, France, by permitting German troops to 
operate against France from Belgian territory. (§85.) Bel- 
gium, though facing destruction as the alternative, refused 
to sacrifice its honor. The German government was not 
disturbed by similar scruples. It had bound itself by special 
treaty to respect Belgium's neutrality, and its Minister 
at Brussels had on July 31 assured the Belgian government 
that this pledge would be observed.f But on August 3, upon 
the plea of "military necessity" — by which was meant only the 
prospect of military advantage — the German forces poured across 
the frontier, and there followed that month of "frightfulness" 
in Eastern Belgium which the world will never forget. 

B.— ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS. 

[§79] ENGLISH STATEMENT ON THE CAUSES OF 
THE WAR. 

By Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs. (March 22, 1915.) 

Hundreds of millions of money have been spent, hundreds 
of thousands of lives have been lost, and millions have been 
wounded or maimed in Europe during the last few months. 
All this might have been avoided by the simple method of a 
conference or joint discussion between the European Pow- 
ers concerned, which might have been held in London, or in 
The Hague, or wherever or in whatever form Germany 
would have consented to have it. It would have been far 
•easier to have settled by a conference the dispute between 
Austria-Hungary and Serbia, which Germany made the occa- 
sion for this war, than it was to get successfully through 
the Balkan crisis of two years ago. Germany knew, from 
her experience of the conference in London which settled 
the Balkan crisis, that she could count upon our good will 
for peace in any concert or conference of the powers. We 
had sought no diplomatic triumph in the Balkan conference. 
We had not given ourselves to any intrigue. We had pur- 
sued impartially and honorably the end of peace. We were 
ready last July to do the same again. In recent years we 



*To the same desire to make the war appear "defensive" in German and 
Italian eyes must be attributed the series of 'saseless charges of French 
acts of aggression, which constituted the official grounds of the declaration 
of war against France (August 3). The falsity of these charges is fully 
shown in a semi-official French work, Le Mensonge dn 3 Aout (Paris, 
Payot, 1917), which is not yet translated into English. A summary of it 
by H. W. Wilson appears in The Nineteenth Century and After, June, 
1917. 

■\Belgian Gray Book, No. 12. 



THE EUROPEAN WAR 75 

had given Germany every assurance that no aggression upon 
her would receive any support from us. We had withheld 
from her but one thing: an unconditional promise to stand 
aside, however aggressive Germany herself might be to 
her neighbors. Last July France was ready to accept a 
conference, Italy was ready to accept a conference, Russia 
was ready to accept a conference; and we know now that 
after the British proposal for a conference was matle, the 
Emperor of Russia himself proposed to the German Em- 
peror that the dispute should be referred to The Hague. 
Germany refused every suggestion made to her for settling 
the dispute in this way, and on her rests now, and must 
rest for all time, the appalling responsibility for having 
plunged Europe into this war, and for involving herself and 
the greater part of a whole continent in the consequences of 
it — the fourth time within living memory, prepared and 
planned. 

As to our own part. We had assured Belgium that never 
would we violate her neutrality so long as it was respected 
by others. I had given this pledge to Belgium long befora 
the war. On the eve of the war we asked France and Ger- 
many to give the same pledge. France at once did so, but 
Germany declined to give it. When, after that, Germany 
invaded Belgium, we were bound to oppose Germany with 
all our strength; and, if we had not done so at the first 
moment, is there anyone now who believes that, when Ger- 
many attacked the Belgians, shot combatants and non-com- 
batants, and ravaged the country in a way that violated all 
rules of war of recent times, and all rules of humanity for 
all time — is there anyone who thinks it possible that we 
could have sat still and looked on without eternal disgrace? 
Now, what are the issues for which we are fighting? 
In due time, the terms of peace will be put forward by 
our Allies in common with us, in accordance with the 
Alliances that now exist between us and are public to the 
world. But one essential condition must be the restoration 
of Belgium to her independent national life and the free 
possession of her territory; and reparation to her, as far as^ 
reparation is possible, for the cruel wrong done to her. 

That is part of the great issue for which we with our Allies 
are contending, and which is this : 

We wish the nations of Europe to be free to live their 
independent lives, working cut their own forms of govern- 
ment for themselves and their own national development, 
whether they be great States or small States, in full liberty. 
That is our ideal. The German ideal — we have had it poured 
out by German professors and publicists since the war began 
— is that of the Germans as a superior people; to whom all 
things are lawful in the securing of their own power; 
against whom resistance of every sort is unlawful and to 
be savagely put down; a people establishing a domination 
over the nations of the Continent; imposing a peace that 
is not to be a liberty for other nations, but subservience 
to Germany. I would rather perish or leave this Continent 



76 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

altogether than live in it under such conditions. After this 
war, we and the other nations of Europe must be free to 
live, not menaced by talk of supreme War-Lords and shining 
armor and the sword continually rattled in the scabbard 
and Heaven continually invoked as an accomplice to Ger- 
man arms, and not having our policy dictated and our 
national destinies and activities controlled by the military 
caste of Prussia. We claim for ourselves, and our Allies 
claim for themselves, and together we will secure for 
Europe, the right of independent sovereignty for the dif- 
ferent nations; the right to pursue national existence, not 
in the shadow of Prussian hegemony or supremacy but in 
the light of equal liberty. 

(Speech delivered by Sir Edward Grey.) 

[§80] AUSTRIA'S PROPOSAL TO ATTACK SERBIA 

IN 1913. 

By Giovanni Giolitti, Former Italian Premier. (Dec. 5, 1914) 

I feel it my duty to recall a precedent showing how cor- 
rect was the interpretation of the alliance by the [Italian] 
Government when the conflict began. During the Balkan 
War, on August 9, 1913, being absent from Rome, I received 
the following telegram from the late Marquis di San Giuliano 
[then Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs] : "Austria has 
communicated to us and Germany that it has been the 
intention to act against Servia, defining such action as 
defensive and hoping for an application of a casus foederis 
[case to which the terms of the treaty of alliance are ap- 
plicable] by the Triple Alliance, which I consider inapplica- 
ble. I am trying to agree with Germany concerning efforts 
to prevent Austrian action, but it may be necessary to say 
clearly that we do not consider such eventual action as 
defensive, and, therefore, do not think that there exists a 
casus foederis. Please send a telegram saying whether you 
approve." 

I answered Marquis di San Giuliano thus: "If Austria goes 
against Servia, a casus foederis evidently does not exist. It is 
an action she accomplishes on her own account. It is not 
defensive, because nobody thinks of attacking her. It is 
necessary to declare this to Austria in the most formal 
manner, hoping that Germany will act to dissuade Austria 
from a very dangerous adventure." 

(Speech in the Italian Chamber of Deputies: cited from 
Stowell, The Diplomacy of the War of 1914, 470-471.) 



THE EUROPEAN WAR :77 

[§81] GERMANY'S REAL CASUS BELLI: WAR IF 

RUSSIA MAKES ANY MILITARY 

PREPARATIONS. 

(a) The Threat. (July 26, 1914) 

In the course of the same day [July 26], the first news of 
Russian mobilization reached Berlin. On the evening of the 
26th, the German Ambassadors at London, Paris and St. Peters- 
burg were instructed to point out strongly the .danger of this 
Russian mobilization. After the official explanation by Austria- 
Hungary to Russia that she did not claim territorial gain in 
Servia, the decision concerning the peace of the world rested 
exclusively with St. Petersburg. On the same day the Imperial 
Ambassador at St. Petersburg was also directed to make the 
following declaration to the Russian Government: 

"Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us to 
counter-measures which must consist in mobihzing the army. 

"But mobilization means war. 

"As we know the obligations of France towards Russia, this 
mobilization would be directed against both Russia and France. 
We cannot assume that Russia desires to unchain such a Euro- 
pean war. Since Austria-Hungary will not touch the existence 
of the Servian kingdom, we are of the opinion that Russia can 
afford to assume an attitude of waiting. We can all the more 
support the desire of Russia to protect the integrity of Servia 
as Austria-Hungary does not intend to question the latter. It 
will be easy in the further development of the affair to find a 
basis for an understanding."— (Translated from the German 
White Book, German text.) 

(b) The Threat Repeated. (July 29, 30, 1914) 

(Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador 
in France) : 

St. Petersburg, 29th July, 1914. 

Today the German Ambassador communicated to me the 
resolution taken by his Government to mobihze if Russia did 
not stop her military preparations. Now we only began these 
latter as a consequence of the mobilization to which Austria 
had already proceeded, and in view of the evident absence on 
the latter's part of any desire to accept any kind of a pacific 
solution of its conflict with Servia. 

Since we cannot accede to the desire of Germany, it only 
remains for us to hasten our own armament and to take meas- 
ures for the probable inevitability of war. — (Russian Orange 
Book, No. 58.) 

(The German Emperor to the Tsar) : 

July 30th, 1 a. m. 

My Ambassador has instructions to direct the attention of 
Your Government to the dangers and serious consequences of a 
mobilization; I have told You the same in my last telegram. 
Austria-Hungary has mobilized only against Servia, and only 



78 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

a part of her army. If Russia, as seems to be the case accord- 
ing to Your advice and that of Your Government, mobilizes 
against Austria-Hungary, the part of the mediator virith which 
You have entrusted me in such friendly manner and which I 
have accepted upon Your express desire, is threatened if not 
made impossible. The entire weight of decision now rests upon 
Your shoulders. You have to bear the responsibility for war 
or peace. — German White Book, Exhibit 23.) 

(c) Austria Does Not Regard Russia's Counter-Mobilization 
as a Hostile Act. (July 30, 1914) 

(French Ambassador at Vienna to French Minister for For- 
eign Affairs) : 

At an interview of great importance between M. Schebeko 
[Russian Ambassador at Vienna] and Count Berchtold 
[Austrian Foreign Minister] . . . M. Schebeko explained 
that the only object of the military preparations on the Russian 
side was to reply to those made by Austria, and to indicate the 
intention and the right of the Tsar to formulate his views on 
the settlement of the Servian question. The steps towards 
mobilization taken in Galicia, answered* Count Berchtold, have 
no aggressive intention and are only directed towards main- 
taining the situation as it stands. On both sides endeavors will 
be made to prevent these measures from being interpreted as 
signs of hostility. — (French Yellow Book, No. 104.) 

(Austrian Foreign Minister to Austrian Ambassador at St. 
Petersburg) : 

Since -Russia is obviously mobilizing against us, we are com- 
pelled to extend our own mobilization ; I, however, wish to 
point out expressly, that this measure should not be considered 
as a hostile act against Russia, but simply as a response to the 
Russian mobilization. I asked M. Schebeko to report the above 
to his government, which he undertook to do. — (Austro-Hun- ■ 
garian Red Book, No. 50.) 

[§82] RUSSIA'S FINAL EFFORTS AT CONCILIATION 

(a) Offer to Submit to the Decision of The Hague 
Tribunal. (July 29, 1914) 

Thanks for your telegram, which is conciliatory and friendly, 
whereas the official message presented today by your Ambassa- 
dor to my Minister was conveyed in a very different tone. I 
beg you to explain this divergency. It would be right to give 
over the Austro-Serbian problem to The Hague Tribunal. I 
trust in your wisdom and friendship. 

(This telegram, sent by the Tsar to the German Emperor, 
.was suppressed in the German White Book, which prints the 
rest of the despatches exchanged between the Tsar and the 
German Emperor. Its authenticity, however, was acknowledged 
by the German Government upon its publication in the Russian 
press, Jan. 31, 1915.) 



THE EUROPEAN WAR 79 

(b) Proposal of Basis for Agreement with Austria. 

(Proposal transmitted to Berlin by the Russian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, July 30, 1914.) 

If Austria, recognizing that the Austro-Servian question has 
assumed the character of a European question, declares herself 
ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the points which are 
an infringement of the sovereign rights of Servia, Russia under- 
takes to cease her military preparations. — (Russian Orange Book, 
No. 60.) 

(Revised form of same proposal, transmitted July 31, 1914) : 

If Austria agrees to arrest the advance of her troops on 
Servian territory, and if, recognizing that the dispute between 
Austria and Servia has assumed the character of a question of 
general European interest, she will allow the Great Powers to 
examine how Servia can give satisfaction to Austria-Hungary 
without impairment of her rights as a sovereign and independent 
state, Russia will undertake to maintain her waiting attitude. — 
(Russian Orange Book, No. 67.) 

[§831 LAST EFFORT OF ENGLAND TO AVERT WAR 

(July 31, 1914) 

By Sir Edward Grey. 

It has occurred to me that Germany might sound Vienna and 
I would undertake to sound St. Petersburg, whether it would be 
possible for the four disinterested Powers to offer to Austria 
that they would undertake to see that she obtained full satis- 
faction of her demands on Servia, and the integrity of Servian 
territory. . . . All Powers would of course suspend further 
military operations or preparations. You may sound the Sec- 
retary of State about this proposal. 

I said to German Ambassador this morning that if Germany 
could get any reasonable proposal put forward, which made it 
clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve 
European peace, and that Russia and France would be unrea- 
sonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburg 
and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and France 
would not accept it His Majesty's Government would have 
nothing more to do with the consequences ; but, otherwise, I 
told German Ambassador that if France became involved we 
should be drawn in. You can add this when sounding Chan- 
cellor or Secretary of State as to proposal above. 

(Despatch to the British Ambassador at Berlin, British White 
Book. No. 111.) 



80 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

[§84] GERMANY'S REPLY TO THE PROPOSALS OF 
RUSSIA AND ENGLAND: THE ULTIMATUM 
JULY 31-AUG. 1, 1914. i 

(a) (German Chancellor to the German Ambassador in 
Paris, July 31, 1914) : 

We have declared the stale of threatening war, which is 
bound to be followed by mobilization unless Russia stops within 
twelve ho'irs all military measures (Kriegsmassnahmen) against 
us and Austria. Mobilization inevitably means war. Please ask 
French Government whether it intends to remain neutral in a* 
Russo-German war. Reply must be made in eighteen hours. 
Wire at once hour at which this inquiry is made. Utmost 
speed vecessary.— (German I'/hite Book, Exhibit 25.) 

(b) (Russian Foreign Minister to Russian Representatives 
Abroad, Aug. 1, 1914) : 

At midnight the German Ambassador announced to me, on 
the instruction of his Government, that if within twelve hours 
we have not begun to demobilize, not only against Germany 
but also against Austria, the German Government would be 
compelled to give the order for mobilization. — (Russian Orange 
Book. No. 70.) 

[§85] HOW THE WAR CAME TO BELGIUM. 

By Baron Moncheur, Head of the Belgian Mission to the 
United States (Aug. 3, 1917.) 

Three years ago today, Aug. 3, 1914, my country was free. 
On Aug. 2, in the evening, my Government had received a most 
insulting ultimatum from Germany, demanding unimpeded pas- 
sage for her troops and offering a bribe, to sell our honor and 
to disregard our plighted word. 

We were given 12 hours within which to reply. The time 
was more than enough. Yet, there could be only one answer. 
The King summoned his cabinet and his ministers of state. 
They were all of one mind. In fact, there was absolute unan- 
imity of thought in every Belgian mind, and there was not a 
dissenting voice in the council of the King. Belgiumfs reply 
was sent to the German legation before 7 o'clock in the morn- 
ing of Aug. 3. You all know the substance of that reply. One 
sentence of the document reads : "The Belgian Government, 
if they were to accept the proposals submitted to them, would 
sacrifice the honor of the nation and betray their duties toward 
Europe." Neither Belgium's liberty nor her honor were for 
sale. 

This day three years ago was an anxious day in Belgium. 
We asked the diplomatic support of the powers who had guar- 
anteed our neutrality, but we asked their diplomatic support 
only. A request for military support was, after careful con- 
sideration, deliberately deferred until Germany sho\ild have 
consummated her crime by sending troops into our territory. 



THE EUROPEAN WAR 81 

We were careful to give her no pretext whatever for claiming 
that we had violated our neutral obligations in favor of her 
enemies until she had actually consummated her threatened 
crime. 

The 3d of August was, therefore, a day of anxious waiting; 
but at half past nine on the morning of the 4th we received 
a telegram that Belgian territory had been violated by German 
troops at Gemmeunich, a little village close to the frontier and 
a few miles from Aix-la-Chappelle. The invading forces had 
been met by Belgian gendarmes on guard at this frontier post. 
Blood had flowed; the die was cast. 

You all know what has happened since that fateful day 
three years ago. My country has been ravaged with fire and 
sword. Old men, women and children have been deliberately 
and ruthlessly massacred. Our war materials and our crops 
have been seized without payment, our factories have been 
destroyed, our machinery has been stolen and sent into Ger- 
many; and, crowning infamy of the centuries, our workmen 
have been torn from their homes and sent into slavery. The 
Belgian people still stand caged behind steel bars, formed of 
German bayonets. Those who have escaped fixe and sword 
and nameless evils are still hungry, famished and enslaved, 
ground down beneath the heel of the tyrant. But their courage 
remains unbroken and unbreakable. 

No true-hearted Belgian regrets the decision which was made 
three years ago. They are ready to lay down their lives for 
liberty. They know that in the end justice will triumph. As 
our King said three years ago, "A country which defends itself 
commands the respect of all the world and cannot perish."* 

(Address before the Mass. Constitutional Convention, Boston.) 

[§86] C— SPECIAL REFERENCES. 

Books. 

Gibbons, Herbert Adams. The New War Map of Europe. 

(N. Y., Century Co., 1914.) 
Headlam, J. W. The History of Tivelve Days. (1915.) 
/ Accuse. (N. Y., Doran, 1915.) (Indictment of German 

Government, by a German.) 
McClure, S. S. Obstacles to Peace. (Bost., Houghton, 

Mifflin, 1916.) 
Members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History. Why 
We Are at War — Great Britain's Case. (Oxford, Clar- 
endon Press, 1914.) 
Modern Germany in Relation to the Great War. By vari- 
ous German writers. Trans, by W. W. Whitelock. 
(N. Y., Kennerley, 1916.) (Most authoritative pres- 
entation of Germany's case, by leading German his- 
torians and publicists.) 
Scott, James Brown. Diplomatic Documents Relating to 
the Outbreak of the European War. (2 vols., N. Y., 
Oxford Univ. Press, 1916.) (Best compilation of 
documents, well indexed.) 



82 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

Seymour, Charles. Diplomatic Background of the War. 
(New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1916.) (Careful diplo- 
matic history, impartial.) 

Truth About Germany: Facts About the War. (N. Y., 
1914.) (A semi-official statement of Germany's case. 
Prepared under the direction of a committee of eminent 
German scholars and publicists; grossly inaccurate.) 

Articles. 

Chirol, Sir Valentine. "The Origins of the Present War." 

Quarterly Review. (Oct. 1914.) 
Dillon, E. J. "Causes of the European War." Contempo- 
rary Rev. (Sept., 1914). 
Ferrero, Guglielmo. "The European Tragedy." Atlantic 

(Nov., 1914). 
Harnack, Adolf von. "Germany and the Present War." 

Educational Rev. (Nov., 1914). 
Hart, Albert Bushnell. "The Historical Roots of the 

War." Outlook (Sept. 23, 30, 1914). 
Hill, David Jayne. "Germany's Self-Revelation of Guilt." 

Century (July, 1917). 
Hymans, Paul. "How and Why Belgium Drew the 

Sword." Outlook (Sept. 30, 1914). 
Lovejoy, A. O. "What was the Casus Belli?" Nation 

(N. Y., March 4, 1915, v. 100, pp. 246-7). 
Politicus. "The Causes of the War." Fortnightly Rev. 

(Sept., 1914). 
Turner, E. R. "Causes of the Great War." Am. Pol. 

Science Rev. (Feb., 1915). 



CHAPTER V. 

What the Government Must Do to Make the War 
Successful. 

A.— SUMMARY STATEMENT. 

[§87] The first necessity in order to meet the war which has 
been forced upon the United States is to realize the prodigious 
task which thus suddenly arises. When the war began the 
United States had its disposal only about 100,000 trained reg- 
ular soldiers and 70,000 trained seamen; plenty of rifles, but not 
a single big cannon such as are essential for modern warfare; 
not a single military airplane that could face German fire; not a 
trench bomb; not a man trained in trench warfare; no supply 
of ammunition for fortifications or ships that would last beyond 
a few hours' fight ; few and small submarines ; few motor trucks 
suitable for military purposes; no reserve of clothing, equip- 
ments, tents and other necessities for the soldier; no barracks 
and camps available for the housing and training of great 
armies; only 5,000 military officers and 3,C00 naval officers, in 
the regular service. The militia had just broken down in the 
campaigns on the border of Mexico because the excellent ma- 
terial could not be properly equipped, transported, housed, fed 
or trained under the conditions then obtaining. The beginning 
of an adequate system of national defense is to look fairly in 
the face the state of things existing when a state of war was 
recognized by act of Congress on April 6, 1917. 

[§88] The first step taken by Congress was to pass a loan bill 
for immediate emergencies. It developed into the Liberty Loan of 
2,000 millions, which first brought home to the American people 
the immense money sacrifices that the nation must sustain. This 
loan must necessarily be followed by other loans, and still others, 
for the Government must face expenditures of 6, 8 or 10 billions 
in a single year of war. The duty of Congress is to provide 
bountifully, and at the same time to check extravagance and 
waste. Along with the loans come the taxes. New sources of 
taxation have been sought amounting to about 2 billions a year, 
in addition to the billion a year which had previously been 
raised. These taxes will necessarily take just so much out of 
the annual income of the country. They cannot be paid without 
sacrifice, and they must and will be paid. Common sense dictates 
that there should be no hanging back when it is a question of 
national defense. 

[§89] The main purpose of this heavy expenditure is to keep 
men in the field and at sea where they may reach our enemies. 
Inasmuch as the men and officers actually on foot available for 

[83] 



84 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

immediate service on August 1, 1917, together counted up only 
about 800,000 men, it became necessary immediately to provide 
for larger levies by a selective draft of the able bodied men be- 
tween 21 and 31. The first drawing, of July, 1917, provided for a 
first installment of 660,000 men for a new national army. At the 
same time*began the construction of camps for their reception, 
and training camps for the officers who should drill the new 
recuits. The duty of the Government is to keep on with these 
calls from time to time, so as to create a force which will 
inspire respect in Germany and give support to the Allies 
wherever they are most needed. When fighting actually begins 
at the front the casualties, together with the sick, will diminish 
the numbers, and a reserve must be kept up in this country, out 
of which the ranks shall be constantly filled. There is no other 
way in which a war can be fought with any. chance of success. 

[§90] Parallel with the raising of money and of men must go 
a constructive organization of all the governmental forces of the 
country. The general staff of the army, which is the brain and 
organized will, must be given sufficient powers. A general staff 
must be provided for the navy on a similar basis. The bureaus 
of the War and Navy departments need increase, re-organization 
and strengthening. The President, under an act of Congress, 
has appointed an elaborate Council of National Defense. Every 
step taken by this Council, by the heads of departments, by Con- 
gress and by the President, in the direction of better organiza- 
tion, concentration of responsibility and efficiency from top to 
bottom of the whole service, must have the loyal support of the 
nation. One of the greatest dangers before us is that the strain 
upon our complicated and ordinarily rather slow government 
may prove too great. The only road to salvation is through put- 
ting great responsibilities on single, responsible heads for such 
great services as food supply and distribution, transportation, 
ship building, munition making, provisioning of the troops, con- 
veying them across the ocean, and command of armies and 
navies. 

[§91] In this process states, cities and local governments can 
help by giving aid at every point to the placing of loans, draft- 
ing and organization of troops and the various services of the 
national government. The state committees of defense should 
be especially active in arousing and keeping alive the sentiment 
of patriotism in the nation. Every effort should be made to 
elect strong men, who can see and understand the crisis, to 
state legislatures, to state offices, and to Congress. Every 
American should understand that the question is not simply 
that of defeating the central powers in Europe, but of maintain- 
ing for ourselves the permanent right to form our own govern- 
ment. The action of Germany in the conquered and dependent 
territory at the present moment is a warning to the United 
States of what we might expect if by some terrible reverse 
Germans were ever to get a footing within our boundaries. 
The fate of the Serbians and Montenegrins, the Armenians 
and the people of northern France and of Belgium, is a sufficient 
warning to us of the German conception of the way to treat 
a subject and helpless people. 



THE GOVERNMENT AND THE WAR 85 

[§92] It is the duty of all Americans to stand by the great 
principle that governments exist for the people, and not the peo- 
ple for their governments. But our government of the people 
must respond to the necessities of the people; it must av^^ake to 
the new tasks of the time. No theories of government, no prin- 
ciple of the division of powers, no senseless terror of "a man 
on horseback," must deprive the American people of their right 
to a strong, efficient, serviceable government, which will turn its 
back on the obsolete and helpless military and naval methods of 
the past. We live in a new world, with new forces ; we must 
organize to take our part in that world. This is the opportunity of 
centuries for the American government to show that it is com- 
petent to meet the gravest dangers and triumph over the greatest 
difficulties. We must prove that democracy can create and 
obey a government of power. 

B.— ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS. 

[§93] DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT AND SUCCESS 
IN WAR. 

By Arthur O. Lovejoy. 

Success in war requires quickness in decision, continuity of 
policy, secrecy in counsel, and concentration of control. All 
these things are foreign to the genius of representative govern- 
ment, which proceeds by the method of deliberate discussion, 
requires full pubhcity for all matters of public interest, exercises 
the liberty of changing its mind, and diffuses responsibility for 
governmental decisions throughout the people at large. War 
is an abnormal condition ; democracy is the normal political 
order for civilized peoples ; and it is not surprising that it is by 
nature ill adapted for the prosecution of war. There arise, 
however, junctures in human history in which democracies are 
compelled to wage war in defense of their own security, or of 
the principles to which they are dedicated. At such a juncture 
a wise democracy will promptly and unflinchingly modify its 
ordinary and normal processes of government, and the customary 
procedure of its political life, in such ways — though only in such 
ways — as may be needful to ensure success in the unwelcome 
business immediately in hand. It is possible in a time of crisis 
to be so tenacious of the form and habitual routine of demo- 
cratic government as to imperil the cause of democracy through- 
out the world. When, then, the Republic goes to war, it must : 
(a) concentrate power and responsibility in the hands of its 
executive; (b) subordinate thoroughness of discussion to 
celerity of action; (c) accept loyally innumerable restrictions 
of individual liberty which in time of peace it would deem 
intolerable; (d) clearly understand and firmly resolve that 
these departures from its usual modes of action are to be 
regarded solely as exceptional and transitory means of meeting 
the peril with which democracy itself, with all the normal life 
of mankind, is threatened. 



86 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

[§94] WHAT ADEQUATE PREPAREDNESS MEANS. 
By Captains J. A. Moss and M. B. Stewart. 

P"ancy yourself on your way to work when you unfold your 
paper and read those headlmes— (1,000,000 Volunteers). What 
does it mean to you? War, of course! But what sort of a 
picture does it bring to your mind? Let us look at it. One 
million men out of our male population. One man out of every 
forty-seven males — boys and men, young, old, able-bodied, de- 
crepit. That is the first thing it means in the life of a nation. 

What does it mean in the home, in the business, of the forty- 
seventh man we can only guess. What does it mean for those 
who face the task of finding those 1,000,000 men, taking them 
in hand, sorting them, arranging them, organizing them, arming, 
uniforming, training and equipping them — making them into a 
fighting machine? 

Summed up, it is a task that would tax the finest organization 
and machinery that peace-time ingenuity could devise and years 
of patient preparation could effect. With disaster hanging over 
our heads, danger threatening us on every side, and the confusion 
of unpreparedness handicapping our every effort, it means a 
task that will strain the utmost shoulder-to-shoulder efforts of 
the nation to the breaking point. Let us glance at the round 
numbers that such a task rolls up in front of our eyes. 

First of all, 1,000,000 men — a column of men, four abreast, 
over 400 miles long— 1,000,000 men eager to fight in defense of 
their country and ignorant of the first principles of the soldier's 
trade. A million men who are nothing but a burden, to be 
cared for until they can be taught to care for themselves. A 
million men who cannot move without leaders, or raise a hand in 
defense until they have been taught. 

What else does it mean? 

750,000 rifles and bayonets for them to fight with. 

265,000 pistols— little brothers of the rifie. 

8,000 machine guns, the military scythe. 

2,100 field guns to batter down attack. 

165,000,000 cartridges to carry them into their first fight, and 
as many more for each succeeding fight. 

2,500,000 shells and shrapnel for our field guns for every 
hour they are in action. 

196,000 horses to carry them and pull their gun carriages. 

127,000 mules to haul their supplies and pack their guns. 

8,000 wagons to transport their supplies and ammunition. 

1,000,000 cartridge belts for their ammunition. 

1,000,000 first-aid packets to bind up their wounds. 

1,000,000 canteens. 

Each of them must have uniform and equipment: 

1,000,000 shelter-halves to protect them from the weather. 

1,000,000 pouches to keep them dry. 

2,000,000 blankets to keep them warm. 

2,000,000 pairs of shoes. 

2,000,000 uniform coats, breeches, leggings, suits of underwear. 



THE GOVERNMENT AND THE WAR 87 

1,000,000 hats. 
2,000,000 shirts. 
4,000,000 pairs of socks. 

1,000,000 haversacks to carry their equipment. 
Finally they must eat: 
1,000,000 pounds of meat each day. 
1,000,000 pounds of bread each day. 
2,000,000 pounds of vegetables each day. 
3,000,000 pints of coffee or tea each day. 

All this must be purchased, transported, prepared and cooked 
each day, and to eat it they must have: 
1,000,000 cups. 
1,000,000 plates. 
1,000,000 knives. 
1,000,000 forks. 
1,000,000 spoons. 
To provide for proper care, training and lead in battle they 

should have: 

25,000 trained officers. 

(Captain James A. Moss and Captain Merch B. Stewart, 5"^//- 
Helps for the Citizen-Soldier.) 

[§95] CONSCRIPTION THE ONLY JUST, DEMO- 
CRATIC AND EFFICIENT WAY TO 
RAISE AN ARMY. 

By the Senate Committee on Military Affairs. (April 21, 1917) 

The volunteer method has never proved adequate and effectual 
for national needs, and will prove far less so now. War as now 
conducted is of a hitherto unconceived magnitude. Now millions 
of men are demanded where formerly a few thousands only 
were required. We must no longer think in terms of divisions, 
l)ut in large groups of armies, each consisting of hundreds of 
thousands of men. In former times of national stress, far less 
perilous than this, the volunteer method has never furnished the 
men needed for emergency. History shows that, much to our 
detriment, we have begun our wars with this inadequate and 
ineffectual method, and have brought them to a successful con- 
clusion only by resort to a system based on proper principles. 
The volunteer method failed this nation in the Revolution, and it 
was only the material aid of France that gave us our independ- 
ence. It failed us in the war of 1812, and had it not been for 
drastic draft laws and the diversion created by the Napoleonic 
war we could not have concluded even such peace as we did. 
It failed the Confederacy in. the Civil War, and that govern- 
ment, to its advantage, was quicker to perceive that fact than 
our own. It likewise failed the Federal Government, and volun- 
teering having practically ceased by the end of 1862, was suc- 
ceeded in the following year by the f^rst of the draft acts. It 
failed us in the Spanish-American War, for the force then 
called for was never obtained. 

The volunteer method has no fundamental legal basis for us 



88 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

existence. The universal liability to render military service is 
based upon the fundamental concept of the relation of a free 
man to the state. From the earliest times, every free man, in 
legal theory at least, has been under the necessity of renderinc 
military service to the state. The volunteer method grew not 
out of any legal principles, but was adopted doubtless as an 
expedient, having no other basis perhaps than that the need of 
llie state on ordinary occasion has heretofore required the 
service of far less than the numbers available. The mere fre- 
quency of resort to this method of raising forces, which in its 
origin had nothing to sustain it but convenience, has resulted 
in causing us in some degree to forget the fundamental facts that 
every citizen capable of bearing arms has the bounden duty to 
render military service to the state. And the same frequency 
of resort has established the tradition that the volunteer system 
is the only system of raising military forces compatible with the 
maintenance of liberty. On the contrary, it is incompatible with 
that right and duty of equal participation in the affairs and 
burdens of state which characterizes American political institu- 
tions. To render military service to a nation is a higher duty 
than to contribute to its financial support. Fundamentally con- 
sidered, therefore, military service is the highest duty of a 
citizen, and is in no sense to be regarded as a voluntary 
offering. ... 

The volunteer system does not accord with the principles of 
our institutions. It is undemocratic. It shifts the burden of 
national defense from the many, where it rightfully belongs, to 
the shoulders of the few whose condition in life or patriotism 
impels them first to offer themselves to accept the risks and 
hardships of war. The spirit of real democracy, which must 
lie at the basis of national defense, could not be better expressed 
than was done by the mother of two sons, who, in writing to 
urge that the system established by this bill be adopted, said: 
"It is the only just, equitable and democratic way; otherwise the 
flower of the country is sacrificed. We mothers with our sons 
want to defend this country, but we resent thus saving a lot of 
shirkers. This is the woman's point of view, but from the 
military standpoint it is also most efficacious." 

In a word, the volunteer system which this measure is de- 
signed to supersede is undemocratic, unreliable, extravagant, in- 
efficient and, above all, unsafe. The system established by this 
bill will have one other effect greatly to be desired in this 
nation, consisting as it does of varied elements of all races 
Jind tongues. It would directly and very effectually tend to the 
unification of our people by common association in a common 
cause, in furtherance of the principle that it is the duty, as it 
should be the desire, of all citizens, of whatever race or origin, 
to undergo all necessary sacrifice for the national good. It 
strikes down that opportunity, which the volunteer method de- 
liberately induces, for the selfish and unpatriotic to remain at 
home in time of war and to profit out of the nation's adversity 
at the expense of those whose patriotism has impelled them to 
perform a citizen's duty. 

This is no time to tolerate uncertainty in the raising and the 



THE GOVERNMENT AND THE WAR 89 

maintenance of the large numbers of men which the present 
emergency is likely to require, nor uncertainty in the methods 
to be adopted for the establishment of an adequate, efficient 
military service. The bill makes certain the raising and main- 
tenance of the required forces with the utmost expedition. It 
establishes the principle that all arms-bearing citizens owe to 
the nation the duty of defending it. It selects only those who 
by reason of their age and physical capacity are the best fitted 
to receive the training and withstand the actual hardships of a 
campaign, and who, happily, can be taken with least disturbance 
of normal economic and industrial conditions. 

{Report of Senate Committee on Military Affairs, recommend- 
ing the enactment of the Universal Service Bill, submitted by 
Senator Chamberlain, of Oregon.) 

[§96] A WAR PRESIDENT ON OBLIGATORY 
SERVICE. 

By Abraham Lincoln. 

The principle of draft, which simply is involuntary or enforced 
service, is not new. It has been practiced in all ages of the 
world. It was well known to the framers of our Constitution 
as one of the modes of raising armies, at the time they placed in 
that instrument the provision that "the Congress shall have 
power to raise and support armies." It had been used just be- 
fore in establishing our independence, and it was also used under 
the Constitution in 1812. Wherein is the peculiar hardship now? 
Shall we shirk from the necessary means to maintain our free 
government, which our grandfathers employed to establish it and 
our own fathers already employed once to maintain it? Are 
we degenerate? Has the manhood of our race run out? 

(From an Address to the American People, prepared in 1863 
but never issued; quoted in Congressional Record, April 21, 1917, 
p. 924.) 



[§97J ADVANTAGES OF THE SELECTIVE DRAFT. 

By Representative Julius Kahn of California. (April 27, 

1917.) 

Under the proposed law there will be no stigma. Gentlemen 
who have spoken for the volunteer system have repeatedly as- 
serted during this debate that it would be a stigma to conscript 
men into the service. Yes, if we passed a draft law similar to 
the laws that were passed during the Civil War, of course there 
would be a stigma. But under the selective draft system, where 
every man is treated alike, where every man of military age is 
compelled under the law to do his bit for the country, there can 
be no stigma or odium. Every man knows that his neighbor is 
going to be treated just as he is treated. If they had had during 
the Civil War an equitable draft, such as is proposed here, there 



90 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

never would have been any trouble under it, and especially if 
such a law had been passed at the very beginning of the Civil 
War, there never would have been a moment's trouble or delay 
in filling all the regiments that were required to fight the war 
to a successful conclusion. 

During the progress of that war that great man in the White 
House, the lamented Lincoln, wrote this letter to a mother up 
in New England. It is dated Executive Mansion, Washington, 
November 21, 1864, and is written to Mrs. Bixby, Boston, Mass.: 

Dear Madam : I have been shown in the files of the 
War Department a statement of the adjutant-general of 
Massachusetts that you are the mother of five sons who 
have died gloriously on the field of battle. I feel how 
weak and fruitless must be any word of mine which 
should attempt to beguile you from the grief of a loss so 
overwhelming. But I cannot refrain from tendering you 
the consolation that may be found in the thanks of the 
Republic they died to save. I pray that our Heavenly 
Father may assuage the anguish of your bereavement and 
leave you only the cherished memory of the loved and 
lost and the solemn pride that is yours to have laid so 
costly a sacrifice upon the altar of freedom. 

Yours very sincerely and respectfully, 

A. Lincoln. 

Why, my colleagues, why should that mother in New England 
have been permitted to make such a sacrifice to the Republic 
while somebody living near her probably made no sacrifice at 
all? My friend, the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania 
(Mr. Fachet), spoke to me a day or two ago and told me that 
in his district there was one family that sent nine sons to the 
war. Under the selective draft system advocated by the ad- 
ministration, that would not be possible. And it ought not to 
be possible in these days. Why should these nine men have 
been allowed to do the fighting for shirkers and cowards who 
refused to volunteer? 

I am simply pointing out the evils of the volunteer system 
during the Civil War. Again I assert that I admire those 
soldiers who went to the fields of battle voluntarily. We owe 
them everything that the Republic can bestow upon them. Dur- 
ing my membership in the House I have voted repeatedly to 
show the debt of gratitude that I feel the country owes them 
by giving my assent to legislation in their behalf. 

(Congressional Record, 1267.) 

[§98] HOW VOLUNTARY SERVICE WORKED IN 
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION. 

Condensed from General Emory Upton. 

From the beginning to the end of the struggle almost 400,000 
men were called out; yet notwithstanding this formidable num- 
ber — on paper — the most men that Washington could get to- 



THE GOVERNMENT AND THE WAR 91 

gether for any one battle was 17,500, while as a rule the fighting 
strength of his command was so far below that number that 
an alert and aggressive enemy had many opportunities to termin- 
ate the war at one stroke. If, for illustration, Howe had struck 
at Boston the cause would have been lost. Washington fully 
expected the enemy to take advantage of his well-known weak- 
ness and to strike a crushing blow. 

Blind to the difference between men enrolled and men de- 
veloped into soldiers. Congress pursued its weak policy, and 
though in one year it summoned 89,600 men, Washington's fight- 
ing strength before Princeton and Trenton was only 4,000 1 

"To bring men," wrote Washington to Congress, "to a proper 
degree of subordination is not the work of a day, a month, 
or even a year. To place any reliance upon militia is assuredly 
resting upon a broken staff. Men just dragged from the tender 
scenes of domestic life, unaccustomed to the din of arms, totally 
unacquainted with every kind of military skill (which, followed 
by a want of confidence in themselves when opposed by troops 
regularly trained, disciplined and appointed, superior in knowl- 
edge and superior in arms) are timid and ready to fly from 
their own shadows. Besides, the sudden change in their man- 
ner of living, particularly in their lodging, brings on sickness in 
many, impatience in all, and such an unconquerable desire of 
returning to their respective homes that it not only produces 
shameful and scandalous desertions among themselves, but also 
infuses the like spirit in others." 

"It is needless to add," he declared later, "that short-term 
enlistments and a mistaken dependence on militia have been the 
origin of all our misfortunes and the great accumulation of our 
debt. These, sir, are the men I am to depend upon ten days 
hence; this is the basis on which your cause will, and must, 
forever depend till you get a large standing army sufficient of 
itself to oppose the enemy." 

The cost of this mistaken policy in money and in discipline 
was enormous. Men came and went, consumed public stores, 
created a spirit of insubordination, often indulged in shocking 
lawlessness, and presently returned to their homes, having done 
little besides taking up the time of their superiors and being a 
charge upon the public treasury. 

But deplorable as was the waste in money, it was nothing in 
comparison with other evils it spread. Two of the disasters are 
sufficient to show the far-reaching effect of the mistaken policy: 
In the campaign of 1775 the only important offensive movement 
undertaken by the Colonists was the invasion of Canada. Gen- 
eral Montgomery crossed the frontier and occupied Montreal. 
General Arnold marched through the wilderness of Maine to 
Canada. They joined forces, attacked the stronghold of Quebec, 
and the assault failed. Sixty Americans were killed or wounded; 
between 300 and 400 were made prisoners ; Montgomery lost his 
life. The failure was due to the circumstance that the attack 
was made at an inopportune time. The terms of enlistment of 
nearly all of Montgomery's men were about to expire, and he 
knew that they would immediately leave him; hence he deter- 
mined upon a final stroke before his force was dissolved, al- 



92 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

though his military judgment would have dictated otherwise had 
he been master of the situation. 

The second misfortune occurred in 1777, when the American 
commander was unable to grasp the full fruits of the victory 
over Burgoyne at Saratoga. Ordinary military wisdom would 
have suggested the prompt transfer of the victorious army of 
17,000 men to Philadelphia, where a British force of 10,000 was 
opposed by about the same number of Continentals and militia. 
A decisive defeat of Howe at Philadelphia, which this transfer 
would probably have assured, promised to end the Revolution 
then and there. But the transfer was not made, because Gates's 
volunteer army was again dissolving; and the war dragged on 
for five weary years more. 

(Condensed from Some Fads of American History, based 
upon Upton's Military Policy of the United States. 

[§99] WHY WE FIGHT ABROAD. 

By Theodore Roosevelt. (July 26, 1917.) 

At the outbreak of the war our people were stunned, blinded, 
terrified by the extent of the world disaster. Those among our 
leaders who were greedy, those who were selfish and ease-loving, 
those who were timid and those who were 'merely short-sighted, 
all joined to blindfold the eyes and dull the conscience of the 
people so that it might neither see iniquity nor gird its loins for 
the inevitable struggle. But at last we stand with our faces to 
the light. At last we have faced our duty. Now it behooves us 
to do this duty with masterful efficiency. 

We are in the war. But we are not yet awake. We are passing 
through, in exaggerated form, the phase through which England 
passed during the first year of the war. A very large number of 
Englishmen fooled themselves with the idea that they lived on 
an island and were safe anyhow; that the war would soon be 
over, and that if they went on with their business as usual and 
waved flags and applauded patriotic speeches somebody else 
would do the fighting for them. England has seen the error of 
her way; she has paid in blood and agony for her shortsighted- 
ness; she is now doing her duty with stern resolution. We are 
repeating her early errors on a larger scale; and assuredly we 
shall pay heavily if we do not in time wake from our short- 
sighted apathy and foolish, self-sufficient optimism. 
. We live on a continent. We have trusted to that fact for 
safety in the past; we do not understand that world conditions 
have changed, and that the oceans and even the air have become 
highways for military aggression. The exploits of the German 
U-boat off Nantucket last summer — exploits which nothing but 
feebleness, considerations of political expediency and downright 
lack of courage on our part permitted— showed that if Germany • 
or any other possible opponent of ours were free to deal with 
us the security that an ocean barrier once offered was an- 
nihilated. In other words, the battle front of Europe is slowly 
spreading over the whole world. Unless we beat Germany in 



THE GOVERNMENT AND THE WAR 93 

Europe, we shall have to fight her deadly ambition on our own 
coasts and in our own continent. A great American army in 
Europe now is the best possible insurance against a great 
European or Asiatic army in our own country a couple of years 
or a couple of decades hence. 

(Address before the Moose Convention at Pittsburgh.) 



[§100] THE HARD FACTS OF THE WAR. 

By Pomeroy Burton, British Expert in Publicity. (July 2, 

1917.) 

First. — That the war is nowhere near an end. 

Second. — That its most serious phases are yet to come. 

Third. — That it is and has been as much America's war as it 
is and has been France's and England's war ever since the first 
shot was fired. 

Fourth. — That notwithstanding the warnings of the past three 
years, this country finds itself entering upon war against Ger- 
many amazingly unprepared. 

Fifth. — That if a long war is to be averted, with its attendant 
world-wide suffering and a continuance of the ghastly fighting 
that is now in progress, America must quickly throw its full 
strength and resources into the struggle. 

Sixth. — That the pressing and immediate reason for arousing 
this country to action on the greatest possible scale is that if 
anything were to go seriously wrong with the Allied war pro- 
gramme so as to affect sea-control, Germany would at once 
descend upon this country and exact a stupendous war in- 
demnity, wreaking vengeance in true Prussian military fashion 
upon our defenseless women and children and establishing a 
permanent foothold on this continent. 

Seventh. — That the vital Allied war needs of the moment are 
ships, food and aeroplanes in vast numbers; hence the urgency 
of getting the whole war programme moving without a single 
hour's unnecessary delay. 

Eighth. — That much valuable time has been lost, and still 
more time is now being wasted in dangerous controversy, while 
the war goes swiftly on. 

Ninth. — That the only safe basis of procedure, in view of all 
these circumstances, is to assume that this country alone is 
fighting Germany; that there is no British fleet to shield it and 
no other Allied armies to pound the German forces back while 
the United States is making ready for war, but that invasion is 
imminent, and that back of the Government's war programme 
must be the people's whole strength and fully aroused spirit in 
order to avert national disaster; and, 

Tenth, That on America's promptness of action may depend 
the length, and possibly the actual outcome, of the war. 

Address before the Speakers' Training Camp, National Secu- 
rity League, Chautauqua, N. Y. 



94 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

C— [§101] SPECIAL REFERENCES. 

Books. 

Dullard, Arthur. Mobilising America. (N. Y., Mac- 

millan, 1917.) 
Stirling, Commander Yates. Fundamentals of Naval 

Service. (N. Y., Scribner, 1917.) 
Upton, Bt. Major General Emory. The Military Policy 

of the United States. (Wash., Gov. Print. Office, 

1912.) 
Wood, Major General Leonard. The Military Obliga- 

gations of Citisenship. (Princeton, University Press, 

1915.) 

Articles. 

Bullock, C. J. ^"Financing the War." Quarterly Journal 

of Economics. {May, 1917.) 
Creel, Geo. "The Sweat of War." Everybody's. (June, 

1917.) 
"Financing the War." New Republic. (April 7, 1917.) 
"Food Control." New Republic. (March 10, 1917.) 
Giddings, Franklin H. "The Democracy of Universal 

Military Service." Am. Acad, of Pol. Annals and Soc. 

Sci. (July, 1916.) 
Hard, W. "America Prepares." New Republic. (March 

31, 1917.) 
Hard, W. "Our Duty in the Air." New Republic. (April 

28, 1917.) 
Lippman, W. L. "Integrated America." New Republic. 
"The Tasks of America." New Republic (May 26, 1917.) 
"To Defeat the Submarine." New Republic. March 3. 

1917.) 
War Department, U. S. "Mobilization of Industries." 

Document 517. 



CHAPTER VI. 

WHAT THE CITIZEN MUST DO TO MAKE THE 
WAR SUCCESSFUL 

A.— SUMMARY STATEMENT. 

[§102] While the governments at Washington and in the States 
of the Union are laboring on the problem of creating an army 
and enlarging the navy, every man, woman and child in the 
country has his own part in the war. In this respect there is no 
distinction between the native born and the naturalized citizen. 
They all have the same obligation to obey the laws, to pay 
their taxes, and to render to the country all the service that is 
within their power. They all have the same right to protection. 
Discriminations against American citizens simply because of 
their names or their race-descent are un-American and dis- 
loyal. Every citizen in the U. S. is entitled to the presumption 
that he or she loves the country, is opposed to its enemies, 
and will do his or her part in the struggle. 

[§103] Aliens of the Allied powers are presumed to be friends 
and willing to do their share for the common cause. Aliens who 
have remained citizens of Germany, Austro-Hungary, Bulgaria 
or Turkey must submit to restrictions of their movements and 
employments necessary for the safety of the community — restric- 
tions far less than would be applied in Germany against Ameri- 
can citizens who should be found in great numbers inside Ger- 
many. Many of these "alien enemies" are, in fact, good Ameri- 
cans in spirit, who have not the slightest intention to injure the 
country in which they have chosen to live. But the spying and 
destruction of lives and property by order of German officials and 
by the direct hand. of German citizens during the last three 
years make it necessary to keep all persons of questionable alle- 
giance under surveillance. 

[§104] One of the great duties of Americans is to unite in the 
national organizations for rousing the spirit of the people and 
for the care of sick and wounded soldiers and of families left 
destitute by the absence or death of their supporter. Every 
American ought to join the Red Cross, an immense nation-wide 
organization which takes the place occupied by the Sanitary 
Commission during the Civil War. It has the faithful and 
untiring aid of the military, naval and hospital authorities of 
the government. The hundred million dollars so splendidly 
supplied will before long be exhausted, and the community 
must make up its mind to subscription after subscription. 
Some people can aid by paying their dues and subscribing other 
sums ; some people, especially the women, can give their thought, 
their work and their powers of organization to the great cause. 

[95] 



96 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

There cannot be too many bandages or comforts or supplies. 
The Red Cross is well organized and well officered, and has 
been made an official part of the military organization of the 
country. 

[§105] The great patriotic societies ought also to have the en- 
thusiastic support of hundreds of thousands of women. The Navy 
League, the National Security League, and some other similar 
societies have for several years been helping to educate the 
country on the need of preparedness and the best methods of 
national defense. Professional men ought to array themselves 
also in the special organizations of their brethren, such as the 
engineers and physicians. Everybody can increase his power 
by joining with his neighbors for a common cause. 

[§106] Another field of patriotic effort is a share in the na- 
tional duty of economy. Everybody ought to economize. When 
the taxes are raised, as they must be, when prodigious sums are 
taken out of the available capital in order to use them to save 
the country by destroying the opposing forces, the net national 
income will be that much reduced; it is impossible that 'every- 
body should have the same net income as before. Hence there 
must be a concerted effort to club together to facilitate saving. 
This applies first of all to the food supply, which must be care- 
fully nursed; for it is as needful that our Allies and the troops 
who are fighting in the common cause should be fed out of 
our surplus as it is that men and munitions should cross the 
ocean. We Americans have always had a great abundance of 
cheap food, and the average consumption during the next few 
years can be very much reduced without anybody suffering. 
There is food enough for all, though the prices may be high. 
It is part of the duty of the individual to aid in preventing 
the taking of inordinate profits by the middleman, and in seeing 
that families who are on a small fi.xed income do not suffer. 

f§107] The citizens can also help by taking part in the reor- 
ganization of labor, which will be necessary as soon as large num- 
bers of men are withdrawn from their regular employments to go 
into the army. There will be a large demand for labor of every 
kind. Women will, as in France and England and other coun- 
tries, be called upon to take the jobs of men who have gone to 
the front. There will be work enough and wages enough to 
support everybody, if proper pains are taken to see that every- 
body is placed where he or she can do the most good. 

[§108] In this great national work the children have their part. 
Many of them will find special summer employment necessary 
because of the absence of workers. Both boys and girls can 
find interest and the opportunity of helpfulness as boy scouts 
or girl scouts, by whom necessary messenger service can be 
kept up. Children can aid in the household duties of canning 
fruits and vegetables, and otherwise joining in the food-saving 
service. Where fathers and brothers are at the front, the 
children must take responsibilities to help at home and keep the 
household going. Upon this point the "What Can I Do" com- 
mittee of the National Security League is expected to make 
valuable suggestions and to organize the work. 



THE CITIZEN AND THE WAR 97 

[§109] It is clear, therefore, that the plain citizen, man or wo- 
man, native or foreign born, old or young, may "do his bit"; first 
by giving loyal support to all that the Government calls for as a 
part of the citizen's duty; second, by joining with others in 
societies and organizations intended to accumulate funds and 
mass efforts for some of the great needs of the time; and 
always by accepting the new tasks and responsibilities as they 
come in a cheerful and loyal spirit. 



B.— ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS. 

[§110] NO FIFTY-FIFTY ALLEGIANCE. 

By Theodore Roosevelt. (July 4, 1917.) 

Weak-kneed apologists for infamy say that it is "natural" 
for American citizens of German origin to favor Germany. 
This is nonsense, and criminal nonsense to boot. Any 
American citizen who thus feels should be sent straight back 
to Germany, where he belongs. We can have no "fifty-fifty" 
allegiance in this country. 

This is a new nation, based on a mighty continent of 
boundless possibilities. No other nation in the world has 
such resources. No other nation has ever been so favored. 
If we dare to rise level with the opportunities offered us, our 
destiny will be vast — beyond the power of imagination. We 
must master this destiny, and make it our own; and we can 
thus make it our own only if we, as a vigorous and separate 
nation, develop a great and wonderful nationality, distinctive- 
ly different from any other nationality, of either the present 
or the past. For such a nation all of us can well afford to 
give up all other allegiances, and high of heart to stand a 
mighty and united people, facing a future of glorious promise. 

The obligation of single-minded Americanism has two 
sides — one as important as the other. On the one hand, 
every man of foreign birth or parentage must in good faith 
become an American and nothing else; on the other hand, if 
he thus in good faith, in soul and in body becomes an 
American, he stands on a full and entire equality with every- 
body else, and must be so treated, without any mental reser- 
vation, without any regard to his creed or birthplace or 
descent. One obligation is just as binding as the other. 

iNew York Times, July 5, 1917.) 

[§111] NATIONAL SERVICE FOR EVERY MAN, 
WOMAN, BOY AND GIRL. 

The United States Needs Men Who Are Willing 

To serve in the army and navy. 
To work in munition factories. 
To man the ships of the merchant marine. 



98 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

To serve in the Home Guards now being organized in the 
cities. 

To contribute to the Red Cross fund for the support of the 
families of soldiers and sailors. 

To till every available acre of soil. 

To help the nation by adopting a policy of persoJial 
economy. 

To preach and practise a new spirit of national unity. 

The Country Needs Women 

To give their sons to defend the nation. 

To force the ''slacker" to do his "bit." 

To encourage their children to save their pennies for the 
Red Cross. 

To sew and knit for the men who are at "the front." 

To produce their own vegetables in their back-yards. 

To keep a watchful eye on the family pocket book. 

To serve as Red Cross nurses. 

To work in munition factories. 

To teach classes in American citizenship in the schools and 
churches. 

To display the American flag from their homes. 

To teach their sons and daughters to salute the national 
emblem. 

To remember the President and the men of the fighting 
forces in their prayers. 

To urge a new spirit of national unity. 

Boys and Girls Can Help, Too. 

Every girl who has no brother to give to her country can 
"adopt" some young man in the army or navy and write him 
a cheerful letter at least once a week. They can help, too, 
in the vegetable gardens and with the sewing and knitting. 
The boys can enlist in the Home Guards, help with the work 
on the farm so that the men may be released for military 
service or other work of national importance. 

(Circular of a patriotic society.) 

[§112] THE NECESSARY MEANS. 
By Hiram W. Johnson and Others. (April 25, 1917.) 

Believing that our country has entered the great war 
rightly, wisely, and of necessity, that it is our duty as a great 
free people to take our part in the defense of liberty, 
democracy and civilization against the attack of militarism, 
and that our sober purpose is to secure a just and lasting 
peace, we support with all our hearts and all our powers the 
war plan of the Government, declared b}) the President in his 
address to Congress on April 2. 

We earnestly desire that the war may be brought to a 
successful, prompt and permanent conclusion; that our allies 
may receive from us whatsoever assistance will best sustain 
them in their vast sacrifices, and that our nation, playing its 



THE CITIZEN AND THE WAR 99 

part with honor, courage and efifectiveness, may be spared all 
needless burdens and avoidable loss. 

To carry forward the war plans of our government with 
full success, and thereby achieve the ends just named, we 
believe that the following measures are immediately neces- 
sary: 

1. Universal military service, to insure equality of sacri- 
fice in the national defense. 

2. Universal industrial service of both men and property 
in support of the nation. 

3. An official guarantee that the government will buy at 
stated prices all agricultural products offered, so as to en- 
courage tl\e largest possible production on our farms. 

4. Government control of the price of the necessities of 
life, including rent, food and fuel, to stop undue increase of 
the cost of living. 

5. Federal and State guarantees to the wage earners of 
America that their rights shall not be lost, so that the sacri- 
fices that are required of them, in common with all other citi- 
zens during the war, shall not continue after peace is restored. 

6. Government co-operation to maintain and develop the 
efficiency of law-abiding enterprises, thus preserving the 
foundations of our commercial prosperity. The tremendous 
struggle for the markets of the world which will follow the 
war must not find us unprepared. 

7. A graduated income tax, by which an increasing part of 
the larger incomes shall be conscripted for public purposes, 
so that wealth may bear its fair share in the general sacri- 
fice. 

8. A limit upon profits on American and allied govern- 
ment orders, and a supertax on excess profits due to war 
conditions. To lend our allies $3,000,000,000, and then exact 
the return of it in extortionate profits would be indefensible. 

9. Conservation of grain so far as possible for food pur- 
poses. 

10. The payment of as much of the cost of the war as 
can be met out of current revenues. 

11. National and state legislation granting women equal 
political rights with men, thus completing the establishment 
of democracy. 

12. The retention and control of all natural resources now 
held by the government, so' that the foundations of national 
efficiency and industrial strength may not be impaired. 

13. The workers of our country will make heavy sacri- 
fices during the war. With peace will come industrial read- 
justment. A government commission should be organized 
now to prepare for the distribution of unemployed labor 
after the war and for government use of surplus labor. V/ith 
far-sighted purposes, we should plan to carry forward into 
the coming peace the increased industrial power resulting 
from a reorganization of labor and capital made necessary by 
the war. 

14. From common devotion to service to perpetuate and 
advance democracy there should be assurance of common 
benefit, so that out of the sacrifices of war America may 



100 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

achieve broader democracy in government, more equitable 
distribution of wealth, and greater national efficiency in rais- 
ing the level of the general welfare. 

(Statement drawn up by Hiram W. Johnson, William Allen 
White, Gifford Pinchot, Raymond Robbins and others, N. Y. 
Times, April 25, 1917.) 

[§113] "I DIDN'T RAISE MY BOY." 
By Abbie Farwell Brown. 

Not to be a soldier? 

Did you then know what you, his mother, were raising him for? 

How could you tell when and where he would be needed? 
When and where he would best pay a man's debt to his country? 

Suppose the mother of George Washington had said, "I didn't 
raise my boy to be a soldier!" 

Suppose the mother of General Grant, or the mother of 
Admiral Dewey had said it, or the mothers of thousands and 
thousands of brave fellows who fought for independence and 
liberty — where would our country be to-day? 

If the mothers of heroes had clung and sniveled and been 
afraid for their boys, there wouldn't perhaps be any free 
America for the world to look to. 

Mother, you are living and enjoying America now — you and 
the boy you "didn't raise to be a soldier." 

Thanks to others, you and he are safe and sound — so far. 

You may not be to-morrow, you and the other women, he 
and the other men who "weren't raised" — if Americans turn out 
to be Sons of Cowards, as the Germans believe. 

You want your boy to live and enjoy life with you — to make 
you happy. 

You don't want to risk your treasure. What mother ever 
wished it? It is indeed harder to risk one's beloved than one's 
self. But there are things still harder. 

You don't want your lad to meet danger, like Washington 
and Grant and Sheridan, and the rest whom you taught him 
to admire. 

You'd rather keep your boy where you believe him safe than 
have your country safe! 

You'd rather have him to look at here, a slacker, than abroad 
earning glory as a patriot. 

You'd rather have him grow old and decrepit and die in his 
bed than risk a hero's death, with many chances of coming 
back to you proudly honored. 

You'd rather have him go by accident or illness, or worse. 

There are risks at home, you know! 

Are you afraid of them, too? How can you guard him? 

Is it you who are keeping him back? 

Shame on you, Mother! You are no true, proud mother. 

It isn't only the men who have got to be brave these days. 
It's the women, too. We all have much to risk when there's 
wicked war in the world. 



THE CITIZEN AND THE WAR 101 

Don't you know this is a war to destroy wicked war? 

Don't you want your son to help make the world over? 

This is a war to save our liberty, our manhood, our woman- 
hood — the best life has to give. 

Mother, what did you raise your boy for? Wasn't it to he 
a man and do a man's work? 

Could he find a greater Cause than this to live or die for? 

You should be proud if he can be a Soldier. 

You must send him out with a smile. 

Courage! You must help him to be brave. 

We must help one another to be brave and unselfish. 

For America! 

(Special Service of the Vigilantes.) 

[§114] WHY WE CANNOT HAVE BUSINESS AS 
USUAL. 

By Frank A. Vanderlip, Member of the Advisory Commission 
of the Council of National Defense and President of the 
National City Bank of New York. (May 17, 1917.) 

The sooner the public gets over the idea that we want 
"business as usual," or can have "business as usual" during 
this great war the better for all. We want to stop all un- 
necessary work and unnecessary expenditures short off and 
concentrate on the immense volume of work which has to be 
done. Business men should get rid of any foolish fears that 
economy will bring on a general paralysis of industry or 
trade. There is no danger of not having work for every- 
body; the trouble is that there is more work in sight than 
can possibly be done, and the question is whether we shall 
cut off luxuries or necessities. The farmers are crying for 
labor and the whole world is crying for food; the great 
industries, like mining, lumbering, steel making, cloth mak- 
ing, transportation, shipbuilding, car building, etc., are clam- 
oring for help; a million or two million men are wanted for 
the Army and Navy, and thousands of women will be wanted 
to take their place in shops and offices; the Army must be 
clothed and shod. 

It is absurd under these conditions to talk of the danger 
of unemployment and to urge that the people shall go on 
buj^ing what they do not actually need in order to keep 
labor from unemployment or to maintain business as usual. 
How is labor to be had to make uniforms unless it is re- 
leased from making other clothes? How are looms to be 
had for blankets unless released from something else? How 
is steel to be had for ships, tin can and agricultural imple- 
ments unless other consumption is curtailed? How are 
women to be had for offices unless released elsewhere? And 
finally, how are we to put $7,000,000,000 or $8,000,000,000 of 
purchasing power at the disposal of the Government unless 
we curtail our individual expenditures? The country should 
immediately awake to the fact that it has .1 great task in 



102 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 



I 



hand, and that it cannot carry on a war like this with one 
hand and continue to do all the business it did before with 
the other. No doubt some persons will be inconvenienced 
by being obliged to leave one job and look for another. In 
some instances they will probably improve their lot perman- 
ently; in some instances possibly they will not place them- 
selves so well; but the sooner everybody recognizes the inev- 
itable and plans for it the better. We can no more expect 
co readjust business from peace conditions to war conditions 
without some inconvenience and loss than we can expect to 
send an army to the front without sacrifice and loss. 

All possible aid should be given in effecting the necessary 
shifts in employment. The government should be prompt in 
placing its contracts, and give some attention to their dis- 
tribution with a view to taking up labor that is displaced, 
and there should be organized community effort to aid in 
these readjustments. The essential fact in the situation is 
that readjustment is unavoidable, but that any general state 
of unemployment is impossible. 

(Official Bulletin, May 17, 1917, p. 5.) 



[§115] THE FOOD QUESTION. 

By Herbert C. Hoover, National Director of Food Con- 
servation. (July 5, 1917.) 

The weapons in this war are fighting men, munitions, food, 
ships and finance. If we are to defend liberty in this year, 
1917, all these must be upon such a scale as will demand the 
energies of our people. In previous wars a small proportion 
of the community went to fight, another small portion was 
devoted to their support, but the great bulk of the nation 
did "business as usual." 

Autocracy has been for years organizing its resources to 
the end that they have placed one out of seven of its popu- 
lation on the fighting line, and have so mobilized the civil 
population as to afford them complete support. They have 
suppressed production of every luxury and reduced even 
every necessity. Their arrogant confidence that they will 
become "masters of the world" is based upon their belief 
that the materialism, the selfishness, and the jealousy of indi- 
vidual interests in democracy make it impossible for it to 
organize such a strength. They do not deny the bravery 
of the men of democracy in battle, but they comfort them- 
selves in the belief that we have not the self-sacrifice at home 
for their support. 

Our problem is not alone to mobilize our civilian popula- 
tion for the support of our fighting men, but we also have 
the responsibility of the support of the fighting men of our 
allies. And food is not the least of their necessities. One of 
the great European statesmen has said: "The war will not 
be won by the last 500,000 fighting men, but will be won by 
the last 500,000 bushels of wheat." It is within our ability to 



THE CITIZEN AND THE WAR 103 

give this last 500,000 bushels, but only if we organize to 
produce, organize to save and organize to supply all. 

We must feed our allies that their people may remain con- 
stant in the war. Liberty cannot be maintained upon the 
empty stomachs of the women and children. Through the 
drain of war our allies have steadily decreased in food pro- 
duction and other agencies also curtailed their supplies. Out 
of our abundance, by eliminating waste and extravagance, it 
is in our power, and in our power alone, to hold the wolf 
from the door of the world. Our obligation is greater than 
war itself — humanity demands it of us. 

Eat without waste. We must save in all food. We must 
eat plenty, but wisely and without waste. If we save in our 
consumption and our waste we can increase our surplus to 
export; if we substitute other commodities for those we can 
export we can further increase our surplus. 

Furthermore, by our economies we can save a major por- 
tion of the cost of the war. We can increase our ability to 
subscribe to liberty loans. If we can save food we can 
lower the price of living to our own people and relieve the 
strain and distress under which they labor to-day. We can 
only do this by organization so that there shall be no profit- 
ing from our economy, that all bear the burden equally. 

The food administration is a volunteer organization to be 
endowed with powers by the Government. This volunteer 
organization is not to be limited to a few executives in 
Washington. We are solicitous, nay anxious, to secure as 
actual members of this volunteer eflfort every man and every 
woman, every boy and girl in these United States who will 
undertake the task with us. There is not dictatorship in 
volunteer eflfort. It is by that we can answer autocracy with 
democracy. It is as great in efficiency and greater in spirit. 

(Official Bulletin, July 5, 1917, p. 2.) 

[§116] HINTS TO FARMERS. 
By Mrs. Horace Brock. 

Saz'e staple products and increase their production. 

Eat sufficient food, nourishing food of a varied character to 
keep you in good physical and mental condition, but 

Don't waste anything. Preach the doctrine of a clean plate 
and an empty slop pail. 

Use no wheat breakfast cereals and cut in half your use of 
wheat flour and bread, substituting cornmeal, hominy, rice, 
barley, oatmeal and buckwheat. Wheat bread once a day, even 
bread or muffins once and rye bread once, is suggested. 

Make tzco blades grow where one grew before. Growing of 
beans is specially recommended. Green beans salted away in 
crocks make a good green vegetable for winter. The lima and 
soup beans dried make nourishing vegetables, puree or soup, and 
takes the place of meat. 

Zeep chickens and a pig if you can. Twenty years ago every 



104 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

one with a little place in the country districts of Pennsylvania 
bought a little pig in the spring, fattened it at small cost and 
sold it for a good price in the early winter. 

Don't kill young animals — calves, pigs, lambs, chickens or 
ducks. There is great loss to the world in this, especially in 
the killing of calves and lambs. Be patriotic, no matter what 
it costs you. 

Raise fish. If there is a stream or pond suitable for fish in 
your neighborhood apply to the State Fisheries for fish to stock 
it. They will advise you about it. 

[§117] DON'T CAN— DRY! 

By Hamlin Garland. 

We were talking of food and boats — HamHn Garland and I. 

"Feeding Europe." I said, "isn't so much a matter of growing 
things, as of using all we grow. Why, the vegetables and fruit 
that rot on the ground on my farm every year — and it's not a 
wildly extravagant farm at that — would pretty near feed an- 
other family the size of mine. Our problem as I see it is only 
partly one of production. Above all, it is a problem of saving, 
canning and distributing." 

"I'm not so sure about the canning,"' answered Mr. Garland. 
"Canning means water, and the idea of sending millions of 
tons of water to Europe seems rather foolish. It's foolish even 
to send potatoes in bulk." 

"You can't send them by wireless,"' I protested mildly. 

"No, but you can dry them," he answered. 

"Powdered potatoes?" I asked in amazement. 

"Why, yes,"' he replied with a reminiscent smile. "And 
they're good. too. When I was outfitting for 'The Long Trail' 
into the Yukon Valley in '98, I found myself deeply concerned 
with the question of food transportation. All our supplies for 
eight hundred miles of wild country had to be packed on the 
backs of our horses and every pound of extra weight counted 
against our speed. 

"Naturally we ruled out canned goods — to pack water into 
the British Northwest was idiotic. We turned to dried fruits, 
flour and beans, and then to a new ration which had made its 
appearance in the western markets at that time. This new 
ration was 'granulated' potatoes and "dessicated' eggs. The 
potatoes were in dice-shaped grains. The eggs resembled yellow 
bird-shot. A small can of these grains included, as I recall it, 
six dozen of eggs. In a somewhat larger can I bought the flaky 
residue of several bushels of carrots, parsnips and turnips. 

"My partner was suspicious of 'dessicated' eggs. But as 
soon as we learned how to use them we were delighted with 
the result. A tablespoonful of the eggs, and two spoonsful of 
the potatoes when steamed in a skillet will sweat up into a 
fine savory mess. 

" 'It beats rice for expanding,' my partner said." 

"By George, there's an idea there !" 

"I think so myself," Mr. Garland answered slowly. "Ever 



THE CITIZEN AND THE WAR 105 

since the food problem was first agitated, I have been wonder- 
ing whether such a ration could not be used for our soldiers 
and for the soldiers of our allies whom we may have to feed. 
Transportation is going to be a mighty problem, and the saving 
and shipping of fruits and vegetables in dried form may be one 
of the best forms of food conservation. Canned fruit is heavy, 
dried fruit is light. Potatoes are mostly water, heavy to ship 
and likely to bruise and rot, but 'granulated' potatoes could be 
sent in small compass anywhere, and so far as I know would 
keep indefi.nitely. Local factories could be established where 
the eggs and fruits and vegetables are most abundant, and in 
these ovens the water could be squeezed out and the food com- 
pressed for easy transportation." 

"And you can really eat the stuff?" I asked incredulously. 

"In our own case, with bacon and coffee." Mr. Garland re- 
plied, "it made a perfectly good ration, which we ate day after 
day with satisfaction. I forgot to say that dried raspberries 
also came in for use in our dietary." He chuckled with reminis- 
cent enthusiasm. "Our ration was perfect." 

"Perhaps you have a particularly roL-.^t constitution," I ven- 
tured. 

"No," he said. "All the miners used the ration, because it 
was light, nutritious and easily transported. I am not at all 
sure that the granulated potato and the dessicated eggs may 
not be the solution of the food problem in Europe as it was on 
the Yukon." 

"The granulated potato and the dessicated egg," I murmured 
unhappily. 

"Mr. Garland laid his hand on my shoulder. "My boy," he 
said, "you will have to get used to worse things than dessicated 
eggs if we don't beat the submarines !" 

"If we don't — You don't think there's a chance — ?" 

Mr. Garland looked grave. "I'm not a pessimist," he said, 
"and America's never been licked yet But we need submarine- 
chasers, and here's the best one I know— DON'T CAN !— DRY ! 
Remember it !" 

I told him I would. And I do. Every time I see a potato or 
an egg. I think of it. The idea is beginning to get me. 

It would be funny, wouldn't it, if the world should be made 
safe for democracy by the granulated potato and the dessi- 
cated egg? 

(Special Service of the Vigilantes.) 



[§118] WHAT OUR COUNTRY ASKS OF ITS YOUNG 
WOMEN. 

By Mrs. Percy V. Pennybacker, Member of the Committee 
on Patriotism Through Education; President of the 
National Federation of Women's Clubs. (July 6, 1917.) 

The bugle call has sounded. The women of our land are 
summoned to service in a "food crusade." It is hard for us 
in America to realize, in spite of word from our Government, 



106 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

that we are in danger of food shortage. If we do our duty 
by our Allies and the neutral countries over seas there will be 
this fall a serious lack of meat, potatoes and white flour. In this 
dilemma the Government makes a direct appeal to women. 

First, it asks that we help the men to produce more. 

Second, that we eliminate waste. We are confronted by the 
appalling statement that during the last year there was wasted 
in the American kitchen the sum of $700,000,000. Because it is 
better to face facts, let us confess that we have been a wasteful 
nation; nay, worse, we have not been ashamed of waste: worse 
still, we have taken a certain pride in our wastefulness. We 
have said, "We don't have to be close, we don't have to be 
stingy, we don't have to be economical in food." Oh, the pity 
of it — $700,000,000 worth of food wasted while mothers in 
Belgium were begging bread for their children, while Poland 
buried all her little ones under the age of two because food 
could not be found to sustain life! We didn't intend to be cruel, 
we simply didn't know; but, knowing, we shall turn our 
energies toward reform. There is a concrete contribution that 
each of us can make, beginning to-day, toward the elimination 
of waste. A "war portion" should be our watchword at each 
meal. This does not mean hunger; it only means taking on the 
plate what we will consume, being served a second or third 
time if necessary, but wasting nothing. 

Third, the Government asks that women substitute the cheaper 
foods for those that have grown costly. This calls for thought, 
for study, for planning; but she is an unworthy home-maker, 
a real slacker, who is not willing to put forth her best powers 
in her country's hour of need. 

Fourth, we are asked to conserve all fruits and vegetables 
that are produced this summer, for we shall not feel the full 
brunt of war prices until cold weather comes. 

It becomes the solemn duty of every woman to keep before 
her the fact that this food campaign is not one of short duration. 
As long as the war lasts we must "stand by our guns"; we 
must remember that for every man who goes to the front five 
people at home are needed to sustain him. Above all things, we 
must let it be known that no woman has the right to buy in 
large quantities and hoard food for the use of her family. Some 
one has well said that "such a woman is at heart a traitor." 

There was never greater need for women to be sane than at 
this hour. There is no excuse for excitement or for hysteria. 
If our men are to give the best that is in them, we must keep 
the atmosphere of our homes sweet and serene. Remember, no 
sacrifice is a great sacrifice unless it is made cheerfully. Let 
there be no weeping, no complaining, no lamentation, when our 
loved ones answer the call to duty. 

This is also a time for moral sanity and for lofty ideals. I 
wish I could burn into the heart of every young woman the 
remark that a distinguished military man made a few days ago : 
"The influence of young women on soldiers is terrifying in its 
strength ; it is not what a woman says, it is not what a woman 
does, it is what she really is that counts. Men sense inmost 
beliefs. Men raise or lower their ideals as she dictates." This 



THE CITIZEN AND THE WAR J07 

is an awful responsibility, young women, but it is yours; you 
cannot escape it. In these days of distress, every woman should 
pass her soul in review before herself and ask : "What are my 
standards? Do I really believe that the Commandments were 
given for men as vi^ell as for women? Do I realize that I am 
in part 'my brother's keeper'?" In dress, in speech, in manner, 
in thought, are the young women of America doing their full 
duty to help our boys in the ranks to retain the loftiest ideals 
of womanhood, to live clean lives, to take as much pride in 
moral as in physical victory? The awful conditions that sur- 
rounded our training and concentration camps up to June, 1917, 
have been blots upon the history of civilization. Secretary 
Baker, of the War Department, and his aides are making every 
effort to secure the proper environment. It is the duty of every 
woman in this country to help, because the happiness of all is at 
stake — the salvation of the next generation is in peril. 

(Address at Speakers' Training Camp and Conference, Chau- 
tauqua, N. Y.) 

[§119] WHAT CAN SHE DO? 

By Albert Bushnell Hart. 

What can "she" do? How did Eve spend her time while 
Adam was hunting dragons? How did Calphurnia help when 
Julius Caesar was practising frightfulness on the Gauls? 
What aid did Mrs. Grant give while the General was fighting 
the Virginia campaign? What have heroic women always 
done when the war cloud descended upon their country and 
their men took up spear or cross-bow or rifle? Just the 
same thing that the women of America are to do during the 
continuance of this tremendous war. 

"She" can keep the family going. The profession of most 
women is homekeeping, and there is no lessening of demand 
for competent mothers and sisters and aunts and sweethearts 
to feed the hungry, bring up the children and strengthen the 
hearts of the faint. Every country that goes into a real war 
fights on the base line of the home, from which aid, comfort 
and love flow without cessation to the men in the trenches. 
The great work of the home which is the preservation of 
civilization must go on, war or no war. If the father is 
where he cannot take part, the mother must take all the 
responsibility. 

"She" can take a part in the industrial life of the country 
which will set hundreds of thousands of men free for the 
hard campaigning which they alone can perform. She has 
long been a workwoman in a factory, a saleswoman, a sten- 
ographer, a bookkeeper, a business woman — all those things 
she will keep on doing, and she will add innumerable tasks 
that are waiting for women to perform. In' the great or- 
ganization of the industrial forces of the country she will 
give indispensable help. The war cannot be successfully 
fought without her. New opportunities will open up to her, 
as telegrapher, department clerk or confidential secretary. 



108 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

She will have the most glorious opportunity in the history of 
womankind to share in the constructive work of business and 
of war. 

"She" is wanted as an actual sharer in warlike operations. 
She will furnish the nurses, the experts in cooking, the store- 
keepers, the accountants, the searchers for lost soldiers, the 
aids to the convalescent. She will offer to many a poor 
wounded fellow that touch of home and humanity which 
will coax him back to life. She will furnish courage to her 
man on the firing line and to some other girl's man in the 
hospital. 

"She" will nerve the nation up to its work. She will hold 
the patriotic meetings and organize the women of her city or 
of her hamlet to work together for the common need. She 
will be brave in defeat, she will urge on after victory. She 
may be depended upon, whether maid, wife or widow, to 
bear her equal share of the sacrifices and sufiferings, of the 
joys and triumphs of the national struggle. 

(Special Service of the Vigilantes.) 

[§120] YOU AND THE RED CROSS. 
By Hildegarde Hawthorne. 

The immense mission of the Red Cross is to give help. 
But in order to give the full measure of help it must have 
assistance in its turn. You must help the Red Cross if the 
Red Cross is to help our men when they are wounded, when 
they are sick, when they are worn and weary from the 
work of war in which so soon they will be plunged. 

Try to see just one soldier with the eyes of your imagina- 
tion. Some young man with his life before him, some older 
man who has laid aside the life so carefully built up and so 
dear to him to go out to this service; both, young or older, 
working for us at the bitterest work on earth. See him, 
bleeding from some terrible wound, staggering back from 
the trench, or lying lost in No Man's Land. See him sufifer- 
ing untold pain for the lack of an anesthetic. See him bleed 
to death for lack of a bandage. See him left unfound to die 
because there was no automobile ambulance to seek him. 

And think this: If you had helped the Red Cross the Red 
Cross could have helped, might have saved him. 

It is just that. Whatever you do is done for some suffer- 
ing man or woman or child. The Red Cross takes it and 
uses it where the need is greatest. Behind the Red Cross 
it is you who bind the bandage, who set the broken bone, 
who give the soothing anesthesia, who carry back the 
wounded or dying man from the hideous torture of the field 
to the hospital. It is you too who refuse this succor if it is 
withheld. Not the Red Cross, for it can do nothing without 
you. The workers there in the dark zone of battle are mak- 
ing the supreme sacrifice. What will you sacrifice? 

The service of our Red Cross is to go first to our own. 



THE CITIZEN AND THE WAR 109 

But these are not the only ones in the hell of war who need 
its help. 

Do you know that the bones of little babies lie thick as 
leaves along the desolate roads of Poland? They are gone; 
neither you nor the Red Cross can help them now. But 
others still live. Through the Red Cross they can be saved, 
their little bones need not be scattered a sacrifice to the 
war — if you will give your help. 

The world is in awful need. Between its suffering and you 
stands the Red Cross, desperately eager to lessen the pain, to 
save life, to give a little hope, a little peace, a little comfort 
where now there is none. To do this it must have money, 
and it is you who must giva the money. 

Look into it. Give just an hour to finding out what the 
Red Cross is doing, what it hopes to do, what the need is. 
You will hardly turn away unmoved if you give that hour. 
You will want to do something. You will do something. 

Will you not sacrifice a little ease, a little money, a little 
time, when you understand that by so doing you will save 
some fine boy to live his life sound and strong, after his 
months of struggle and suffering, will restore to some man 
his health, will heal his shattered body, and bring him back 
to the sweet life he gave up for the sake of his country. 
When you realize that what you do, what you give, will save 
a starving child and its mother, will you not do and give all 
you can? 

The Red Cross, that helps a world in pain, asks your help. 

(Special Service of the Vigilantes.) 

[§121] SAFEGUARDING CHILDHOOD IN WAR. 

By Owen R. Lovejoy, General Secretary, National Child 
Labor Committee. 

Many years ago when our country was in the throes of a 
terrible civil conflict and the ranks of the Confederate armies 
were depleted by war and famine and it was proposed that 
young children should be recruited, the President of the Con- 
federacy, Jefferson Davis, replied, "We must not grind the seed 
corn." Doubtless every American would echo this sentiment to- 
day. But in view of the information we have gathered from 
warring European countries let us realize that it is not only 
upon the field of battle that the germ of Hfe is taken from the 
nation's seed corn. Our vision must be more discernmg. In 
addition to the death from bullet and exposure and disease at 
the battle front, there is the breaking down of the education 
and health and other conservation standards at home. Our 
school rooms will be deserted, agencies protecting the health, 
the morals, and the prosperity of children will suffer for lack 
of funds. The exposure of little boys to the rigors of indus- 
trial life in factory, coal mine, sweatshop and truck garden 
will be based solely on the high motive of patriotic service and 
defense of the flag. The childhood of the present generation 
will suffer irretrievable loss unless those of us who have dedi- 



110 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

cated ourselves to the protection of these defenseless ones 
keep our heads clear and our motives unmixed, determining 
that whatever happens all other treasure, all other forms of 
wealth, all other methods of defense shall be sacrificed before 
we compel the children of America to pass through the fixe. 
(Child Labor BiiUctin, May, 1917.) 

[§122] C— SPECIAL REFERENCES, 

Books. 

Franks, Thetta D, Household Organization for War 
Service. (N. Y., Putnam, 1917.) (Motto of the book, 
"America expects every woman to do her duty.") 

French, Allen. The Home Vegetable Garden. (Boston, 
Mass., State Bd. of Agriculture, 1917.) 

Hagedorn, Hermann. You Are the Hope of the World. 
(N, Y., Macmillan, 1917.) (To the children of 
America.) 

Handy, Amy L. War Food. (Boston, Houghton, 1917.) 

Kellor, Francis A. Straight America: A Call to National 
Service. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1917.) 

Moss, Capt. James A., and Stewart, Capt. M. B. Self- 
Helps for the Citiaen-Soldier. (Washington, U. S. 
Infantry Assoc, 1916.) (A guide by which the civilian 
may inform himself concerning military matters, by 
two officers of the General Staff.) 

Perry, Ralph Barton. The Free Man and the Soldier. 
(N. Y., Scribner, 1916.) 

U. S. Bureau of Agriculture. Drying Fruits and Vege- 
tables in the Home. (Farmers' Bulletin No. 841, 



June. 1917.) 



Articles. 



Chamberlain, M. "Women and War Work," Survey (May 

19, 1917). 
Dewey, John. Enlistment for the Farm: A Message to 

School Boards, Principals and Teachers. (Columbia 

University War Papers, 1917.) 
Finley, John H. "Serving the Nation," Am. Review of 

Reviews (May, 1917). 
"How Can I Serve j\Iy Country?" World's V/ork (April, 

1917). 
"Mobilizing the Y. M. C. A." Literary Digest (May 19, 

1917). 
Gompers, Samuel. "Labor." World's Work (May, 1917) 

(Demands of labor in war times.) 
Hurley, Edward R. "Business in General." World's 

Work (May, 1917). (Business co-ordination under na- 
tional direction necessary in war times.) 
Lusk, Graham. "What to Eat in War Time." World's 

Work (August, 1917). 
"Red Cross and Its Plans." Survey (Feb. 10, 1917). 



THE CITIZEN AND THE WAR m 

Moulton, Harold G. "Why Not Industrial Conscription?" 

North American Review (August, 1917) 
Smith, J. Russell. "Food or Famine?' Century (Sept.. 



"What To Read About Civilian Service." Independent 
(April 21, 1917). 



CHAPTER VII 
World-Peace After World- War. 
A.— SUMMARY STATEMENT. 

[§123] The supreme hope of the American people in this war 
is that they may help to bring it to such an issue that no future 
generation will have cause to fear so dreadful a catastrophe. We 
are fighting in order to win, fixst, a just peace at the end of the 
present conflict; and beyond that, such a lasting reorganization 
of the relations between peoples that it will hereafter be im- 
possible for any nation to set the world on fire. 

[§124] The object of Germany in 1914 was undoubtedly to 
force a peace in which the power and authority of Germany 
should be so full and so wide that no one for many years to 
come would dare dispute her dominating position in the world. 
The military deadlock prevented Germany from realizing these 
hopes; hence the Germans brought into operation the new 
weapon of submarine warfare against merchantmen, which finally 
brought the United States into the war. In December, 1916, the 
Germans announced that they were willing to enter upon peace 
negotiations. They have, however, as yet given only vague and 
equivocal indications of the terms they were willing to accept, 
and as late as July, 1917, the Imperial Chancellor refused to 
adopt the formula of "no annexations and no indemnities." 

[§125] The Allies have been more outspoken, and have (De- 
cember 30, 1916) expressly declared that they would not return 
to the status quo ante bellum, i. e., would not accept terms of 
peace which merely left the several countries with the same terri- 
torial boundaries as on August 1st, 1914. The Allies declare that 
such an outcome would really be a German victory, since it would 
mean that Germany would be the gainer by having begun the 
war and having carried it on by the lawless methods which she 
has employed. For it would leave Germany the most powerful 
State in Europe, controlling directly or indirectly a belt of terri- 
tory stretching from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf, through 
Central Europe and Western Asia. Austria-Hungary and Bul- 
garia would thus remain within the sphere of German influ- 
ence; Serbia and Rumania would be prostrate and helpless; 
and Turkey would be little else but a German province. The 
responsibility of the German authorities for the Armenian mas- 
sacres was a proof that even the civilized Christian people of the 
Turkish empire could not expect protection from German over- 
lords. The AlHes have also taken the position that the terms 
of peace must give recognition to the demands of subject and 
sundered nationalities, such as the Poles, for reunion and some 
form of self-governing national existence. 

[112] 



WORLD-PEACE 113 

[§126] By supplying fresh forces, the United States has much 
increased the probability that the German project of a Vast Euro- 
pean and Asiatic Empire will fail. It is absolutely contrary to 
the interests of the United States to see such an empire created. 
It is in keeping with the traditions and principles of the United 
States to recognize the right of nationalities to be free from op- 
pressive and alien rule; and with the aspirations of many of 
these nationalities for a more democratic government, the Amer- 
ican republic cannot but be in hearty sympathy. On the other 
hand, the United States is not interested in any merely. terri- 
torial ambitions which any of the European powers may enter- 
tain. 

[§127] Everyone recognizes that any peace that can be made 
at the end of this war is likely to be temporary, unless it can be 
transformed into a general world-peace. Simply to go back to the 
conditions of 1914 might stop the bloodshed that is now going 
on, but would leave a likelihood of its beginning again within a 
generation. The United States has long been one of the fore- 
most of all nations in efforts to promote universal peace, as is 
shown by the large number of arbitrations and arbitration trea- 
ties to which tlie United States has been a party. Yet the 
present war has shown a fundamental weakness in all the plans 
for universal peace hitherto attempted; for Germany has demon- 
strated that it is possible for any great world power, which is 
sufficiently strong and ruthless, to compel its immediate neigh- 
bors to go to war; and in the present entanglement of most of 
the powers in alHances and ententes, if two great powers fall 
out, they may drag a score of other nations into war. 

[§128] Four possible plans for world-peace have been pro- 
posed (for three of these see also extracts in this chapter) : 
(1) A world tribunal, on the general plan of the Hague Court 
established in 1907, to which quarrelsome powers were expected 
to bring any controversies over their rights and plans. (2) The 
same plan, supplemented by an International Council of Con- 
ciliation and frequent world conferences to frame and codify 
rules and international law. (3) A League of Nations to En- 
force Peace, the principle of which is that none of its members 
shall go to war with another until it has first submitted its case 
to a tribunal and the tribunal has reported thereon. Only this 
period of delay of one year for concilation and judicial report 
would he compulsory, the nations being left free at the end of 
that time to make war if they saw fit. The proposed compul- 
sion, when necessary, would be exercised by economic and mili- 
tary pressure from the other nations in the League. (4) A 
world federation, having both a legislative and judicial body, 
and with power to enforce the decisions of the latter body upon 
refractory nations is also conceivable, but no feasible plan has 
yei been suggested. 

[§129] Both Germany and the principal allied powers have 
during the war assented to the view that there ought to be some 
world organization which would prevent future wars. The great 
difficulty is, however, that many parts of the earth are still in an 
undeveloped state of social and political development, as in 
Africa ; aod that so many hundreds of millions of civilized people 



114 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

are subjects of colonies ruled by distant nations. Thus the 
problem of devising a practicable plan of world organization, 
which will realize both peace and justice in the dealings of 
nations with one another, is far from a simple or easy one. 
Yet there is no problem before mankind which so imperatively 
demands solution. The influence of the United States is pledged 
to world peace, and the best time in the history of mankind to 
urge it will be at the peace negotiations which — at some time or 
other, no one can say just when — will bring to an end the fright- 
ful calamity which otherwise will destroy the civilization of the 
world. 



B.— ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS. 
[§130] THE FOUNDATIONS OF PEACE. 

By President Woodrow Wilson. (Jan. 22, 1917.) 

The present war must first be ended ; but we owe it to candor 
and to a just regard for the opinion of mankind to say that so 
far as our participation in guarantees of future peace is con- 
cerned it makes a great deal of difference in what way and upon 
what terms it is ended. The treaties and agreements which 
bring it to an end must embody terms which will create a peace 
that is worth guaranteeing and preserving, a peace that will win 
the approval of mankind; not merely a peace that will serve the 
several interests and immediate aims of the nations engaged. 
We shall have no voice in determining what those terms shall 
be, but we shall, I feel sure, have a voice in determining 
whether they shall be made lasting or not by the guarantees of 
a universal covenant; and our judgment upon what is funda- 
mental and essential as a condition precedent to permanency 
should be spoken now, not afterward, when it may be too late. 

No covenant of co-operative peace that does not include the 
peoples of the New World can suffice to keep the future safe 
against war; and yet there is only one sort of peace that the 
peoples of America could join in guaranteeing. The elements 
of that peace must be elements that engage the confidence and 
satisfy the principles of the American Governments, elements 
consistent with their political faith and the practical convictions 
which the peoples of America have once for all embraced and 
undertaken to defend 

Only a peace between equals can last. Only a peace the very 
principle of- which is equality and common participation in a 
common benefit. The right state of mind, the right feeling be- 
tween nations, is as necessary for a lasting peace as is the just 
settlement of vexed questions of territory or of racial and 
national allegiance. 

The equality of nations upon which peace must be founded if 
it is to last must be an equality of rights; the guarantees ex- 
changed must neither recognize nor imply a difference between 
big nations and small, between those that are powerful and those 



WORLD-PEACE 115 

that are weak. Right must be based upon the common strength, 
not upon the individual strength, of the nations upon whose 
concert peace will depend. Equality of territory or of resources 
there, of course, cannot be; nor any sort of equality not gained 
in the ordinary peaceful and legitimate development of the 
peoples themselves. But no one asks or expects anything more 
than an equality of rights. Mankind is looking now for freedom 
of life, not for equipoise of power. 

And there is a deeper thing involved than even equality of 
rights among organized nations. No peace can last, or ought to 
last, which does not recognize and accept the principle that 
governments derive all their just powers from the consent of 
the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples 
about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were 
property. . . . 

But mere terms of peace between the belligerents will not 
satisfy even the belligerents themselves. Mere agreements may 
not make peace secure. It will be absolutely necessary that a 
force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settle- 
ment so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged 
or any alliance hitherto formed or projected that no nation, no 
probable combination of nations, could face or withstand it. 

If the peace presently to be made is to endure it must be a 
peace made secure by the organized major force of mankind. 

The terms of the immediate peace agreed upon will determine 
whether it is a peace for which such a guarantee can be secured. 
The question upon which the whole future peace and policy of 
the world depends is this : Is the present war a struggle for a 
just and secure peace or only for a new balance of power? If 
it be only a struggle for a new balance of power, who will guar- 
antee, who can guarantee, the stable equilibrium of the new 
arrangement? Only a tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe. 
There must be not only a balance of power but a community of 
power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common 
peace. . . , 

(Address before the Senate; Congressional Record, 1742.) 



[§131] PLAN OF THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE. 

By Walter L. Fisher, Former Secretary of the Interior. 

The League to Enforce Peace does not propose to prevent us 
from fighting if we wish ; it merely requires us to go before a 
board of arbitration, or a council of conciliation before engag- 
ing in war. It does not undertake to enforce the award of the 
one or the recommendation of the other. This hideous world 
war may make it possible to go much further than this in 
international reorganization, but the strength of this movement 
at present lies in the moderation and simplicity of its proposals. 
It seeks to do today what can be done today in the way that is 
available today. It leaves to tomorrow the adoption of methods 
and the accomplishment of objects that tomorrow alone may 
make attainable. Quite sufficient for the day are the difficulties 



116 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

thereof; and the advocates of this league of peace do not over- 
look or minimize them. They simply do not regard them as 
insuperable. Confident in the power of a great purpose and in 
the resources of statecraft, they are the proponents of a prin- 
ciple; not the draughtsmen of a treaty. 

They propose a league open to all who accept its conditions — 
a league which binds its own members not to engage in war 
between themselves until they have first submitted their differ- 
ence, if this difference is justiciable (which means determinable 
upon established principles of law or equity), to an international 
court or board of arbitration, or to a council of conciliation if 
the difference is one involving a conflict of national interests 
or policies not justiciable in their nature, such as the Monroe 
Doctrine or our policy with respect to oriental immigration. 
The nations joining the league agree to use their economic and 
if necessary their military forces against any of their number 
who begin hostilities without first resorting to the methods thus 
provided for the avoidance of war. In order that the field of 
adjudication may be steadily enlarged, the signatory powers are 
to hold conferences from time to time to formulate and codify 
the rules of international law, the results to be binding unless 
rejected by some power within a stated period. . . . 

Here then is a proposal, which, so far as it goes, as useful as 
it may prove, whether it succeeds or fails in accomplishing all 
its advocates expect, is at least a move in the right direction. 
It will at least diminish the causes and the occasions of war. 
Therefore we, the people of the United States, desiring peace, 
willing to take our part in the great family of nations, should 
be willing to contribute whatever is necessary to further the 
most practical plan which has thus far been suggested for avoid- 
ing another unspeakable catastrophe such as the one now plung- 
ing the world in misery; and thus to aid those forces which 
work for civilization and for the peaceful progress of mankind. 

(Am. Acad, of Pol. and Soc. Sci., Annals, July, 1914.) 



[§132] PLAN OF THE WORLD COURT LEAGUE. 

A World Court is absolutely necessary. Had such a World 
Court been in existence in A.ugust, 1914, the present terrible 
struggle would probably never have occurred. Unfortunately 
for Europe, unfortunately for the world, it was not. How such 
a court may be created, whether by action of four or five of the 
mightiest of the nations of the world, or by the common agree- 
ment of all nations, of how many judges it shall be composed, 
the methods to be pursued in the selection of judges, the powers 
to be vested in the court, the kind of disputes which may prop- 
erly come under its jurisdiction, above all, the grave question as 
to the methods through which the solemn decisions of the great 
tribunal shall be enforced, whether by the creation of a great 
international police force, backed by the combined armies and 
navies of the world, or through economic pressure brought to 
bear upon a recalcitrant nation — a pressure that might easily be- 
come more effective than force of arms — are questions concern- 



WORLD-PEACE 117 

ing which men hold varying opinions and, surely, this is neither 
the place, nor the hour, for their discussion. 

Our simple contention is that the establishment of a great 
court of the nations is a project the feasibility of which few men 
now question, and the necessity of which still fewer will deny. 
War must be prevented. Upon that proposition all men, save 
those who believe that war is a necessity for the preservation 
of a nation's virility are beginning to unite. For it every church 
in America, every peace society in the land, every man, every 
woman, familiar with the horrors of war, would stand up and 
be counted. 

Such a court for the trial of cases decided to be justiciable, 
that is, cases purely legal in character, supplemented by interna- 
tional boards of conciliation and arbitration and of international 
congresses or conventions for the determination of the questions 
proper to be submitted to the tribunal, and by the creation of 
some body charged with the execution of the decisions of the 
court — a work the court could not of itself perform — would, in 
our judgment, as a World Court, soon acquire the dignity, the 
prestige, the authority, the respect, the obedience associated in 
the thought of America and the world with the Supreme Court 
of the United States of America — the greatest court of the 
world today. 

But, however desirable, however feasible, however necessary, 
such a court may be for the peace of the world, nothing is 
clearer than the fact that under present conditions it cannot be 
brought into being save at tremendous cost of money, energy 
and time. 

Not in a day, not without tremendous eflfort, can the old 
ideas that, from time immemorial have obsessed the minds of 
men, be displaced. Not without campaigns of education, not 
until the great ideas of the majesty and supremacy of law, for 
nations as well as for individuals, shall be more fully recognized, 
not until righteousness shall be more fully enthroned in the 
minds of men, not until the great maxim of "equal justice to 
all, to rich and poor alike, to the strong and to the feeble — 'the 
square deal for every man' " — shall have taken deeper root in 
the life of the nations of the world, will nations do what in- 
dividuals refuse to do, namely, submit to law, whether national 
or international. 

(The World Court. July 1916.) 

[§133] THE FAILURE OF PACIFISM. 

By Robert Goldsmith. 

The failure of pacifism — for it can hardly be denied that 
pacifism has failed — clears the ground and makes room for 
saner and more practical efforts. There is no denying the fact 
that a good deal of pacifist sentiment was hardly distinguishable 
from mild-mannered sentimentality. The disciples of this school 
were unquestionably sincere enough and perhaps were rigorously 
logical, but they refused to look the facts of life in the face and 



118 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

to deal with men and nations as they actually are. They were 
naive. Their plans were visionary and their schemes chimerical. 
"The peace movement," writes Ellen Key in her most recent 
book, "that has only appealed to the emotions has never put the 
axe to the root of the problem. ... So long as it was only 
a proclamation of Christian humanitarianism, it never built on a 
foundation of reality." These pacifists too often thought of 
countries and statesmen in the abstract, gave free rein to their 
imaginations, and dreamed of a day when blessed peace would 
cover the earth as the waters cover the sea. Their ignorance 
of real politik was both profound and comprehensive. 
They evidenced but little genius for practicality, and dogmati- 
cally refused to compromise. Like Brand in Ibsen's drama, 
they could have "all or nothing," and because they could not 
have all, they were perforce obliged to take nothing, or, what 
is infinitely worse — war. Maybe the time will come, in the far 
future when human nature will not merely acknowledge the 
wrong and waste and folly of war, but will go ahead and actu- 
ally forge its swords into plough-shares, remodel its ships into 
schools and transform its arsenals into factories that produce 
the goods the people need. But that time has not yet come, and 
we shall gain nothing but disappointment by deluding ourselves 
with fantastic visions. It can hardly help to speculate on when, 
if ever, this desired day will dawn. 

Because pacifism has failed in its endeavor to prevent war, it 
must now, willingly or involuntarily, make way for statesman- 
ship, for a new kind of statesmanship. The pressing task now 
is to make statesmen out of pacifists and pacifists out of states- 
men. We shall have to quit gazing into the heavens and turn 
our attention to the actual problems that confront men and 
nations in a real world. We shall have to lay aside every weight 
of vain visioning and run with patience the long race. We shall 
have to substitute willing for wishing and cultivate a talent for 
details. We shall have to organize the world for peace and not 
for war. We must be ready to reckon with the facts as they 
are, and with human nature as it is. It will probably be con- 
ceded without discussion that this particular kind of "pacifism," 
this new statesmanship, has not yet had a tryout. Whether or 
not it can succeed in preventing war is still unsettled and uncer- 
tain. We shall know more about that a decade or a century 
hence. 

(/4 League to Enforce Peace, 1917.) 



WORLD-PEACE 



11^ 



[§134] THE TWO PROGRAMS AT A GLANCE. 



The World's Court League. 

Favors a League among na- 
tions to secure : 

L An International Court of 
Justice for all justiciable ques- 
tions not settled by negotiation. 

2. An International Council 
of Conciliation, in addition to 
the Permanent Court of Arbi- 
tration at The Hague. 

3. World Conferences meet- 
ing regularly at shorter inter- 
vals than heretofore : To es- 
tablish the Court and Council; 
to formulate and codify rules 
of international law valid for 
all nations which approve them. 

4. A Permanent Continua- 
tion Committee of the World 
Conferences with such powers 
as the Conferences may grant. 



(The World Court.) 



The League to Enforce 
Peace. 

Favors a League of nations 
to secure : 

1. A Judicial Tribunal for 
all justiciable questions not set- 
tled by negotiation. 

2. An International Council 
of Conciliation. 

3. Conferences of signatory 
powers from time to time : To 
formulate and codify rules of 
international law valid unless 
vetoed by some signatory 
power within a stated period. 

4. Joint use of economic 
forces against a signatory 
power which refuses to submit 
any question to court or coun- 
cil before committing hostili- 
ties; joint use of military 
forces against a signatory 
which actually begins war be- 
fore such submission. 



[§135] DEMAND FOR PEACE ONLY AFTER SUR- 
RENDER OF GERMANY. 

By Franklin H. Giddings. 



There is only one issue out of this war that can bring world 
peace, and that is the surrender of the Central Powers to the 
allied powers — surrender as complete as that of Great Britain to 
the American Colonies; as that of the seceding States through 
General Lee at Appomattox. 

Why? Because (1) Germany has asserted in philosophical 
disquisition and by arms that a people which regards itself su- 
perior in race to other peoples, which assumes that it has a culture 
superior to the culture of other peoples, may impose itself on 
other peoples by force of arms. Do we suppose that there can 
be peace in this world until that idea is sincerely repudiated by 
the people that have advanced it? (2) Because Germany has 
declared, and by arms supported her declaration, that inter- 
national covenants and agreements may be disregarded at the 
convenience of one of the parties thereto, under the plea of 
military necessity. On what grounds can we assume that a 
power which takes and defends such a position could be trusted 
to observe the agreements presumed in a world organization for 
the development of international co-operation and the settlement 



120 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

of international disputes? (3) Because the only guarantee of 
a repudiation of military conquest as a means of territorial ex- 
pansion will be offered when the great powers, including Ger- 
many, actually begin to reduce their armies. Promises won't 
answer. The thing must be done. Can we imagine that Great 
Britain, France and Russia will begin to reduce their armies at 
the end of this war unless Prussian militarism is disavowed by 
Germany herself and her acts match her words, and do we not 
know that from the first it has been the declared purpose of the 
Allies to push this war until Germany stands ready to do that 
very thing? Do we not know that this is what the Allies are 
fighting the war for? Have we not yet grasped the idea that 
England and France stand ready to make peace any day, any 
hour, when they can have assurances (that any sane man can 
trust) that they won't have it all to do over again within at 
least the next two or three generations? Those assurances will 
be given when Germany throws up her hands. No assurance 
short of that pacific gesture will be worth a scrap of paper. 

The issue is one of the most clean-cut, straightforward,- un- 
complicated issues ever presented to a clean-cut, straight-thinking 
intellect. What we have to strive for is peace — peace that will 
stay peace — peace that will be the real thing, and not a pious 
registration of sentiments and good intentions. 

(A''. Y. Times, December 19, 1916.) 

[§135] A FEDERATION OF NATIONS. 
By Lord Northcliffe. 

I have a strong conviction that with peace will come a close 
federation of the nations who are now fighting the grear fight 
for freedom. You have only to look at the spectacle of what I 
might call the United Nations of Great Britain to-day to see 
the effect that the war has upon the co-ordination of peoples 
and nations of widely conflicting temperaments and national 
structures. You see democratic Australia, a near socialistic New 
Zealand, a vast country like India, with its feudal princetains 
and other rulers; a free South Africa, and what is nothing less 
than the Republic of South Africa, all pouring their blood and 
treasure out upon the battlefields of France, linked by a common 
feeling of empire and sustained by a common hope of liberation 
from the militarism that sought to dominate the world. 

A close federation of the nations now fighting the good fight 
will be the only insurance against the autocracy that made this 
war possible and the horrors that the armies of the autocrat per- 
petrated on innocent non-combatants. The world must be made 
free for democracy. 

(New York Times, June 29, 1917. 



WORLD-PEACE 121 

[§137] REMOVAL OF INTERNATIONAL MISTRUST. 
By G. Heymans. 

There is another question we must consider when this war 
will have drawn to a close and Peace sheds its benign influence 
upon the wounds that have been inflicted: how long will it last? 
For how long will the nations of Europe be left in peace, to try 
and restore the havoc of the past few months as best they may? 
How long will it be before our Continent is subjected to another 
such attack of frenzy that will claim fresh victims and alienate 
the nations anew? And above all, for how long, time after 
time, shall we have to ask this question : When shall we, or shall 
we never, see peace unbroken by war? 

It appears to me that in principle at any rate the latter ques- 
tion admits of a feasible answer. A peace which shall outlast 
war will settle down when the mutual mistrust between the 
States has been removed. In that mistrust and in nothing else 
lies the actual menace to peace. Much has been said concerning 
conflicts of interests that can only be solved by the power of 
the sword; if one looks closer, the conflicts appear to be, nearly 
without exception, the outcome of mutual suspicion. What rea- 
son is there for a State to make conquests if not to get more 
defensible frontiers, to increase the army and strengthen its 
finances, and so to be better protected against the dreaded attack 
of a neighbor? Why come forward to the assistance of allies, 
even though the cause be unjust, unless there is a similar obliga- 
tion on the allies to come forward to help in case of need? 
Why desire the possession of harbors and colonies if not from 
the fear that those of other States may be closed? What ob- 
jection can there be to the rapid economic progress of a neigh- 
boring country except that it thereby becomes an increasingly 
dangerous rival? Such is the prevailing situation everywhere. 
If a State had no cause to fear outside attack, or impediments 
to progress, it is difficult to conceive a motive warranting in the 
remotest degree the catastrophes attendant upon war. Experi- 
ence teaches us plainly that the serious conflicts of interest dis- 
appear immediately when several States unite into a federation, 
which excludes mutual attacks and governs the rights which the 
citizens of one State are entitled to in another. Look, for in- 
»tance, at the relations existing in the federations of Germany, 
Switzerland and the United States of North America. There 
war has practically ceased to exist. The histories of these fed- 
erated States furnish the empirical confirmation of what has 
already been urged, and an example for the future at the same 
time. Wherever the States have united into a federation they 
have abandoned their mutual mistrust of each other and ceased 
to make war, and it will not be until the civilized nations recog- 
nize federation as the sole means of disbanding mistrust that a 
lasting peace can be secured. 

{To the Citizens of the Belligerent States. Amer. Assoc, for 
International Conciliation, 1915.) 



122 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

[§138] THE TEST OF EVERY PLAN OF PEACE. 
By President Woodrow Wilson. (Aug. 27, 1917.) 

To His Holiness Benedictus XV., Pope: 

In acknowledgment of the communication of your Holiness to 
the belligerent peoples, dated Aug. \, 1917, the President of the 
United States requests me to transmit the 1 allowing reply: 

Every heart that has not been blinded and hardened by this 
terrible war must be touched by this moving appeal of his Holi- 
ness the Pope, must feel the dignity and force of the humane 
and generous motives which prompted it, and must fervently 
wish that we might take the path of peace he so persuasively 
points out. But it would be folly to take it if it does not in 
fact lead to the goal he proposes. Our response must be based 
upon the stern facts, and upon nothing else. It is not a mere 
cessation of arms he desires; it is a stable and enduring peace. 
This agony must not be gone through with again, and it must 
be a matter of very sober judgment what will insure us against 
it. 

His Holiness in substance proposes that we return to the status 
quo ante-bellum and that then there be a general condonation, 
disarmament, and a concert of nations based upon an acceptance 
of the principle of arbitration; that by a similar concert freedom 
of the seas be established; and that the territorial claims of 
France and Italy, the perplexing problems of the Balkan States, 
and the restitution of Poland be left to such conciliatory adjust- 
ments as may be possible in the new temper of such a peace, 
due regard being paid to the aspirations of the peoples whose 
political fortunes and affiliations will be involved. 

It is manifest that no part of this program can be successfully 
carried out unless the restitution of the status quo ante furnishes 
a firm and satisfactory basis for it. The object of this war is 
to deliver the free peoples of the world from the menace and 
the actual power of a vast military establishment, controlled 
by an irresponsible Government, which, having secretly planned 
to dominate the world, proceeded to carry the plan out without 
regard either to the sacred obligations of treaty or the long- 
established practices and long-cherished principles of international 
action and honor ; which chose its own time for the war ; de- 
livered its blow fiercely and suddenly; stopped at no barrier, 
either of law or of mercy; swept a whole continent v/ithin the 
tide of blood— not the blood of soldiers only, but the blood of 
innocent women and children also, and of the helpless poor; and 
now stands balked, but not defeated, the enemy of four-fifths 
of the world. 

This power is not the German people. It is the ruthless mas- 
ter of the German people. It is no business of ours how that 
great people came under its control or submitted with temporary 
zest to the domination of its purpose; but it is our business to 
see to it that the history of the rest of the world is no longer 
left to its handling. 

To deal with such a power by way of peace upon the plan 



WORLD-PEACE 123 

proposed by his Holiness the Pope would, so far as we can sec, 
involve a recuperation of its strength and a renewal of its policy; 
would make it necessary to create a permanent hostile combina- 
tion of nations against the German people, who are its instru- 
ments ; and would result in abandoning the new-born Russia to 
the intrigue, the manifold subtle interference and the certain 
counter-revolution which would be attempted by all the malign 
influences to which the German Government has of late accus- 
tomed the world. 

Can peace be based upon a restitution of its power or upo^n 
any word of honor it could pledge in a treaty of settlement and 
accommodation? 

Responsible statesmen must now everywhere see, if they never 
saw before, that no peace can rest securely upon political or 
economic restrictions meant to benefit some nations and cripple 
or embarrass others, upon vindictive action of any sort, or any 
kind of revenge or deliberate injury. The American people 
have suffered intolerable wrongs at the hands of the Imperial 
German Government, but they desire no reprisal upon the Ger- 
man people, who have themselves suffered all things in this war, 
which they did not choose. They believe that peace should rest 
upon the rights of peoples, not the rights of Governments — the 
rights of peoples, great or small, weak or powerful — their equal 
right to freedom and security and self-government and to a par- 
ticipation upon fair terms in the economic opportunities of the 
world, the German people, of course, included, if they will 
accept equality and not seek domination. 

The test, therefore, of every plan of peace is this : Is it based 
upon the faith of all the peoples involved, or merely upon the 
word of an ambitious and intriguing Government, on the one 
hand, and of a group of free peoples, on the other? This is a 
test which goes to the root of the matter; and it is the test which 
must be applied. 

The purposes of the United States in this war are known to 
the whole world — to every people to whom the truth has been 
permitted to come. They do not need to be stated again. We 
seek no material advantage of any kind. We believe that the 
intolerable wrongs done in this war by the furious and brutal 
power of the Imperial German Government ought to be repaired, 
but not at the expense of the sovereignty of any people — rather 
a vindication of the sovereignty both of those that are weak and 
of those that are strong. Punitive damages, the dismemberment 
of empires, the establishment of selfish and exclusive economic 
leagues, we deem inexpedient, and in the end worse than futile, 
no proper basis for a peace of any kind, least of all for an en- 
during peace. That must be based upon justice and fairneso and 
the common rights of mankind. 

We cannot take the word of the present rulers of Germany 
as a guarantee of anything that is to endure unless explicitly 
supported by such conclusive evidence of the will and purpose 
of the German people themselves as the other peoples of the 
world would be justified in accepting. Without such guarantees 
treaties of settlement, agreements for disarmament, covenants to 



124 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

set up arbitration in the place of force, territorial adjusments, 
reconstitutions of small nations, if made with the German Gov- 
ernment, no man, no nation, could now depend on. 

We must await some new evidence of the purposes of the 
great peoples of the Central Powers. God grant it may be given 
soon and in a way to restore the confidence of all peoples every- 
where in the faith of nations and the possibility of a covenanted 
peace. 

(From the Department of State.) 



[§139] A MESSAGE TO AMERICA. 
By Remain RoUand 

My faith is great in the high destinies of America. And it is 
clear to me that the events of today make more urgent than 
before that these be realized. On our old Continent, civilization 
is menaced. It becomes America's solemn duty to uphold the 
wavering torch. 

You have great advantages over the European nations. You 
are free of traditions. You are free of that vast load of thought, 
of sentiment, of secular obsession under which the Old World 
groans. The intellectual fixed ideas, the dogmas of politics and 
art that grip us, are unknown to you. You may go forward, 
unhampered, to your future; while we, in Europe, sacrifice ours, 
daily, to quarrels and rancors and ambitions that should be 
dead. Europe has found no better channel for its genius than 
to revive these quarrels; to submit, over and again, to the tyran- 
nies that they impose. And each time that Europe attempts to 
solve them, it succeeds merely in strengthening the web that 
binds it. Where it should strike clear of its shackles, it forges 
still more iron meshes. Like the Atrides, it works out its trag- 
edy under a curse. And like them, again, it prays for its release 
in vain, to some indifferent god. 

In conclusion, writers and thinkers of America, we expect of 
you two things. We ask that you defend the cause of Liberty; 
that you defend its conquests ; and that you increase them. And 
by Liberty I mean both political and intellectual liberty. I mean 
the incessant rebirth and replenishment of life that it enfolds. 
I mean the wide River of Spirit that never stagnates, but flows 
on forever. 

Also, we ask that you so master your lives as to give to the 
world a new ideal for lack of which it bleeds — an ideal, not of 
section and tradition, but of Harmony. You must harmonize 
all of the dreams and liberties and thoughts brought to your 
shores by all your peoples. You must make of your culture a 
symphony that shall in a true way express your brotherhood of 
individuals, of races, of cultures banded together. You must 
make real the dream of an integrated entire humanity. 

You are fortunate. Your life is young and abundant. Your 
land is vast and free for the discovery of your works. You are 
at the beginning of your journey, at the dawn of your day. 



WORLD-PEACE 125 

There is in you no weariness of the Yesterdays; no clutterings 
of the Past. . . . 

Behind you, alone, the elemental Voice of a great pioneer, in 
whose message you may well find an almost legendary omen of 
your task to come — your Homer: Walt Whitman. 

Surge et Age [Rise and Act]. 

{The Seven Arts, 1917.) 



[§140] C— SPECIAL REFERENCES. 
Books. 

Bourne, Randolph, (Ed.). Towards an Enduring Peace. 
(N. Y., Am. Soc. for Int. Conciliation, 1916.) 

Brailsford, Henry N. A League of Nations. (N. Y., 
Macmillan, 1917.) 

Buxton, Charles R., (Ed.). Towards a Lasting Settle- 
ment. By G. L. Dickinson, C. R. Buxton and others. 
(N. Y., Macmillan, 1917.) 

Collin, Christen. The War Against War. (N. Y., Mac- 
millan, 1917.) 

Eliot, Charles W. The Road to Peace. (Bost., Hough- 
ton, 1915.) 

Fried, Alfred Herrmann. The Restoration of Europe. 
Trans, from the German by L. S. Gannett. (N. Y., 
Macmillan, 1916.) 

Fayle, C. Ernest. The Great Settlement. With Maps. 
(N. Y., Duffield, 1915.) 

Hobson, John A. Towards International Government. 
(N. Y.. Macmillan. 1915.) 

Goldsmith, Robert. A League to Enforce Peace. (N. Y., 
Macmillan, 1917.) (By the Secretary of the American 
League to Enforce Peace.) 

Muir, Ramsay. Nationalism and Internationalism. (Bost., 
Houghton. 1917.) 

Veblen, Thorstein. The Nature of Peace. (N. Y., Mac- 
millan, 1917.) 

[§128] Articles. 

Cadwalader, John, Jr. "The Best Way to Enforce Peace." 
N. Y. Times Current History (June, 1916). 

Cosmos [Pseud.]. "The Basis of Durable Peace." New 
York Times (Nov. 20-Dec. 18, 1916.) 

Croly, Herbert. "The Structure of Peace." New Repub- 
lic (Jan. 13, 1917). 

Dickinson, W. H. "War and After." Contemporary Rev. 
(Sept., 1914). 

Lowell, A. Lawrence. "A League to Enforce Peace." 
Atlantic (Sept., 1915). 

Marburg, Theodore. "The League to Enforce Peace — A 



126 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

Reply to Its Critics.' Am. Acad, of Pol. and Soc. Sci., 
Annals (July, 1917.) 

Moore, John B. "The Peace Problem" in North Am. Re- 
view, Vol. 204, pp. 74-89 (July, 1916). 

New York Times Current History. See I.X, Index, p. ix ; 
X, Index, p. viii. 

Simons, L. "Neutrals and a Permanent Peace." Atlantic 
(Aug., 1917). 



WORLD-PEACE 



127 



EXPANSION OF GERMAN DOMINION. 

GERMAN EMPIRE AFTER THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR 



Prussia 1872 
CoDirolled hy 




O.S.B.ftCa,N.T. 



GERMAN DOMINION 1917 



Frnssia 1916 

Controlled by 

PMssia 




128 HANDBOOK OF THE WAR 

MEMORANDA 



THE NATIONAL SECURITY LEAGUE 

(19 WEST 44th STREET, NEW YORK CITY) 



is a non-political, non-partisan league of American men and 
women who are DOING EFFECTIVE WORK IN PROMOT- 
ING PATRIOTIC EDUCATION AND UNIVERSAL MIUTARY 
TRAINING AND SERVICE. 



Honorary President— 'Euinv Root, New York. 

[Note — Mr. Choate occupied the position of Honorary President from the 
date of the organization of the League until his death, May 14, ISllT.] 

Honorary Vice-President — Alton B. Parker, New York. 

Presidents. Stanwood Menken, New York. 

Vice-Presidents — George Wharton Pepper, Philadelphia. 

George von L. Meyer, Boston. 

WiLLET M, Spooner, Milwaukee. 

Luke E. Wright, Memphis. 

Franklin Q. Brown, New York. 
Secretary — Herbert Barry, New York. 
Treasurer— Eav^Assi H. Clark, New York. 
Chairman, Board of Directors — Charles E. Lydecker, New York. 
Chairman, Finance* Committee — Alex. J. Hemphill, New York. 
Executive Secretary— Henky L. West, New York. 

The National Security League is supported by 
small contributions of the public. It is not 
endowed and finds that the work of raising 
sufficient funds for the distribution of its litera- 
ture is a matter of most serious difficulty. 

All those who believe in forwarding its work 
are earnestly urged to support it and aid in 
securing new members. 



Mar 



^L. 



^^ 1918 

S£«v/C£ 



